04.08.2013 Views

The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

CHAPTER XX. 123<br />

(b) <strong>The</strong> elimination of the case in which all parties would be practically free to abstain from any action. <strong>The</strong><br />

introduction of a system of arbitration and of provisional measures which permits of the determination in<br />

every case of the aggressor.<br />

(c) No decision is taken as to the strength of the military, naval and air forces, and no details are given as to<br />

the measures which are to be adopted in a particular case. None the less, objective criteria are supplied which<br />

define the obligation of each signatory; it is bound, in resistance to an act of aggression, to collaborate loyally<br />

and effectively in applying the sanctions in accordance with its geographical situation and its particular<br />

situation as regards armaments.<br />

That is why I said that the great omission in the Covenant has been made good.<br />

{202}<br />

It is true that no burden has been imposed on States beyond the sanctions already provided for in the<br />

Covenant. But, at present, a State seeking to elude the obligations of the Covenant can reckon on two means<br />

of escape:<br />

(1) <strong>The</strong> Council's recommendations need not be followed.<br />

(2) <strong>The</strong> Council may fail to obtain unanimity, making impossible any declaration of aggression, so that no<br />

obligation to apply military sanctions will be imposed and everyone will remain free to act as he chooses.<br />

We have abandoned the above system and both these loopholes are now closed.<br />

Article 11, paragraphs 3 and 4.<br />

Paragraph 3 of Article 11 has been drafted with a view to giving greater precision to certain provisions of<br />

Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. Article 16, paragraph 3, refers to mutual support in the application<br />

of financial and economic measures. Article 11, paragraph 3, of the present <strong>Protocol</strong> establishes real economic<br />

and financial co-operation between a State which has been attacked and the various States which come to its<br />

assistance.<br />

As, under Article 10 of the <strong>Protocol</strong>, it may happen that both States involved in a dispute are declared to be<br />

aggressors, the question arose as to what would be the best method of settling this problem. <strong>The</strong>re were three<br />

alternatives: to apply the principle contained in paragraph 1, which is practically equivalent to making a sort<br />

of police war on both parties--or to leave the matter to pursue its course, or, finally, to compel States which<br />

disturb the peace of the world to desist from acts of war <strong>by</strong> the employment of means less severe than those<br />

indicated in paragraph 1. It is the last method which has been chosen. Only economic measures will be taken<br />

against such States, and naturally they will not be entitled to receive the assistance referred to in Article 11,<br />

paragraph 3.<br />

{203}<br />

Article 12.<br />

Article 16, paragraph 1, of the Covenant provides for the immediate severance of all trade or financial<br />

relations with the aggressor State, and paragraph 3 of the same Article provides, inter alia, for economic and<br />

financial co-operation between the State attacked and the various States coming to its assistance.<br />

As has already been pointed out, these engagements have been confirmed and made more definite in Article<br />

11 of the <strong>Protocol</strong>.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!