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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER VII. 26<br />

Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the imposed origin of a situation may not continue as the cause of<br />

that situation. It may become accepted and voluntary, a full agreement. An instance here is the reparations<br />

question. <strong>The</strong> status quo as to reparations (a very uncertain one) imposed <strong>by</strong> the Treaty of Versailles upon<br />

Germany, has now, under that very Treaty, become an agreed status quo <strong>by</strong> reason of the voluntary adoption<br />

<strong>by</strong> Germany of the Dawes Report; for in reality as well as in strictness of law that plan could not have been<br />

adopted, much less be carried out, without the voluntary assent of Germany to its provisions.<br />

However, taking the frontier status quo of the Peace Treaties at its worst, that is to say at its alleged worst,<br />

admitting, in other {34} words, that parts of it are unjust and are the result only of force, what are we to say as<br />

to the future?<br />

<strong>The</strong> possibility of change which, under the supposition that I have made, would in itself be admittedly<br />

desirable, is along two lines, the line of agreement or the line of war. <strong>The</strong> so-called fixation or consecration of<br />

this status quo under the League of Nations in no way precludes a change <strong>by</strong> agreement, the utmost that it can<br />

do is to preclude a change <strong>by</strong> war.<br />

Accordingly, we are confronted at the outset with the question as to whether the continuance of this status quo<br />

is, or is not, a worse evil than war. Even those who assume or who believe that war is the preferable of the two<br />

must, in order to reach that belief, hold that change <strong>by</strong> agreement is impossible. Such an assumption is<br />

contrary to the facts of history, but for the sake of this discussion it may be admitted.<br />

In other words, I am willing to assume that a particular part of the frontier status quo is wrong, is unjust, and<br />

was brought about <strong>by</strong> force, and should be changed, and that it cannot be changed <strong>by</strong> agreement, and come<br />

directly to the question if, in these circumstances, it should or should not be changed <strong>by</strong> war. My answer to<br />

this question is: No. And I do not think it is necessary to put this answer merely on the ground of the evil of<br />

the war itself, the death, the destruction and so on. It is sufficient to support a negative answer to point out that<br />

the effect of the war could not be limited. War never is limited, it goes to lengths that have nothing to do with<br />

the supposed injustice for which it is commenced.<br />

Let me give an instance as a concrete supposition. Take the Bulgarian-Greek frontier and suppose, as I do,<br />

that it ought to be changed, and suppose further, as the advocates of war assert, that it should be changed <strong>by</strong><br />

war between Bulgaria and Greece; one of two things would happen in all human probability. Either Greece<br />

would be the victor and then not only would the boundary be as unjust to Bulgaria as it is now, but much more<br />

so. Or else Bulgaria would be the victor, in which case the injustice would simply be reversed; the frontier<br />

would not move to any {35} theoretical point of justice, but would move to the point dictated <strong>by</strong> the new<br />

Peace treaty.<br />

In other words, war is not like a litigation which ends in the settlement of a particular dispute. Any war, in its<br />

settlement, goes far beyond the dispute which brought it about; every war opens up every possible ambition<br />

and desire of the victor.[6] Did the World War end merely in deciding the question about the rights of Austria<br />

and Serbia in connection with the murder of the Archduke? Where was the fate of the German colonies<br />

decided--in East Africa and in the Pacific, or on the Western Front?<br />

This whole question is of vital importance in connection with the <strong>Protocol</strong> of <strong>Geneva</strong>. If that <strong>Protocol</strong> comes<br />

into force and is accepted <strong>by</strong> Germany, <strong>by</strong> Austria, <strong>by</strong> Hungary and <strong>by</strong> Bulgaria, it will have this effect at<br />

least; it will change what I may call the status of the status quo in regard to these countries to this extent, that<br />

in lieu of that status quo being one imposed <strong>by</strong> force, it will have become one agreed to, at least to the point<br />

that it is agreed that the status quo may not be changed <strong>by</strong> war but only <strong>by</strong> agreement.[7] As a practical<br />

example, it will mean, as we now see, that the German effort to regain some of her lost colonies under the<br />

mandate system, will again be an effort of negotiation[8] and not an effort of force.<br />

All that the Covenant or the <strong>Protocol</strong> of <strong>Geneva</strong> attempts to do about the status quo is to say that frontiers

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