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Architecture Modeling - SPES 2020

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AirTempSystem<br />

C1<br />

C<br />

temp occurs each 50ms<br />

temp occurs each 50ms<br />

with jitter 5ms<br />

C2<br />

<strong>Architecture</strong> <strong>Modeling</strong><br />

Delay between temp and actTemp within [5ms,7ms]<br />

actTemp occurs each<br />

50ms with jitter 10ms<br />

temp actTemp<br />

Capture<br />

Delay between temp and control within [15ms,20ms]<br />

Delay between actTemp and control within [10ms,12ms]<br />

AirTempControl<br />

Figure 4.7: VIT Example with Real-Time Contracts<br />

control<br />

Due to the fact that, when C1 is satisfied, then also the assumption of C2 is satisfied (remind<br />

that C1 and C2 are compatible), we can eliminate A2s. If both guarantees G1 and G2 are satisfied,<br />

both together satisfy G because the result of G1 ∧ G2 is a simple addition of delays. This<br />

completes the proof chain.<br />

temp occurs each 50ms<br />

temp occurs each 50ms<br />

with jitter 5ms<br />

Delay between temp and actTemp within [5ms,7ms]<br />

actTemp occurs each<br />

50ms with jitter 7ms<br />

actTemp occurs each<br />

50ms with jitter 10ms<br />

!<br />

Delay between temp and control within [15ms,20ms]<br />

Delay between temp and control within [15ms,19ms]<br />

"<br />

Delay between actTemp and control within [10ms,12ms]<br />

Figure 4.8: VIT Example with Real-Time Contracts: Proof Chain<br />

VIT Example for Safety Contracts<br />

<strong>Modeling</strong> safety aspects is usually more elaborated than for real-time, since specification of<br />

failure conditions and dependencies are often rather complex. A simple application example of<br />

VIT for safety shall however be discussed. Figure 4.9 shows an abstract model of a wheel brake<br />

system. The BSCU controls a hydraulic system, that provides the brake force to a wheel, by<br />

sending commands via CMD AS. The braking system is redundantly implemented. Both BSCU<br />

and Hydraulic contain the relevant parts twice. The figure shows that BSCU is composed of<br />

two redundant control units BSCU1 and BSCU2. The control units take the (also redundant)<br />

brake pedal positions (PedalPos1 and PedalPos2) and calculate respective commands<br />

(CMD AS1 and CMD AS2) to control the hydraulic system. Both controls units maintain validation<br />

ports (Valid1 and Valid2) indicating whether the commands send are valid or not.<br />

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