The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
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CHAPTER XII. 50<br />
sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant were to be applied to any Member of the League which resorted to<br />
war in disregard of certain provisions of the Covenant in Articles 12, 13 and 15, and the difficulty of<br />
determining whether or not, in a given case, a resort to war was a violation of those other Articles of the<br />
Covenant was not solved, particularly as the Covenant does not preclude a resort to war in every case. Under<br />
the <strong>Protocol</strong>, however, every resort to war <strong>by</strong> the parties to it is forbidden (except <strong>by</strong> way of defense or in aid<br />
of defense or perhaps in execution of a judgment of some tribunal), and a procedure which, in theory at least<br />
and probably in practice, would always determine the aggressor, is provided. For if my view is correct, an<br />
"aggressor" is a State which openly and wilfully defies the other Signatories when summoned <strong>by</strong> the Council<br />
under Article 10 of the <strong>Protocol</strong>. Consequently, it is now for the Council, upon the determination of the<br />
aggressor, to call for the application of the sanctions.<br />
Of course, in all cases of a serious decision such as this would be, the Council is not an outside body "calling"<br />
upon Governments to do something. <strong>The</strong> words used lead one almost unconsciously to visualize the Council<br />
as a sort of entity like a Court, laying down a rule of conduct for some one; but this is a false vision; for in any<br />
such case the Council is a group of representatives of Governments agreeing, in the first instance, as such<br />
representatives of their own Governments, upon a course of action to be taken <strong>by</strong> those very Governments<br />
pursuant to a treaty obligation. We must think of any such action <strong>by</strong> the Council as meaning primarily that the<br />
British representative and the French representative, and so on, agree that the respective countries which they<br />
represent will follow a certain course of action in accord. If the Council were composed of all the Members of<br />
the League, it would be proper to describe its action under such a provision as this as being a conference of<br />
the parties to the {75} treaty to decide as to what, if anything, those parties should do, and to come to such<br />
decision unanimously, if any decision is to be reached. It is only as to the Governments which are not<br />
represented on the Council that the Council "calls" for action; so far as the Governments represented on the<br />
Council are concerned, what they do is to agree upon a course of action.<br />
In theory, as I have said, the sanctions of the <strong>Protocol</strong> are no more than a development of those of Article 16<br />
of the Covenant. <strong>The</strong> language of the <strong>Protocol</strong> indeed, in Article 11, incorporates the provisions of Article 16<br />
of the Covenant <strong>by</strong> reference.<br />
No provisions of the Covenant have been more debated since it was written than those of Article 16. In 1921,<br />
various amendments to this Article of the Covenant were proposed, none of which has gone into force; and, as<br />
mentioned above, the Assembly then adopted various interpretative resolutions regarding Article 16 which,<br />
with the proposed amendments (one of which was textually modified in 1924), are provisionally in force.[5]<br />
It is unnecessary to attempt any detailed consideration of the exact legal effect of Article 16 of the Covenant<br />
at the present time in view of these interpretative resolutions and proposed amendments; in general they are<br />
intended to make the system of the economic blockade more flexible in its application so far as may be<br />
consistent with the purpose of the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, namely, to institute a<br />
complete economic and financial boycott of an aggressor.<br />
This first paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant says also that the aggressor shall ipso facto be deemed to<br />
have committed an act of war against the other Members of the League; this provision does not create a state<br />
of war; it simply gives the other Members of the League the right to consider themselves at war with the<br />
aggressor if they see fit; this provision is supplemented <strong>by</strong> the language of Article 10 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> which<br />
gives to any signatory State called upon to apply sanctions the privilege of exercising the rights of a<br />
belligerent, if it chooses.<br />
{76}<br />
Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant made it the duty of the Council to "recommend" to the various<br />
governments what armed forces they should severally contribute for use in protecting the covenants of the<br />
League.