The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER XX. 74
I answer by saying that the solution of these problems is very difficult, because with it are involved feelings of
national fear and haunting doubts of possible national disaster. The feeling of security must be a plant of slow
growth, and progress toward disarmament cannot be realized except to the extent that that growth comes. All
that can be done now is to make a beginning, and, if too much is attempted, less will be accomplished. The
world must rely on the development of the new idea of the reign of law and reach its feeling of security as that
reign succeeds and triumphs.
The Protocol of Geneva is one of the most important of modern international documents. This is true whether
it comes into force as a binding treaty or whether it does not; and it is true because the Protocol represents a
development of international thought since the World War along lines of what may be called international
morality, of what may almost be called international religion, which, while not novel in the realm of thought,
were wholly novel in the diplomatic field of action.
The belief that international law must be strengthened, the thought that it must lay hold of international
questions before the time of war and the idea that the security of a country is to be a security for peace and not
simply a security in war, were the principles upon which the Covenant of the League of Nations was based;
but in that document they were to some extent formulated only as hopes for the future.
These ideas which the Protocol of Geneva seeks to make complete realities have fundamentally become a part
of international life. To my mind, they are certain to be carried out in some document in the near future and
one of their incidents will be the realization of schemes for the reduction of armament as an incident of the
development of the feeling which exists as to security.
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The Protocol of Geneva will undoubtedly be much changed as a result of the consideration which is now
being given to it by the various important governments of the world.[3] In various respects the Protocol goes
farther than cautious public sentiment of countries like Great Britain and her Dominions is, or ought to be,
willing now to proceed; but it is these very matters which can easily be changed and which will be changed.
The Conference on Disarmament and its result are the cornerstones on which the Protocol of Geneva rests.
That Conference must be held and it must have a result; the public sentiment of the world demands it; and the
satisfaction of that demand involves the adoption by the Members of the League of the Protocol of Geneva,
not the document as it now is, but as it will be.
[1] See Annex G, p. 271.
[2] Supra, p. 84.
[3] Since this monograph was written, I have received the text of the Report of the British Delegates regarding
the Protocol of Geneva (Miscellaneous No. 21, 1924, Cmd. 2289). It is reprinted as Annex E, page 217. It is a
most valuable and interesting document. I have carefully considered its conclusions, some of which are not
the same as my own, and despite my very high regard for its authors, I see no reason to change anything that I
have written.
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ANNEXES.
PAGE
A. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS .......................... 117