Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf

sheltered from having to justify the numbers of undocumented immigrants actually residing
within the state. Kossoudji (1992) would agree with the underlying theme of the Davila et al
(1999) arguments; she contends that strategic temporal and monetary shortcuts taken by INS
post-apprehension may actually increase the long-term costs to immigration enforcement, and
may possibly increase the quantity of immigration and length of stay. By returning immigrants
directly across the United States-Mexico border, instead of returning them to their point of origin
within the sending state, the INS inadvertently increases the number of attempts to cross the
border. As a result, the INS acts more as a “spigot” than a barricade (Kossoudiji, 1992, 162).
There are several arguments that increased enforcement does not necessarily lead to decreased
immigration (Kossoudiji 1992; Donato et al 1992; Djajic 1999). The results from Kossoudiji’s
(1992) study indicate that increased enforcement and increased apprehensions by INS lead to
longer stays by undocumented immigrants with less movement across the border, but do not
necessarily lead to decreased immigration. Donato et al (1992) find similar results, despite
increased resources (funding and personnel) and increased apprehension rates, the INS was not
able to decrease the number of immigrants successfully crossing the border. The findings of the
Donato et al (1992) study seem to show that as more resources are dedicated to enforcement,
more apprehensions do take place, but so do more attempts to cross the border, thus negating the
increased resources and apprehensions by the receiving state. Djajić (1999) presents similar
outcomes from increased enforcement of immigration policies along the borders in receiving
states. He argues that as enforcement is increased in geographic areas (border areas) and in
certain types of employment (agricultural jobs, construction jobs) migrants then spread out into
new geographic areas and new sectors of the economy where they will be less likely to be
detected by the enforcement mechanisms employed by the state. Once settled the migrants will
form migrant networks from their newly employed physical locations, as a consequence drawing
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