The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER III. 10
the League of Nations declares that the Plan has or has not been carried out, it may be said {7} that the
Protocol is only provisionally in force; it is subject to avoidance.
The question here arises as to what is meant by the language of the Protocol when it speaks of the Plan for the
Reduction of Armaments being "carried out," or, in the French text, "execute." This is a question rather
difficult of answer. Certainly the expression can hardly refer to the actual physical carrying out of such a Plan;
for that might require a very long period. It seems to me that the expression envisages the formalities requisite
for such a Plan. The Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which is to draw up a Plan for such
reduction is to draw up, in other words, a Treaty or Treaties between the parties to bring about such reduction.
Such Treaty, or such Treaties, will of course be voluntary agreements and will of course require ratification
subsequent to the holding of the Conference itself. Accordingly, it is my view that the "carrying out" of the
Plan for the Reduction of Armaments adopted by the Conference means in the Protocol the ratification of such
Plan, that is to say, the transformation of the Plan into a binding agreement. Of course, the precise terms as to
ratification, the number of ratifications required, the time of the deposit of ratifications and all such other
formalities are for the Conference to decide; the reference here, however, is to those provisions as they may be
drafted.
Accordingly, the "grounds" to be laid down by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, on which it
may be declared by the Council that the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments has not been carried out, will
mean, I take it, the laying down of some requirement that the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments be
formally ratified within a time stated by a certain number of States, including certain named States; in default
whereof, the Council may and will declare the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments not to have been carried
out.
It is to be observed that the Protocol in the last paragraph of Article 21 speaks of the possibility of a Signatory
failing to "comply" with the reduction of armaments Plan "after the expiration of the period fixed by the
Conference."
{8}
This refers, I think, to a failure by a particular Signatory to ratify the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments,
the effect being, so far as Article 21 is concerned, that such Signatory would be bound by the terms of the
Protocol but could not benefit by them.
The language of this last paragraph of Article 21 is, however, broad enough to include the case of a State
which had ratified the Treaty containing the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments and had then failed to carry
out its agreement regarding such reduction.
It will thus be seen that the Protocol of Geneva is wholly dependent upon the success of the Conference for
the Reduction of Armaments; and the success of that Conference depends wholly upon the voluntary
agreement then made. There is nothing in the Protocol which requires the States represented at the Conference
to agree to any particular plan for the reduction of armaments; the assent which they may give to such plan
must be voluntary.
The question of the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference will be discussed hereafter.[4]
However, there is one point that may be mentioned here. The Plan for the Reduction of Armaments drawn up
by the Conference or, in other words, the Treaty or Treaties drawn up by that Conference, will not be
perpetual in their operation. No plan for disarmament, no treaty regarding reduction of armaments could
possibly be perpetual in its detailed provisions. Not only does this follow from the nature of such an
agreement, but it is explicitly laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant that any such Plan is to be subject to
reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. Accordingly, the Treaty or Treaties for the Reduction of