The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller
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CHAPTER XI. 46<br />
But proceeding on the other theory, and looking only at the language, the presumptions are important; here it<br />
is necessary to refer to only one of them.<br />
{68}<br />
This presumption arises when a State has "disregarded" a decision <strong>by</strong> the Council, <strong>by</strong> the Court or <strong>by</strong> the<br />
Arbitrators following the Court, that a dispute arises out of a domestic question and has also not submitted[6]<br />
the question to the Council or the Assembly for discussion, under Article 11 of the Covenant.<br />
Before the Japanese amendment, the text was that the presumption arose when a State "disregarded" such a<br />
decision to the effect that the dispute arose out of a domestic question.<br />
Now let us see what the difference between the two is, that is to say, the difference between the text prior to<br />
the Japanese amendment and the text with the Japanese amendment.<br />
In either case the decision on the question of law has gone against the complaining State. <strong>The</strong> proper tribunal<br />
has decided that the question is a domestic question and that decision in either case is and remains conclusive.<br />
In either case, the State "disregarding" that decision and going to war is an aggressor. We may see that this is<br />
so <strong>by</strong> supposing that the entire original text as well as the text of this portion of the Japanese amendment was<br />
stricken out.[7] <strong>The</strong>n, clearly, the State would be an aggressor under Article 2 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> and under the<br />
first paragraph of Article 10; and there is nothing either in the original text that we are considering or in the<br />
Japanese addition thereto which changes that conclusion.[8]<br />
<strong>The</strong> difference then between the original text and the text with the amendment is this: in the original text, a<br />
complaining State disregarding such a binding decision as to the domestic character of the question was<br />
presumed an aggressor if it went {69} to war either before or after the consideration of the matter <strong>by</strong> the<br />
Council or the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant. Under the text as amended, such a State is<br />
presumed to be an aggressor only if it resorts to war before such consideration under that Article 11.<br />
In other words, the difference between the original and amended texts would arise only in the following<br />
circumstances: State A brings a dispute against State B before a tribunal (Council, Committee of Arbitrators,<br />
etc.). <strong>The</strong> tribunal renders a binding decision that the dispute arises out of a domestic question. <strong>The</strong><br />
complaining State, bound <strong>by</strong> that decision, then brings the matter before the Council or the Assembly under<br />
Article 11 of the Covenant and no adjustment results; thereupon the complaining State resorts to war.<br />
Under those circumstances, in the original text, the State resorting to war would be presumed an aggressor, a<br />
presumption to be upset only <strong>by</strong> the unanimous vote of the Council against it. Under the amended text, the<br />
complaining State would be an aggressor, but there would be no presumption; and the determination that it<br />
was an aggressor would come on to be made <strong>by</strong> the Council, which would either have to vote unanimously<br />
that the complaining State was an aggressor, or else proclaim an armistice.<br />
I confess that it is difficult to see why such a refined and subtle and technical distinction about the<br />
presumption of aggression should be made. If there is a binding decision <strong>by</strong> a tribunal that a dispute arises out<br />
of a domestic question, surely a complaining State, under the principles of the <strong>Protocol</strong>, is bound not to go to<br />
war, because it is legally wrong in its claim and has been so adjudged. Just why a State going to war under<br />
such circumstances should be presumed to be and be an aggressor if it goes to war before a discussion of the<br />
matter subsequent to the decision and not be presumed to be an aggressor but merely be an aggressor, if it<br />
goes to war after such discussion, is not logically to be explained.<br />
However, the foregoing discussion resulting in such an {70} obscure and technical distinction is, as I<br />
intimated, based solely on the language of the Article and on the legalistic theory of its framers as to its