The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER VII. 31
And it must not be forgotten that it is not only the wicked powers of Europe that have acted along these lines.
In reference {44} to the affairs of other countries, though not its own, the United States has maintained this
privilege of paternal intervention by force. We maintained it, for example, in Cuba in 1898, chiefly on the
ground of the sake of humanity.[20] In connection with the Panama Canal, Mr. Root set up the famous
proposition[21] that the sovereignty of Columbia over the Isthmus was limited and qualified by the general
right of mankind to have a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and to have that canal kept open for the
commerce of all.
Many other instances might be cited. It is, however, worth while to recall in connection with this alleged
limited right of sovereignty of Columbia over part of its territory that the United States subsequently paid
$25,000,000 to the owner of the qualified fee.
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that this alleged right of intervention, as between great powers, was
recognized by another name as a method of changing the status quo, namely, the method of war.
The effect of the Protocol is unquestionably to consecrate the international status quo with a definite position
of legality, not to be disturbed by force.[22] The views of the writers, as opposed to the practice of Great
Powers, have been adopted.
Article 2 of the Protocol forbids a resort to war[23] as against any {45} other State, a party to the Protocol,
"except in case of resistance to acts of aggression."[24]
Under Article 8, every Signatory agrees to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression.
Under these provisions and the provisions of the Protocol for the settlement of international disputes,
intervention to upset the status quo (or to prevent a state from changing it where it legally may) becomes
aggression and is an international crime.
[1] Such as discovery, occupation of terra nullius, etc. See the Treaty of Spitzbergen, A. J. I. L., Vol. XVIII,
p. 109.
[2] A. J. I. L., Vol. XI, at p. 626.
[3] A.J. I. L, Vol. XI, Supp. 1917, p. 53.
[4] Some regions of Asia may be exceptions.
[5] See the Franco-Swiss Free Zones, by Louis Schulthess, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 331, with map.
[6] "Et il faut bien remarquer, que la Guerre ne décide pas la question; la Victoire contraint seulement le
vaincu à donner les mains au Traité qui termine le différend. C'est une erreur non moins absurde que funeste,
de dire, que la Guerre doit décider les Controverses entre ceux qui, comme les Nations, ne reconnoissent point
de Juge." Vattel, Book III, Section 38.
[7] In general, this is the theory of Article Ten of the Covenant.
[8] See the Genesis of the War, Asquith, pp. 97, 98.
[9] Article 15.
[10] President Wilson's so-called first draft of the Covenant contained a provision along these lines in Article
III. See Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Baker, Vol. III, p. 89.