Complete Thesis_double spaced abstract.pdf

governments have been given with the consent of the state, for purposes and goals previously
established by the state (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2002, 177).
The economics and effects of enforcement is the last sub-topic within the immigration
enforcement literature. The questions addressed by this literature center on three types of
inquiries: (1) the amount and type of resources dedicated to immigration enforcement, (2) the
effects of successful and unsuccessful immigration enforcement for the domestic populations and
for immigrant populations attempting entry, and (3) the effect of increased enforcement on the
level of immigration. In response to the first and second line of inquiry, the agencies charged
with the task of regulating and enforcing immigration policies, such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the United
States, do not have access to unlimited budgets or personnel. As a result, agencies make strategic
decisions regarding the enforcement of immigration policies, which have effects on domestic and
immigrant populations. One of the most significant effects of this strategic funding is the location
of immigration enforcement. While Davila et al (1999) argue that interior enforcement and
border enforcement are both important aspects to immigration control, very often the agencies in
charge of enforcing immigration policies favor spending their finite resources on border
enforcement over interior enforcement. 5
Davila et al (1999) argue that interior enforcement, or
employer based enforcement, would have a greater value toward decreasing unwanted
immigration since it would drive down the availability of employment. Furthermore, Davila et al
(1999) posit that the INS spends a disproportionate amount of income on border control since this
type of activity produces verifiable results: apprehensions. Since there is no established formula
that can reliably predict the number of undocumented immigrants the agency (INS, ICE) is
5 Alberto Davila, Jose A. Pagan, and Montserrat Viladrich Grau, “Immigration Reform, the INS, and the
Distribution of Interior and Border Enforcement Resources,” Public Choice 99, no. 3-4 (1999): 329. The
amount spent on enforcing immigration control policies in the United States doubled from 1985 to 1995,
from US$500 million to over one billion dollars.
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