Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf

The army and the death squads were not the only actors engaged in political violence,
there was also the development of the Civilian Defense Patrols (PACs) by General Montt in the
1980s. The PACs were composed of civilians, former army, or death squad members. In rural
villages any “able-bodied man between the ages of 15 and 60” was forced to serve in the PACs;
although, it was common to have children ages 10-11 serve in the PACs (Black, 1984, 139). In
1982 the military claimed to have recruited 40,000 individuals to serve in the PACs (Black, 1984,
139). Twice weekly service in the PACs was rewarded with food, not monetary compensation
and refusal to participate would label the offender a guerrilla. Those PAC members needing to
migrate for work were required to receive permission from the army to leave for seasonal
employment. Civilian members of the PACs were not trusted by the military; as a result they
patrolled with wooden clubs and machetes instead of guns. As described below in the violence
section, members of PACs were often instructed to kill any persons encountered on patrols,
whether family or fried, since these people were considered guerrillas and subversives.
The counterinsurgency progressed through a variety of incarnations, beginning with the
rural militias in the 1950s, to the paramilitary death squads of the 1960s through the 1980s, to the
formation of the PACs in the early 1980s, and back again to the formation of armed militias in the
early 1990s. In the 1990s local bosses or landowners created armed patrols to restrict the return
of migrants and refugees from their communities of origin. In 1993 a regional militia called
ARAP-KSI frequently used “death threats, assaults, and hostage taking to intimidate Guatemalans
and international officials involved in the repatriations” (Human Rights Watch, 1990, 186).
Human rights violations committed by ARAP-KSI did not result in arrests or prosecution despite
the abundance of evidence in support of the complaints. By the 1990s there had also been a
change in the offices controlling the counterinsurgency efforts. Previously counterinsurgency
was orchestrated out of the official defense department, in the 1990s the duties had shifted to the
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