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The Geneva Protocol, by David Hunter Miller

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CHAPTER XX. 145<br />

representatives of the Dominions and India, and was fully considered <strong>by</strong> them at two further meetings on the<br />

following day. After slight modifications the text of two amendments proved acceptable to the British Empire<br />

Delegation, and after being accepted <strong>by</strong> the Japanese and French Delegations, these amendments were<br />

adopted <strong>by</strong> the First Committee. <strong>The</strong>y involved the addition to the last sentence of article 5 of the words "this<br />

decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation <strong>by</strong> the Council or the Assembly under article 11 of the<br />

Covenant," and the addition at the end of paragraph 2 (1) of article 10 of the words "nevertheless in the last<br />

case the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the<br />

Council or the Assembly in accordance with article 11 of the Covenant."<br />

61. In the opinion of the British Empire Delegation these amendments conferred no new powers or functions<br />

on either the Council or the Assembly. <strong>The</strong>y merely served to make clear the relationship between paragraph<br />

8 of article 15 and article 11 of the Covenant. Article 11 of the Covenant only operates in time of war or threat<br />

of war, and it confers no right on the Council or the Assembly to impose a solution of a dispute without the<br />

consent of the parties. <strong>The</strong> Council or the Assembly may mediate and conciliate, but they cannot make<br />

recommendations which are binding under paragraph 6 of article 15 of the Covenant. When these<br />

amendments were adopted at the final plenary meeting of the First Committee on the 30th September, the<br />

British representative made a statement on the above lines. This interpretation proved generally acceptable,<br />

and it was agreed to incorporate it in the report to be submitted to the Assembly.<br />

62. At the final plenary meeting of the First Committee the British representative drew attention to the<br />

difficulty in which many Delegations were placed, in that they had had no {244} opportunity to consult their<br />

Governments in regard to these amendments. <strong>The</strong> Delegations of Australia and several other countries<br />

thereupon stated that, though they accepted the texts, they could not commit their Governments in any way.<br />

Article 6.<br />

63. Article 6. When the system of compulsory arbitration, contained in article 4, had been established, the<br />

British representative pointed out that under paragraphs 9 and 10 of article 15 of the Covenant a dispute might<br />

still be referred to the Assembly. Article 6 was therefore drafted to ensure that the provisions referring to the<br />

actions and powers of the Council should apply to the Assembly under the new system. After considerable<br />

discussion it was decided to reserve questions of procedure to the Council as being a more suitable body.<br />

Article 10.<br />

64. Article 10, which contains the definition of an aggressor, provided one of the most difficult tasks of the<br />

First Committee. By the 23rd September a number of drafts had been considered but no satisfactory text had<br />

been found. <strong>The</strong> original idea was that it should be the duty of the Council to determine the aggressor, but the<br />

question then arose as to whether, in making this decision, the Council should act unanimously or <strong>by</strong> majority<br />

vote. Adherence to the unanimity rule would have made it possible for one State to prevent a decision being<br />

reached. Procedure <strong>by</strong> a majority vote might have resulted in a State being obliged to apply sanctions against<br />

its own judgment. <strong>The</strong> only way out of this difficulty was to avoid a decision <strong>by</strong> the Council at all, and to<br />

make the test of aggression automatic, when once certain conditions had been found to obtain. This is<br />

achieved <strong>by</strong> establishing a presumption which is to hold good until the Council has made a unanimous<br />

decision to the contrary. If the presumption stands it is considered sufficient to justify the application of<br />

sanctions. Even then it was thought that there would have to be something in the nature of a {245}<br />

"declaration of aggression" in order to initiate the enforcement of sanctions, and that this declaration would<br />

have to be made <strong>by</strong> unanimity. Objections were raised to this, but these objections were finally satisfied <strong>by</strong> the<br />

insertion of paragraph 3, according to which the Council, if it cannot at once determine the aggressor is<br />

bound, as a matter of course, to enjoin an armistice upon the belligerents.<br />

65. <strong>The</strong> Japanese Delegation were opposed to any presumption of aggression arising against a state which was<br />

involved in a dispute covered <strong>by</strong> paragraph 8 of article 15 of the Covenant, and found as the result that,

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