Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf
Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf
Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf
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military-civilian contractors working on the project caused the dam project to overrun estimated<br />
costs by millions of dollars. President Cerezo maintained the development poles and the use of<br />
PACs to keep the rural populace repressed during his administration.<br />
There were other strategies attempted by President Cerezo, he transferred the IIC to<br />
civilian control and in 1988 he promoted the National Reorganization Plan. This plan called for<br />
an increase in taxes on commercial and industrial energy use by 40% and an increase in the<br />
minimum wage. The introduction of the National Reorganization Plan led to a coup attempt of<br />
President Cerezo in May of 1988. The business community refused to acquiesce to these types of<br />
reforms. President Cerezo’s response to the coup attempt was to reprioritizes funds meant for<br />
“modernization projects” to the counterinsurgency efforts (REMHI, 1999, 258). Additionally, the<br />
administration’s discretionary funds were then channeled into purchasing military equipment<br />
during the late 1980s.<br />
At the end of President Cerezo’s term Guatemala’s economy was a jumble of growth,<br />
decline, promising starts and corresponding setbacks. There was a slight increase in total exports,<br />
mostly due to growth in sugar, cattle, and textile industries. Coffee prices had dropped<br />
considerably in 1990, but then the government devalues the quetzal giving the coffee exporters a<br />
chance to recuperate their profits. However, in 1990 “70% of the coffee farms produce less than<br />
14% of the coffee, while 4% of the farms produce 68% of the total,” the devaluing of the quetzal<br />
was a benefit felt mostly by the elite owned coffee plantations (Central America Report, 1990,<br />
293). The devaluing of the quetzal impacted small farmers and peasants by making the purchase<br />
of necessary light equipment and food stuffs that was imported more expensive. The United<br />
States continued to purchase approximately 30% of all Guatemalan exports and supplies 38% of<br />
all of Guatemala’s imports (SALA, v. 35, 777-778). However, while the percentage of exports<br />
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