George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

y Kirk Drennan and Heather Greaves
Army forces combine offensive, defensive,
and stability or civil support operations
simultaneously as part of an interdependent
joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
opportunities to achieve decisive results.
They employ synchronized action—lethal and
nonlethal—proportional to the mission and
informed by a thorough understanding of
all variables of the operational environment.
Mission command that conveys intent and an
appreciation of all aspects of the situation
guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (Field
Manual 3-0 Operations)
Introduction
As a community, the Intelligence Corps` faces certain
challenges in planning intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) to support full
spectrum operations (FSO) at the tactical level.
Many changes have occurred in capabilities, doctrine,
and organization. Prior to 9/11, the ISR capabilities
and assets available at the division and
brigade were much less than tactical commanders
enjoy today. Doctrinal changes call for modifications
in the way tactical forces–including tactical
intelligence units–operate. Through the 1990s the
intelligence community still looked at the battlefield
as a linear array and arrived at echeloned solutions
to meet its challenges.
That began to change with the promulgation of
the contemporary operational environment (COE)
around the change of the century. The COE was formally
established as a training model in 2003 with
FM 7-100, Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework
and Strategy, which laid out how an opposing force
should fight in the COE. Nevertheless the intelligence
community still tended to think in linear
terms in respect to intelligence coverage by echelon.
Meanwhile organizational changes wrought by
modularity shifted many divisional ISR capabilities
to the brigade combat team (BCT).
Changes Kept On Coming
If anything, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
have accelerated changes within the force and have
left some persistent “hanging chad” when it comes
to doctrinal issues. One of particular relevance to
the tactical intelligence community was the question
of battlefield design. The 2001 version of FM
3-0 laid out the ideas of FSO along with contiguous
and non-contiguous areas of operations (AO). It retained
the use of close, deep, and rear areas in describing
contiguous, linear operations. The January
2005 version of FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders
Production, (replacing the standard FM 101-5) continued
to use the close, deep, and rear construct
to describe planning. FMI 5-0.1, The Operations
Process, published in 2006, reinforced concepts
from FM 3-0 and 5-0; although it dropped and adjusted
some terms, it did not address the battlefield
construct of close, deep, and rear.
Meanwhile FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team,
was published in August 2006 to reflect the changes
of modularity. It superseded FM 7-30, The Infantry
Brigade (as well as FM 3-21.31, FM 3-90.3, and FMI
3-90.6). Because it addressed a modular BCT that
could fight as part of a division or independently,
the 2006 FM carefully laid out the concepts of FSO
as well as contiguous and non-contiguous AOs. We
offer what it said regarding deep, close, and rear
operations:
DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS
2-9. The commander may use deep, close, and rear areas to
describe his area of operations. In such situations, the
commander directs and focuses operations in these areas of
his AO. He describes his AO in terms of deep, close, and rear
areas when the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC) require the use of a spatial
reference.
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