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Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf

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The predicted patterns of economic development, violence and migration are not always clearly<br />

distinguished. In Hamilton and Chinchilla’s (1991) previous study the framework was very<br />

generally applied to each of the states in Central America, with El Salvador as the case study.<br />

Hamilton and Chinchilla (1991) claimed to have clearly linked capital penetration (economic<br />

development), the reaction of the state(s), and intra and interstate migration. They provided<br />

evidence that in states where capital penetration was accompanied by land reform and social<br />

spending (soothing effects) state violence and total migration was lower (Costa Rica); in states<br />

where capital penetration was accompanied by land concentration and repression of labor<br />

(aggravating effects), state violence and total migration was higher (El Salvador). In some<br />

instances the Guatemalan case study mimics the Salvadoran case study; both states often chose to<br />

antagonize or accelerate the negative aspects of economic development by (violently) facilitating<br />

land concentration, offering subsidies to large plantation owners, (violently) repressing labor and<br />

community organizing, and both states subsequently experience increasing levels of total<br />

migration. However, there were an equal number of times when the pattern did not appear to<br />

emerge as obviously in Guatemala. During certain administrations, General Ydígoras, General<br />

Peralta, and General Arana, the expected patterns were visible only for a short time period.<br />

During these periods there was often economic development, a high level of state violence, and a<br />

decrease in total migration. In each of these instances total migration was decreasing, but the<br />

overall levels of total migration remained significantly higher than in other periods.<br />

An ability to predict the duration and magnitude of the effects of state sponsored violence<br />

on total migration is lacking in the framework. Since the framework does not seem to predict<br />

duration or magnitude there are several instances where the pattern appears not to exist; yet,<br />

intuitively it seems entirely plausible that the effects of intense political violence were still<br />

driving total migration even though the total number of violent acts being committed had dropped<br />

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