New Imperialists : Ideologies of Empire

146 The New Imperialists
have a profound effect on the course of events. 26 Accordingly, Thucydides’
strong support for the virtue of moderation – a Delphic maxim at
the core of ancient culture – is read as a form of prudential understanding
grounded in his astute reading of history. Not only is
Thucydides’ support for the virtue of moderation purely pragmatic in
character, but Strauss stressed that Thucydides also balances his fondness
for Sparta with support for Athenian daring and determination. States
face natural limits in international relations imposed by the “logic” of
international life, and this encourages moderation; but states are also
given to expand and test their limits in the manner of Athens. Thucydides
admires both Athens and Sparta. But while Thucydides’ admiration
for the moderation of Sparta leaps off the pages of the text, his support
for Athens, we learn, is conveyed “only between the lines of his work.” 27
For our purposes these observations are less important for the fact that
they infuse the schematic Straussian hermeneutic regarding exo/esotericism
with dogmatism, and rather more important for the fact that they
permit us to underscore the Straussian claim that Thucydidean virtues,
namely his open embrace of Spartan moderation and his altogether
unwritten praise of Athenian daring, are grounded exclusively in
immanence.
Straussian thought repudiates the idea that there are transcendent
aspects to Thucydides’ manner of thinking. The standards of political
history can only be political and historical; the Straussian contention is
that the very core of political history rests on the conviction that international
life is impervious to transcendent measure, and that no such
moments ever appear in the History. Indeed, the wisdom of the philosopher
easily runs the risk of being inferior to the wisdom of the political
historian in so far as the former is naïve to one’s own historical irrelevance.
Strauss held that “philosophy,” for Thucydides, “has no point of
entrance into political life. . . . The Peloponnesian War . . . is wholly
independent of philosophy.” 28 To underscore this aspect of political
history, Strauss contends that Plato believed that philosophy could shape
political life directly, and accordingly we are told that his judgement of
political life is more severe. But, in stark contrast, Thucydides harboured
no such beliefs, and his judgement of politics is correspondingly muted
or tempered. There were things about the Peloponnesian war that
Thucydides may have disliked, like the Athenian demagogue Cleon, and
things he admired, like Spartan moderation, but he did not shrink from