The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

CHAPTER VII. 27
shall not be changed as a result of aggression. Indeed, the Protocol[9] protects even an aggressor against loss
of territory or of independence as a penalty for its aggression; discussion, leading up perhaps to peaceful
agreement but to nothing else, is permitted by Articles 11 and 19 of the Covenant, but that is all.
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My view is that these provisions are sound and that they should not be extended.
In saying, as I did, that the possibility of change in the status quo is along only two lines, the line of
agreement and the line of war, I did not lose sight of the proposals made in various forms that there should be
some method under the League of Nations or otherwise by which a tribunal of some sort would be empowered
to make such changes from time to time. Most of these proposals envisage plebiscites in one form or another.
These proposals by their advocates are thought to have the advantage of adaptability to changing conditions
and to be more conformable to the theory of the consent of the governed as a basis of Government.[10]
Of course, changes of frontiers made by any form of tribunal would in a sense be changes of frontiers made
by agreement among the parties; for there would be necessarily an agreement in advance setting up such a
tribunal and engaging to conform to its conclusions.
It may perhaps be imagined that as between two particular countries some such arrangement is possible along
limited lines and relating to a particular area or areas. I doubt even this possibility; but certainly no general
agreement in accord with such theories is possible and in my judgment it would be highly undesirable if it
were possible.
A tribunal which was charged with the duty of determining changes in frontiers would clearly be a superstate,
full-fledged, and in any sense of that much abused term. Obviously, a change of frontier, if it went far enough,
might result in the substantial, or even the literal, disappearance of one state by its incorporation within the
territories of another. It is inconceivable that any country would agree to such a proposition. Even if it were
limited very strictly, it would present enormous difficulties and would certainly arouse fierce passions, as is
well illustrated by {37} discussion regarding the tribunal which is now sitting to consider the frontier between
Northern and Southern Ireland.
Nor would the matter be resolved by the suggested idea of plebiscites. Anyone who will consider this question
of plebiscites will realize that the determining factor is not wholly the vote itself but to a large extent the terms
in which the plebiscite paper is written. He who drafts the agreement for the plebiscite has much to do with
what the plebiscite will determine.[11] The questions are: Is the area to vote as a whole or by districts, and
where is the line of the voting area to be drawn? The first of these was one of the great questions in the Upper
Silesia case. To apply the idea to an existing episode, let us again refer to the case of Ireland. If the plebiscite
were in the whole of Ireland, it would go for Dublin; if it were in Ulster, it would go for Belfast; if it were in
Tyrone or Fermanagh, the result would perhaps depend on the exact date when it was taken, as recent
elections indicate.
Another difficulty about plebiscites is this: Is their effect perpetual or not, and if not how long does it last? If
Tyrone votes for Dublin today, is it an eternal decision or only till another vote in 1930, or till when? There
must be some time limit at least; plebiscites cannot be held every year or even every five years, a fact which
illustrates the quiet advantages of some kind of a status quo.
Another question about a plebiscite is this: Let us concede that an overwhelming vote such as took place in
the regions of East Prussia under the Peace Treaties is to be decisive forever. But suppose the vote is very
close; how about a vote where a little over half of the population go one way and a trifle under half go the
other? Is this conclusive? Does it have the same moral effect as a larger vote? Is a majority of one vote just as