The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER XX. 133
2. Certain Governments accepted the draft Treaty in principle: very few intimated their readiness to adhere to
its actual terms. His Majesty's Government, in a note which has already been made public,[1] explained the
reasons which would render it impossible for them to subscribe to the Treaty.
3. When, therefore, the Fifth Assembly met on the 1st September of this year, the labours of four years, which
had been devoted to the preparation of a scheme for giving effect to the obligation undertaken by all
signatories in article 8 of the Covenant, had not succeeded in establishing agreement, and there seemed no
prospect of making any further advance along the path which had hitherto been followed.
4. Some new direction would have to be given, and the presence in Geneva of the British and French Prime
Ministers gave a special importance to the meeting.
5. It was realised that the problem was not merely to find a general scheme of disarmament and security, but
that the particular question of French security was of immediate political importance, and would shortly
require a solution. The question of "security" had already been raised in conversations between Mr.
MacDonald and M. Herriot in July last, at Chequers {219} and in Paris. During the latter meeting, the subject
was discussed at some length, and the position as it was then left by the two Prime Ministers was set out in the
Franco-British memorandum of the 9th July concerning the application of the Dawes plan. The relevant
paragraph read as follows: "The two Governments have likewise proceeded to a preliminary exchange of
views on the question of security. They are aware that public opinion requires pacification: they agree to
co-operate in devising through the League of Nations or otherwise, as opportunity presents itself, means of
securing this, and to continue the consideration of the question until the problem of general security can be
finally solved." In a declaration made in the Chamber on the 21st August, reporting on the results of the
London Conference, M. Herriot said "security must be the object of another Conference. He did not see why
France should not take the initiative .......... For the rest, the security question would be dealt with at Geneva."
6. The debate in the League Assembly was opened by the British Prime Minister on the 4th September. Mr.
Ramsay MacDonald began by explaining that it was not because they were indifferent to the problem of
national security that His Majesty's Government had given an adverse opinion on the Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance. They believed that security could not be based on military alliances, and they hesitated to become
involved in any agreements which committed them to vague and indefinite obligations. In this respect the
Treaty of Mutual Assistance was open to criticism, especially in its article 3 and in its definition of
aggression. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald emphasised that the main problem was the problem of national security
in relation to national armaments, and the initial difficulty was encountered in the definition of such terms as
"security" and "aggression." In regard to the latter, he said, "the one method by which we can approximate to
an accurate attribution of responsibility for aggression is arbitration," and he proposed that the article of the
Statute of the Permanent Court dealing with {220} arbitration should be carefully examined by a
Commission, with a view to its being placed before the Assembly in a somewhat more precise, expanded and
definite form than it now had. Such a step would be necessary as a preliminary to the discussion of
disarmament, which could produce no good result unless an atmosphere of confidence were previously
created. To summon a Conference on disarmament without such a preparation of the ground would be to court
immediate and disastrous failure. Such a Conference must be the ultimate aim, and it must include all the
nations and must be held in Europe. In his view the Covenant already contained ample provisions for starting
arbitration, for the sanctions that were necessary and for all other eventualities that might arise: what was now
required was that the Covenant should be elaborated. "The British Government thinks that the matter should
now be explored, beginning with the Covenant, applying the Covenant to our present circumstances, and, in
the spirit of the League of Nations, developing a policy that will give security and reduce armaments. The
British Government stands by the Covenant. The British Government has no wish to reduce the authority of
the Council. It rather wishes to extend the authority of the Council consistently with the continued existence
and prosperity of the League. Articles 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Covenant might well form themselves into
a charter of peace if we would only apply them and fill them out."