George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

and data constantly bombards intelligence gatherers
and some things may end up falling on the floor.
Knowledge is a shifting and constantly moving target
that is impacted by many variables, and this
sometimes leads to missed opportunities.
Process
Given the conditions and environment of combat
operations in a war zone, the official concept
the Army employs is referred to as RIP and transfer
of authority (TOA). 2 These two events coexist together
in happening simultaneously but RIP and
its impacts are critical to the focus of this article.
The TOA is the culminating event as official orders
transfer authority to the arriving unit from the departing
one.
Doctrinally, in Field Manual 7-15, The Army
Universal Task List, the conduct of a RIP is:
“A relief in place is a tactical enabling operation
in which, by the direction of higher authority,
all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the
incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced
elements for the mission and the assigned zone of
operations are transferred to the incoming unit.
The incoming unit continues the operation as
ordered. The relieving unit usually assumes the
same responsibilities and initially deploys in the
same configuration as the outgoing unit. Relief in
place is executed for a number of reasons including
introducing a new unit into combat, changing a
unit’s mission, relieving a depleted unit in contact,
retaining a unit, relieving the stress of prolonged
operations in adverse conditions …” 3
As in many operations, the business of war relies
solely on a military’s personnel; therefore performance
is subject to the influence and characteristics
of personality. In order to transfer knowledge
effectively, the U.S. Army has provided an official
two-week window for the RIP cycle to operate. It is
commonly referred to as the left seat/right seat,
meaning that the first week the departing unit is
still driving, but in the second week the incoming
unit drives the operation under oversight of the departing
unit. During the first week, personnel from
both units are teamed together in order to shadow
and align to the outgoing personnel by personally
conducting the transfer of knowledge. Members
are matched up by position to provide a one-onone
exchange capability to reinforce overall mission
capability.
This inter-unit teamwork process lends itself to
the true KM culture of socializing and relies heavily
upon personalities for increasing rates of success.
This structure is supported with much explicit
knowledge representing the experience of the departing
unit and its individual members that transfers
to the incoming Soldiers, imparts a baseline
comprehension, and highlights all factors relating
to the position, the organization, and the mission
of the unit. It serves to translate the operational
picture and make it personal in nature in order to
emphasize the importance and stress of current operational
and enemy situation. The departing personnel
also set up related “meet and greets” with
specific shared organizations, units, and personnel
with whom the incoming unit will have to interact.
This provides a networking opportunity as not all
units rotate at the same time. Such meet and greets
provide the relational contacts necessary to secure
mission success and install a foundation for future
KM opportunities and engagement.
Challenges
Some difficulties arise within the two-week RIP
period that can lead to critical failure, and which
could result in loss of life. The intrinsic factors of
success and importance of this RIP KM transference
is demonstrable in quick order. One challenge is
not to transfer personal biases and of keeping everything
on an objective level. This is a significant test
for both the incoming and outgoing personnel alike
and both need to be aware of mitigating attitudinal
perceptions. A second challenge is that providing
the key analysis and all points in an externalization
process requires re-focusing to a degree by the effect
of departing unit members knowing that they’re
leaving. Knowledge of one’s imminent departure results
in a modality shift that can increase the work
load and sometimes take away from functional operations.
A third challenge is that the transference
of hardware and data can be dependent upon equipment,
training, and capabilities inherent to the inbound
unit.
Related directly to the mission requirements is the
challenge of shifting mission changes imposed upon
the arriving unit, thus affecting the relevance of the
knowledge represented by the out-going unit. The
effectiveness of transfer in this formal exchange is
not commonly evaluated and relies heavily for success
upon the attributes and strengths of Soldiers
74 Military Intelligence