New Imperialists : Ideologies of Empire

y destroying convention (nomos) and undermining the basis for deliberation
and thoughtfulness. 66 And such developments can have a profound
effect on the character of international life, suggesting that Thucydides
accepted that there is a certain seamlessness of life within the polis and life
between the poleis. 67 If there is a fluidity to our humanity there is bound
to be a certain fluidity to the character of international life – and it is
correspondingly impossible to assert on behalf of the historian that all
relations between states have a Realist flavour. The History tells us that
international life was bellicose in the fifth century precisely because the
Hellenes could not reign in their natural selves in a manner true to
human beingness. The History tells us that the Athenian thesis is a pathological
expression of a troubled polis. Things could have been, and should
have been, much more irenic; a better-ordered world is bound to be a
more peaceful one.
CONCLUSION
WORKMAN: When Might is Right 159
Expressed baldly, writers in the Straussian tradition contend that empire
is a natural outgrowth of the “logic” of international life as conditioned
by our “natures.” The ancient historian Thucydides, they claim, prefigures
their own thinking about the inevitability of empire. It can be
said that the Straussian reading of Thucydides’ History is indistinguishable
from their understanding of “small-h” history. All history can
be traced back to an essential human nature. This human nature consists
of ineluctable drives – fear, greed, and honour – that shape the character
of international life and, indeed, of all history. Although we concern
ourselves with justice in the affairs of nations, we ultimately recognize
that considerations of power dominate international life. In the end,
states seek power and power – the Athenian thesis as captured bluntly in
the Melian dialogue – expresses a very simple truth about the causes of
war and empire. Hence, like Thucydides, we should not judge war and
empire too harshly, for this amounts to turning our backs on our basic
natures, a denial of the all-too-human truths that condition the character
of international life.
We have argued here that Thucydides cannot be appropriated on
behalf of the Straussian intellectual project, for the Athenian historian
generated a sobering indictment of the Peloponnesian war and its
excesses. Nevertheless, the Straussian claims about empire elevate a