The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER XX. 106
expression "resort to force" would be liable to be misunderstood, and also because it emphasises the value of
the sanctions at the disposal of the community of States bound by the Protocol.
4.--COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.
Article 3.
The general principle of the Protocol could not be accepted unless the pacific settlement of all international
disputes without distinction were made possible.
This solution has been found, in the first place, in the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
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According to its Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is, in principle, optional. On the other hand, Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute, offers States the opportunity of making the jurisdiction compulsory in respect of
all or any of the classes of legal disputes affecting: (a) the interpretation of a Treaty; (b) any question of
international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation. States have only to declare their intention through the special Protocol annexed to the Statute. The
undertaking then holds good in respect of any other State which assumes the same obligation. It may be given
either unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other States; either
permanently or for a fixed period.
So far such compulsory jurisdiction has only been accepted by a small number of countries. The majority of
States have abstained because they did not see their way to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in
certain cases falling within one or another of the classes of dispute enumerated above, and because they were
not sure whether, in accepting, they could make reservations to that effect.
It was for this reason that the Assembly in its resolution of September 6th, requested the First Committee to
render more precise the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, in order to facilitate its acceptance.
Careful consideration of the article has shown that it is sufficiently elastic to allow of all kinds of reservations.
Since it is open to the States to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in respect of certain of the classes
of dispute mentioned and not to accept it in respect of the rest, it is also open to them only to accept it in
respect of a portion of one of those classes; rights need not be exercised in their full extent. In giving the
undertaking in question, therefore, States are free to declare that it {171} will not be regarded as operative in
those cases in which they consider it to be inadmissible.
We can imagine possible and therefore legitimate, reservations either in connection with a certain class of
dispute or, generally speaking, in regard to the precise stage at which the dispute may be laid before the Court.
While we cannot here enumerate all the conceivable reservations, it may be worth while to mention merely as
examples those to which we referred in the course of our discussions.
From the class of disputes relating to "the interpretation of a treaty" there may be excluded, for example,
disputes as to the interpretation of certain specified classes of treaty such as political treaties, peace treaties,
etc.
From the class of disputes relating to "any point of international law" there may be excluded, for example,
disputes as to the application of a political treaty, a peace treaty, etc., or as to any specified question or
disputes which might arise as the outcome of hostilities initiated by one of the signatory States in agreement