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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER XII. 52<br />

Now, let us look at paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the <strong>Protocol</strong>, quoted above. Each signatory State is "to<br />

cooperate loyally and {78} effectively" not only "in support of the Covenant," but "in resistance to any act of<br />

aggression." Well, certainly resistance to an act of aggression means force and this fact is not qualified but<br />

emphasized <strong>by</strong> the words: "in the degree which its geographical position and its situation as regards<br />

armaments allow." I grant that these words have a qualifying effect in some cases. <strong>The</strong>y would mean, for<br />

example, that if Denmark had no army, she could not be under any obligation to use infantry. But they also<br />

refer to the other side of that picture, that the British do have a navy, that is their particular situation as regards<br />

armaments, a very particular situation; and under this Article, as I read it, the British would be bound "loyally<br />

and effectively" to cooperate in resistance to an act of aggression in the degree which their particular naval<br />

situation allowed.<br />

Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> says that the "obligations * * * in regard to the<br />

sanctions of all kinds mentioned" not only in paragraph 1 but also in paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the<br />

Covenant "will immediately become operative." This indicates that there are military, naval and air sanctions<br />

to be employed and that the parties to the <strong>Protocol</strong> are under obligations to employ them.<br />

Now, it is no answer to this to say that as to the extent of the armed forces to be used, the signatory State has<br />

its own discretion; and it is true that there would be no international command, there would be no turning over<br />

of the forces of one country to the General Staff of another or to an international Staff of all; however, even<br />

that did not take place during the first three years of the World War, except with specific detachments. So, for<br />

example, the British could say that they would send five destroyers or ten cruisers under their own Admiral, or<br />

the Grand Fleet if they chose; but clearly it would be bad faith for them to say with this commitment that they<br />

would not send even a gunboat.<br />

I am entirely satisfied that these provisions greatly extend the provisions of the Covenant; for the first time[6]<br />

there is {79} introduced in the League system a definite military commitment--definite in the sense that it is<br />

obligatory, and not in the sense that it is defined as to extent of force.[7]<br />

It may be argued that the first paragraph of Article 13 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> looks somewhat the other way, but I do<br />

not think that it does. That paragraph merely provides that the parties to the <strong>Protocol</strong>, if they see fit, may give<br />

to the Council "undertakings"[8] as to the military forces which they would use in applying the sanctions of<br />

the document. <strong>The</strong>re is no obligation to give any such undertaking; it is purely optional with each State.<br />

Doubtless if such an undertaking was given and accepted <strong>by</strong> the Council, the State giving it would at least not<br />

have to do anything more in the way of military action than provided in the undertaking; but as the giving of<br />

the undertaking is optional, the fact of its not having been given would not, in my opinion, limit or qualify the<br />

obligation "interpreted" in the second paragraph of Article 11 of the <strong>Protocol</strong>.<br />

I point out here that the word "contingent" in the first paragraph of Article 13 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> does not relate to<br />

the obligatory character of the sanctions but to the necessary uncertainty as to the future existence of the<br />

breach required for their applicability (see the French text); and the debate in the Third Committee and more<br />

particularly the Report unanimously adopted <strong>by</strong> the Assembly, in its discussion of Article 11,[9] make it clear<br />

that the above interpretation as to the military sanctions is correct; uniform in obligation, they are flexible in<br />

application.<br />

Consideration of the third paragraph of Article 11 of the <strong>Protocol</strong> in connection with the third paragraph of<br />

Article 16 of the Covenant tends to support the views already expressed. Without further elaboration, I call<br />

particular attention to the last clause of the paragraph of the <strong>Protocol</strong> mentioned and cite {80} the respective<br />

paragraphs of the two documents in parallel columns:<br />

Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of Paragraph 3 of Article 11 of the Covenant. the <strong>Protocol</strong>.<br />

"<strong>The</strong> Members of the League "In accordance with paragraph agree, further, that they will 3 of Article 16 of

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