The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER III. 10 the League of Nations declares that the Plan has or has not been carried out, it may be said {7} that the Protocol is only provisionally in force; it is subject to avoidance. The question here arises as to what is meant by the language of the Protocol when it speaks of the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments being "carried out," or, in the French text, "execute." This is a question rather difficult of answer. Certainly the expression can hardly refer to the actual physical carrying out of such a Plan; for that might require a very long period. It seems to me that the expression envisages the formalities requisite for such a Plan. The Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which is to draw up a Plan for such reduction is to draw up, in other words, a Treaty or Treaties between the parties to bring about such reduction. Such Treaty, or such Treaties, will of course be voluntary agreements and will of course require ratification subsequent to the holding of the Conference itself. Accordingly, it is my view that the "carrying out" of the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments adopted by the Conference means in the Protocol the ratification of such Plan, that is to say, the transformation of the Plan into a binding agreement. Of course, the precise terms as to ratification, the number of ratifications required, the time of the deposit of ratifications and all such other formalities are for the Conference to decide; the reference here, however, is to those provisions as they may be drafted. Accordingly, the "grounds" to be laid down by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, on which it may be declared by the Council that the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments has not been carried out, will mean, I take it, the laying down of some requirement that the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments be formally ratified within a time stated by a certain number of States, including certain named States; in default whereof, the Council may and will declare the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments not to have been carried out. It is to be observed that the Protocol in the last paragraph of Article 21 speaks of the possibility of a Signatory failing to "comply" with the reduction of armaments Plan "after the expiration of the period fixed by the Conference." {8} This refers, I think, to a failure by a particular Signatory to ratify the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments, the effect being, so far as Article 21 is concerned, that such Signatory would be bound by the terms of the Protocol but could not benefit by them. The language of this last paragraph of Article 21 is, however, broad enough to include the case of a State which had ratified the Treaty containing the Plan for the Reduction of Armaments and had then failed to carry out its agreement regarding such reduction. It will thus be seen that the Protocol of Geneva is wholly dependent upon the success of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments; and the success of that Conference depends wholly upon the voluntary agreement then made. There is nothing in the Protocol which requires the States represented at the Conference to agree to any particular plan for the reduction of armaments; the assent which they may give to such plan must be voluntary. The question of the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference will be discussed hereafter.[4] However, there is one point that may be mentioned here. The Plan for the Reduction of Armaments drawn up by the Conference or, in other words, the Treaty or Treaties drawn up by that Conference, will not be perpetual in their operation. No plan for disarmament, no treaty regarding reduction of armaments could possibly be perpetual in its detailed provisions. Not only does this follow from the nature of such an agreement, but it is explicitly laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant that any such Plan is to be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years. Accordingly, the Treaty or Treaties for the Reduction of
CHAPTER III. 11 Armaments to be drawn up by the Conference will be in this sense temporary, that they will have a fixed limit of time for their operation, precisely as the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament drawn up at the Washington Conference may be terminated in 1936.[5] {9} There is no provision made in the Protocol of Geneva for the withdrawal of any State from its obligations, assuming that those obligations come finally into force. On its face the Protocol is therefore perpetual; but it is not really so. The obligations of the Protocol are so intertwined with the obligations of the Covenant that there is no doubt in my mind that the withdrawal from the League by a Member thereof (when bound by the Protocol) would release that State from the obligations of the Protocol as well as from the obligations of the Covenant. The obligations of the Covenant are terminable by any Member of the League, as to itself, on two years notice. The obligations of the Protocol go much farther than the obligations of the Covenant. The obligations of the Protocol are, by its terms, later to be merged in the Covenant itself, without in any way impairing the withdrawal clause of the latter document. So clearly it is not to be supposed that the obligations of the Protocol of Geneva, as to a Member of the League, are eternal. If the lesser obligations of the Covenant end as to a particular Member of the League upon withdrawal, surely the greater obligations of the Protocol, as to that League Member, end also. The foregoing shows the fallacy, as a matter of logic, of the idea that a non-Member of the League may be bound by the Protocol and yet not be a party to the Covenant; for it would mean that a Signatory might be forever bound to a subsidiary instrument (the Protocol) although the primary instrument (the Covenant) was terminable; but I discuss this more at length later.[6] Furthermore, it should be repeated that the Protocol is intended to be only a temporary document in the sense that, if it comes finally into force, it is contemplated that the Covenant will be amended substantially in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol. [1] Annex D, p. 210 at p. 211, et seq. [2] p. 97, et seq. It is settled that that Conference will be postponed. [3] Article 21. [4] Infra, p. 97, et seq. [5] Article XXIII. See Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Government Printing Office, 1922, p. 1603. [6] p. 10, et seq. {10}
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Page 5 and 6: CHAPTER I. 5 CHAPTER I. THE PROTOCO
Page 7 and 8: CHAPTER II. 7 CHAPTER II. POINTS OF
Page 9: CHAPTER III. 9 CHAPTER III. THE COM
Page 13 and 14: CHAPTER IV. 13 Russia will certainl
Page 15 and 16: CHAPTER V. 15 The first point to be
Page 17 and 18: CHAPTER VI. 17 CHAPTER VI. INTERNAT
Page 19 and 20: CHAPTER VI. 19 (a) The interpretati
Page 21 and 22: CHAPTER VI. 21 It should be pointed
Page 23 and 24: CHAPTER VII. 23 CHAPTER VII. THE ST
Page 25 and 26: CHAPTER VII. 25 As a preliminary, l
Page 27 and 28: CHAPTER VII. 27 shall not be change
Page 29 and 30: CHAPTER VII. 29 Of course some coun
Page 31 and 32: CHAPTER VII. 31 And it must not be
Page 33 and 34: CHAPTER VIII. 33 CHAPTER VIII. DOME
Page 35 and 36: CHAPTER IX. 35 CHAPTER IX. COVENANT
Page 37 and 38: CHAPTER IX. 37 [2] Annex C, p. 180;
Page 39 and 40: CHAPTER X. 39 The view of the Repor
Page 41 and 42: CHAPTER X. 41 Here again, however,
Page 43 and 44: CHAPTER X. 43 [8] September 5, 1924
Page 45 and 46: CHAPTER XI. 45 "If the question is
Page 47 and 48: CHAPTER XI. 47 meaning and result.
Page 49 and 50: CHAPTER XII. 49 CHAPTER XII. SANCTI
Page 51 and 52: CHAPTER XII. 51 Now what Article 11
Page 53 and 54: CHAPTER XII. 53 the mutually suppor
Page 55 and 56: CHAPTER XIII. 55 CHAPTER XIII. SEPA
Page 57 and 58: CHAPTER XIV. 57 [1] September 25, 1
Page 59 and 60: CHAPTER XV. 59 However, the questio
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CHAPTER XV. 61 from treaty and cons
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CHAPTER XV. 63 unless the United St
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CHAPTER XVI. 65 We can look back on
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CHAPTER XVII. 67 CHAPTER XVII. DEMI
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CHAPTER XVIII. 69 CHAPTER XVIII. SE
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CHAPTER XX. 71 CHAPTER XX. THE "AME
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CHAPTER XX. 73 the growth and devel
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CHAPTER XX. 75 B. THE PROTOCOL OF G
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CHAPTER XX. 77 represented at the m
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CHAPTER XX. 79 diplomacy, they will
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CHAPTER XX. 81 Upon such invitation
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CHAPTER XX. 83 (f) will endeavour t
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CHAPTER XX. 85 Covenant of amendmen
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CHAPTER XX. 87 {137} (b) If within
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CHAPTER XX. 89 l'examen du différe
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CHAPTER XX. 91 For the purposes of
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CHAPTER XX. 93 nature, les ouvertur
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CHAPTER XX. 95 ARTICLE 14. The Coun
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CHAPTER XX. 97 Council shall draw u
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CHAPTER XX. 99 INTRODUCTION. After
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CHAPTER XX. 101 footing. Armaments
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CHAPTER XX. 103 An agreement has be
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CHAPTER XX. 105 signatory States wh
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CHAPTER XX. 107 with the Council or
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CHAPTER XX. 109 (a) Compulsory arbi
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CHAPTER XX. 111 must comply is that
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CHAPTER XX. 113 by the Council. In
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CHAPTER XX. 115 which resorts in an
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CHAPTER XX. 117 themselves decide w
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CHAPTER XX. 119 reduction of armame
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CHAPTER XX. 121 At the time when th
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CHAPTER XX. 123 (b) The elimination
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CHAPTER XX. 125 and published by th
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CHAPTER XX. 127 {209} But this abso
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CHAPTER XX. 129 Welcomes warmly the
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CHAPTER XX. 131 RESOLUTION OF THE C
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CHAPTER XX. 133 2. Certain Governme
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CHAPTER XX. 135 of armaments may re
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CHAPTER XX. 137 18. The above brief
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CHAPTER XX. 139 Justice, had been e
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CHAPTER XX. 141 {235} 41. Article 5
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CHAPTER XX. 143 48. Article 1 was d
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CHAPTER XX. 145 representatives of
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CHAPTER XX. 147 72. The draft of a
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CHAPTER XX. 149 the parties makes p
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CHAPTER XX. 151 financial sanctions
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CHAPTER XX. 153 reduction of armame
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CHAPTER XX. 155 After the work of t
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CHAPTER II. 157 CHAPTER II. ACTS OF
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CHAPTER IV. 159 CHAPTER IV. DECREES
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CHAPTER IV. 161 2. The said Commiss
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CHAPTER IV. 163 by the acceptance o
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CHAPTER IV. 165 [Sidenote: Numbers
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CHAPTER IV. 167 If a Member of the
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CHAPTER IV. 169 effectively in supp
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CHAPTER IV. 171 Page numbers in thi
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CHAPTER IV. 173 must, at no additio
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CHAPTER IV. 175 The Foundation's pr
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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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