The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER IX. 36 To see how this would work out, let us suppose that in an arbitration between State A and State B, State A obtained an award to the effect that State B should pay to it the sum of twenty million dollars. Thereupon State B refuses to pay the award and, notwithstanding the efforts of the Council, maintains that {52} refusal, thereby violating its agreement in the Protocol (and in the Covenant also) to carry out any such award. Thereupon the Council authorizes State A to use force to collect the money. It is no answer to this to say that the Council would not authorize the use of force, for we are considering what may be done, not what would be done. State A then begins to use force and, if State B resists at all, the entire machinery of the Sanctions of the Protocol can be brought into play and these include military and naval Sanctions. Of course, such a result would be highly improbable, but I submit that it ought to be legally impossible. The provisions of the Protocol in this regard go very much farther than they ought to go, and very much farther, in my opinion, than the States of the world are now willing to go. The case which I have supposed is one of a money judgment. A more difficult case would be one where the award was for the recovery by State A of certain territory in the possession of State B which State B thereupon refused to give up. In such a case there is more to be said for the use of force than in the other. In any case, the refusal of a State to carry out the judicial decision or the arbitral award after solemnly agreeing to do so is a very serious breach of a treaty; but the idea of the authorization of force to execute such a decision seems to me to present a question of the very gravest character. My own view is against it. I am inclined to think that the penalty of expulsion from the League under the fourth paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant should be the utmost permissible. Whether this view of mine be correct or not, certainly the countries of the world are not going to accept any provision by which they will be obligated in advance to join in measures to enforce the result of an arbitration or of a litigation before the Permanent Court. Whether they will agree to a provision permitting the successful party, so to speak, to execute the decision or award on its own account is perhaps doubtful; but certainly they will go no farther, if as far; and this is one of the provisions {53} of the Protocol which will have to be changed before the document becomes a reality. Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the general covenant under Article 2 of the Protocol not to go to war is, in my opinion all inclusive. It obviously includes all cases where there is a dispute of international cognizance, for in such cases all parties agree upon a final and binding method of decision and agree to carry out the decision. It also includes, as pointed out previously,[4] all cases in which one State would seek to change by force the status quo, or to prevent by force a lawful change in the status quo.[5] Neither the lawful maintenance of the status quo nor its lawful change would come within the general exceptions of Article 2. Furthermore, the covenant against war in Article 2 would also exclude the going to war about domestic questions. All that any Signatory agrees to do regarding such a question, if, when raised internationally, it is not settled by negotiation, is to discuss it before the Council or the Assembly.[6] A State which did that would have fulfilled all its obligations regardless of any action or inaction as to the domestic question itself; and an attack made on it by any other State would then be aggression under the terms of the Protocol. There is no exception. As the Report to the Fifth Assembly says,[7] "Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it." This, if lived up to by the Parties, the paper does, as among them. The detailed provisions of Articles 7 to 10 inclusive of the Protocol confirm the views above expressed. The provisions of these Articles will be more specially considered in connection with the question of Aggression.[8] [1] See the discussion on this point, infra, p. 72, et seq.
CHAPTER IX. 37 [2] Annex C, p. 180; see also pp. 168, 169. [3] The word in the French text of the Report is "déclencher." [4] p. 45. [5] An instance of this would be if States A and B agreed on a cession of territory from one to the other, to which State C objected. [6] Under Article 11 of the Covenant. [7] p. 208, infra. [8] p. 54, et seq. {54}
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Page 5 and 6: CHAPTER I. 5 CHAPTER I. THE PROTOCO
Page 7 and 8: CHAPTER II. 7 CHAPTER II. POINTS OF
Page 9 and 10: CHAPTER III. 9 CHAPTER III. THE COM
Page 11 and 12: CHAPTER III. 11 Armaments to be dra
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER IV. 13 Russia will certainl
Page 15 and 16: CHAPTER V. 15 The first point to be
Page 17 and 18: CHAPTER VI. 17 CHAPTER VI. INTERNAT
Page 19 and 20: CHAPTER VI. 19 (a) The interpretati
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER VI. 21 It should be pointed
Page 23 and 24: CHAPTER VII. 23 CHAPTER VII. THE ST
Page 25 and 26: CHAPTER VII. 25 As a preliminary, l
Page 27 and 28: CHAPTER VII. 27 shall not be change
Page 29 and 30: CHAPTER VII. 29 Of course some coun
Page 31 and 32: CHAPTER VII. 31 And it must not be
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER VIII. 33 CHAPTER VIII. DOME
Page 35: CHAPTER IX. 35 CHAPTER IX. COVENANT
Page 39 and 40: CHAPTER X. 39 The view of the Repor
Page 41 and 42: CHAPTER X. 41 Here again, however,
Page 43 and 44: CHAPTER X. 43 [8] September 5, 1924
Page 45 and 46: CHAPTER XI. 45 "If the question is
Page 47 and 48: CHAPTER XI. 47 meaning and result.
Page 49 and 50: CHAPTER XII. 49 CHAPTER XII. SANCTI
Page 51 and 52: CHAPTER XII. 51 Now what Article 11
Page 53 and 54: CHAPTER XII. 53 the mutually suppor
Page 55 and 56: CHAPTER XIII. 55 CHAPTER XIII. SEPA
Page 57 and 58: CHAPTER XIV. 57 [1] September 25, 1
Page 59 and 60: CHAPTER XV. 59 However, the questio
Page 61 and 62: CHAPTER XV. 61 from treaty and cons
Page 63 and 64: CHAPTER XV. 63 unless the United St
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER XVI. 65 We can look back on
Page 67 and 68: CHAPTER XVII. 67 CHAPTER XVII. DEMI
Page 69 and 70: CHAPTER XVIII. 69 CHAPTER XVIII. SE
Page 71 and 72: CHAPTER XX. 71 CHAPTER XX. THE "AME
Page 73 and 74: CHAPTER XX. 73 the growth and devel
Page 75 and 76: CHAPTER XX. 75 B. THE PROTOCOL OF G
Page 77 and 78: CHAPTER XX. 77 represented at the m
Page 79 and 80: CHAPTER XX. 79 diplomacy, they will
Page 81 and 82: CHAPTER XX. 81 Upon such invitation
Page 83 and 84: CHAPTER XX. 83 (f) will endeavour t
Page 85 and 86: CHAPTER XX. 85 Covenant of amendmen
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CHAPTER XX. 87 {137} (b) If within
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CHAPTER XX. 89 l'examen du différe
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CHAPTER XX. 91 For the purposes of
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CHAPTER XX. 93 nature, les ouvertur
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CHAPTER XX. 95 ARTICLE 14. The Coun
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CHAPTER XX. 97 Council shall draw u
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CHAPTER XX. 99 INTRODUCTION. After
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CHAPTER XX. 101 footing. Armaments
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CHAPTER XX. 103 An agreement has be
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CHAPTER XX. 105 signatory States wh
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CHAPTER XX. 107 with the Council or
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CHAPTER XX. 109 (a) Compulsory arbi
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CHAPTER XX. 111 must comply is that
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CHAPTER XX. 113 by the Council. In
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CHAPTER XX. 115 which resorts in an
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CHAPTER XX. 117 themselves decide w
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CHAPTER XX. 119 reduction of armame
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CHAPTER XX. 121 At the time when th
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CHAPTER XX. 123 (b) The elimination
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CHAPTER XX. 125 and published by th
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CHAPTER XX. 127 {209} But this abso
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CHAPTER XX. 129 Welcomes warmly the
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CHAPTER XX. 131 RESOLUTION OF THE C
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CHAPTER XX. 133 2. Certain Governme
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CHAPTER XX. 135 of armaments may re
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CHAPTER XX. 137 18. The above brief
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CHAPTER XX. 139 Justice, had been e
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CHAPTER XX. 141 {235} 41. Article 5
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CHAPTER XX. 143 48. Article 1 was d
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CHAPTER XX. 145 representatives of
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CHAPTER XX. 147 72. The draft of a
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CHAPTER XX. 149 the parties makes p
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CHAPTER XX. 151 financial sanctions
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CHAPTER XX. 153 reduction of armame
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CHAPTER XX. 155 After the work of t
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CHAPTER II. 157 CHAPTER II. ACTS OF
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CHAPTER IV. 159 CHAPTER IV. DECREES
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CHAPTER IV. 161 2. The said Commiss
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CHAPTER IV. 163 by the acceptance o
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CHAPTER IV. 165 [Sidenote: Numbers
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CHAPTER IV. 167 If a Member of the
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CHAPTER IV. 169 effectively in supp
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CHAPTER IV. 171 Page numbers in thi
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CHAPTER IV. 173 must, at no additio
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CHAPTER IV. 175 The Foundation's pr
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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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