New Imperialists : Ideologies of Empire
New Imperialists : Ideologies of Empire
New Imperialists : Ideologies of Empire
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AL-AZMEH: After the Fact 37<br />
values, and eager to distinguish Europe from America. 31 The model on<br />
<strong>of</strong>fer is clearly at variance with Arab and European notions, traditions,<br />
and experiences <strong>of</strong> democracy, in short <strong>of</strong> democratic “values” outside<br />
America, more attuned to citizenship than to the communalization <strong>of</strong><br />
individuals, though this is not absent, and more inspired by models<br />
<strong>of</strong> French republicanism than the federalist communalism <strong>of</strong> communities<br />
<strong>of</strong> birth and pressure groups. This notion, now being <strong>of</strong>fered as<br />
exemplary, was reflected in the communalist composition <strong>of</strong> the Iraqi<br />
Provisional Ruling Council (P.R.C.) set up by Paul Bremer and<br />
which, according to a benign reading <strong>of</strong> the American multiculturalist<br />
Shangri-La, fosters diversity, equality, and so forth. The P.R.C. was composed<br />
as an oligarchy <strong>of</strong> communal – sectarian and ethnic – worthies, in<br />
the most part long-resident abroad, who find their party-political affiliations<br />
smothered by their affiliations <strong>of</strong> blood. Thus the surreal spectacle<br />
<strong>of</strong> a communist figuring on the Council as a Shiite, or a secular liberal<br />
figuring as a Sunni, and so forth, as if the country were being politically<br />
and socially engineered along a model <strong>of</strong> internal fragmentation which<br />
will lead, at best, to a cold civil peace, at worst to civil war, in the image <strong>of</strong><br />
Balkanization or Lebanization, which is clearly not a formula appropriate<br />
for nation-building. This holds true despite Bremer’s praise – fanciful,<br />
implausible, but most unfortunately probably genuine – for the Lebanese<br />
model, clearly heedless <strong>of</strong> Tocqueville’s preference for a power “so constituted<br />
as to represent the majority without necessarily being a slave <strong>of</strong> its<br />
passions.” 32 The electoral arrangements in 2005 and the resulting transitional<br />
government were based on similar principles. As one U.N.<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial commented after the election, “The election was not an election<br />
but a referendum on ethnic and religious identity. For the Kurds, voting<br />
was about self-determination. For the Shiites, voting was about a fatwa<br />
issued by Sistani.” 33 More real an indicator <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> such<br />
communalization is the spectacle <strong>of</strong> mobile telephone contracts for Iraq<br />
having been awarded by the occupation authority to three separate<br />
companies, not competing with each other but rather each covering the<br />
territory <strong>of</strong> a potentially independent political entity.<br />
There is no denying the diverse composition <strong>of</strong> Iraq, as <strong>of</strong> any other<br />
country, nor the fact, now harnessed to its own purposes by U.S. policy,<br />
that in his last years Saddam Hussein did encourage the retribalization<br />
<strong>of</strong> politics, starting with his own community <strong>of</strong> blood, his sons, and<br />
maternal cousins. It is worth reminding you here that sectarianism – the