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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER XI. 46<br />

But proceeding on the other theory, and looking only at the language, the presumptions are important; here it<br />

is necessary to refer to only one of them.<br />

{68}<br />

This presumption arises when a State has "disregarded" a decision <strong>by</strong> the Council, <strong>by</strong> the Court or <strong>by</strong> the<br />

Arbitrators following the Court, that a dispute arises out of a domestic question and has also not submitted[6]<br />

the question to the Council or the Assembly for discussion, under Article 11 of the Covenant.<br />

Before the Japanese amendment, the text was that the presumption arose when a State "disregarded" such a<br />

decision to the effect that the dispute arose out of a domestic question.<br />

Now let us see what the difference between the two is, that is to say, the difference between the text prior to<br />

the Japanese amendment and the text with the Japanese amendment.<br />

In either case the decision on the question of law has gone against the complaining State. <strong>The</strong> proper tribunal<br />

has decided that the question is a domestic question and that decision in either case is and remains conclusive.<br />

In either case, the State "disregarding" that decision and going to war is an aggressor. We may see that this is<br />

so <strong>by</strong> supposing that the entire original text as well as the text of this portion of the Japanese amendment was<br />

stricken out.[7] <strong>The</strong>n, clearly, the State would be an aggressor under Article 2 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> and under the<br />

first paragraph of Article 10; and there is nothing either in the original text that we are considering or in the<br />

Japanese addition thereto which changes that conclusion.[8]<br />

<strong>The</strong> difference then between the original text and the text with the amendment is this: in the original text, a<br />

complaining State disregarding such a binding decision as to the domestic character of the question was<br />

presumed an aggressor if it went {69} to war either before or after the consideration of the matter <strong>by</strong> the<br />

Council or the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant. Under the text as amended, such a State is<br />

presumed to be an aggressor only if it resorts to war before such consideration under that Article 11.<br />

In other words, the difference between the original and amended texts would arise only in the following<br />

circumstances: State A brings a dispute against State B before a tribunal (Council, Committee of Arbitrators,<br />

etc.). <strong>The</strong> tribunal renders a binding decision that the dispute arises out of a domestic question. <strong>The</strong><br />

complaining State, bound <strong>by</strong> that decision, then brings the matter before the Council or the Assembly under<br />

Article 11 of the Covenant and no adjustment results; thereupon the complaining State resorts to war.<br />

Under those circumstances, in the original text, the State resorting to war would be presumed an aggressor, a<br />

presumption to be upset only <strong>by</strong> the unanimous vote of the Council against it. Under the amended text, the<br />

complaining State would be an aggressor, but there would be no presumption; and the determination that it<br />

was an aggressor would come on to be made <strong>by</strong> the Council, which would either have to vote unanimously<br />

that the complaining State was an aggressor, or else proclaim an armistice.<br />

I confess that it is difficult to see why such a refined and subtle and technical distinction about the<br />

presumption of aggression should be made. If there is a binding decision <strong>by</strong> a tribunal that a dispute arises out<br />

of a domestic question, surely a complaining State, under the principles of the <strong>Protocol</strong>, is bound not to go to<br />

war, because it is legally wrong in its claim and has been so adjudged. Just why a State going to war under<br />

such circumstances should be presumed to be and be an aggressor if it goes to war before a discussion of the<br />

matter subsequent to the decision and not be presumed to be an aggressor but merely be an aggressor, if it<br />

goes to war after such discussion, is not logically to be explained.<br />

However, the foregoing discussion resulting in such an {70} obscure and technical distinction is, as I<br />

intimated, based solely on the language of the Article and on the legalistic theory of its framers as to its

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