The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER XX. 73
the growth and development of the ideas of outlawry of {110} war and of arbitration, may be admitted. That it
can be done now is, to my mind, contrary to the realities of life and to the lessons of history.
There is another phase of this last discussion which should be particularly noticed. It is impossible for any
such agreement for concerted action not to have a direct bearing upon countries which are not parties to the
agreement; in other words, Russia and the United States. We must admit at least the theoretic possibility of a
conflict between one of the Members of the League and one of these two Great Powers, insisting, if we will,
that such a possibility is highly remote so far as the United States is concerned, and utterly unknowable so far
as Russia is concerned; but none the less a possibility.
And certainly, in view of that possibility, any provisions of a document which looks toward force as a last
resort of defence should, in my judgment, be drawn with the utmost care to avoid the idea of a possible
conflict between the parties to the document on the one hand and an outside State on the other. Outlawry of
war and arbitration are things to be agreed upon and not to be compelled against those who are unwilling to
agree; for the breach of such an agreement is a much more serious and a very different thing than a refusal to
arbitrate, or even than going to war when there is no agreement.
That the hospitality, if I may call it so, of the League of Nations should be extended to States which are
unwilling to join it; that its facilities should be offered to these States for the settlement of disputes in every
case where they are willing to accept them; that the covenants of the Members of the League for justice
toward an outside State should be as explicit and complete as its covenants toward a Member, I quite agree;
the covenants of the Members of the League should be covenants of peace among themselves, and of justice
toward all. This is the road to a universal League of all Nations.
If it be said that to Finland or the Baltic States or Poland or Roumania or Turkey there is danger from their
great neighbour, {111} I cannot deny such a possibility; and if any Members of the League are willing to join
with such States in protection against such danger, either in advance of its occurrence or when it happens, I
would see no objection to it, if such agreements were coupled with all the offers of peaceful settlement that
could be written, as well as with offers of membership in the League, either permanent or ad hoc.
To a state which is contemplating the possibility of signing the Protocol of Geneva, it may well be that the
provisions of that document regarding sanctions stand out as the most important, the ones having the greatest
possibilities as to obligations of future action. This is a very natural point of view, and even a very proper one.
And, while I myself am very deeply convinced that, from the point of view of world politics, the most
far-reaching and vital provisions of this document are those which refer to arbitration and to the outlawry of
war, yet perhaps for that very reason, I am equally convinced that the most serious changes which are
necessary in the paper are changes in its provisions for sanctions and for enforcement.
With the principles of compulsory arbitration I am wholly in accord; with the principle that outlawry of war
should follow as the necessary and natural consequence of the substitution of a reign of law for a reign of
force I quite agree; and that some tribunal should determine, if need arise, that the agreement has been broken
and that there is an "outlaw," is a natural consequence of those principles; and that there may be defence
against aggression, if it comes, almost no one will deny. But there, I think, we must stop so far as present
agreement is concerned. That any State may, if it chooses, go to the defence of another against an adjudged
aggressor I would concede; but that all States can be or should be now required to sign an agreement so to go
to such defence, I deny. In the present state of world opinion and when its own direct interests are not
involved, any free people can well say that it will not or ought not to sign such an undertaking.
So I say that, while arbitration may be agreed to in advance {112} and outlawry of war may be agreed to in
advance, sanctions and assistance in defence must be voluntary.
Where does all this leave the problems of disarmament and security?