The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER XX. 136
made in the Protocol for meeting points (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 8 above.
14. The establishment of a complete and comprehensive system for the pacific settlement of all disputes that
might arise rendered it easier to approach the problem of the definition of "aggression." As the Prime Minister
had said, "the one method by which we can approximate to an accurate attribution of responsibility for
aggression is arbitration." In other words, any State which refused to avail itself of the means at hand for a
peaceful settlement of a dispute, or which refused to accept the award given by the arbitral body or bodies
now provided, and proceeded to an act of war, would brand itself as the aggressor. This principle is embodied
in article 10 of the Protocol, which thus gives effect to the idea indicated in paragraph 8 (d) above. The
definition of aggression is extended by articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol to apply to military measures taken
before or during proceedings for a pacific settlement, and to acts constituting a threat of aggression against
another State.
15. The point raised in paragraph 8 (e) above is dealt with in article 11 of the Protocol. Directly aggression
takes place, {225} the Council calls upon the signatory States to apply sanctions against the aggressor (article
10). As soon as the Council has thus called upon the signatory States, "the obligations of the said States, in
regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 16 of the Covenant, will
immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and
effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in
the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." Article 12
of the Protocol provides for the establishment of plans for putting into effect economic and financial
sanctions, and article 13, "in view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by article 16
of the Covenant," empowers the Council "to receive undertakings from States determining in advance the
military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the
fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol."
16. Article 11--the "sanctions" article--has been more closely scrutinized and has been the subject of more
criticism than any other article of the draft Protocol, and a hasty examination of it by some critics has led them
to object that it goes beyond article 16 of the Covenant and imposes fresh obligations on the signatory States.
In reply to such critics, it may be best to quote the words used by the British delegate in his speech to the
Third Committee on the 22nd September:--
"It cannot be too strongly emphasized that everything in this article is already stated or implied in article 16 of
the Covenant. We are remaining within the terms of the Covenant and we are undertaking no new obligations
.......... Surely loyal and effective co-operation in support of the Covenant is what may confidently be expected
from every Member of the League of {226} Nations .......... The extent of the co-operation must depend on the
actual circumstances not only as regards the aggression but also as regards the geographical position and the
resources of all kinds of individual States. It would be no use to bind oneself to do a variety of things which
may not be required. We must and we can rely on the good faith of the Members of the League to decide
themselves how their effective co-operation can best be given if and when the necessity arises."
17. In order to complete the fulfilment of the task assigned to the committees by the Assembly's resolution of
the 6th September, the Protocol finally provides (article 17) for the summoning in June next year of an
International Conference for the reduction of armaments, to meet in Geneva and to include representatives of
all states whether Members of the League or not. M. Herriot first, and other speakers after him, had
emphasised the interdependence of the three great problems of arbitration, security and disarmament, and the
framers of the Protocol, bearing this in mind, have been careful to preserve this interdependence in the
document itself. Thus if sufficient ratifications of the Protocol have not been received by a certain date, the
Conference on Disarmament is to be postponed. In any case, the Protocol does not come into force until that
Conference shall have adopted a plan for the reduction of armaments. And if within a further period, that plan
has not been carried out, the Protocol becomes null and void.