George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

Services Intelligence (ISI), the organization that had
previously coordinated mujahedeen resistance to
the Soviet occupation. 18 These connections substantially
shaped operations in Kandahar. One report
indicates that Pakistan provided indirect fire
support during the Spin Boldak raid. Pakistan also
provided logistical assistance. In the final assault
on Kandahar City, Taliban combatants were reportedly
armed with new weapons, supplied through
Pakistani channels. 19 In addition to military assets,
Pakistan provided political and financial support.
For example, Colonel Imam, the Pakistani ISI representative
in Afghanistan at the time, reportedly assisted
in securing Naqib’s cooperation through a 1.5
million USD bribe. 20
The Taliban’s ability to shape the battlefield
through managing political-military networks before
kinetic operations commenced proved an overwhelming
advantage against a clearly divided group
of self-interested warlords. Such insights might help
inform modern International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. While historical
comparisons must be drawn cautiously,
co-opting political-military networks represents a
viable strategy that would likely assist counterinsurgency
(COIN) efforts. As Michael Semple argues,
the Taliban is a patchwork of political loyalties:
[…] the current insurgency is not
monolithic, but rather a loose association
of different commander networks that
have some overlapping interests but that
also have varying degrees of adherence to
the leadership of the Taliban movement.
Although […] the prospects of a general
political agreement between the Afghan
government and the insurgency are poor,
[…] there is potential for the reconciliation
of particular commander networks
[emphasis added]. 21
However, ISAF cannot exploit these divisions if
it does not invest sufficient intelligence resources
into mapping human terrain. “Friendly” link diagrams
and orders of battle are just as important as
their “enemy” counterparts, as distinctions between
friend and foe in a COIN environment should be
proactively manipulated rather than passively accepted.
Thus, ISAF intelligence operations can and
should incorporate lessons learned from Taliban
successes into its own process.
Yet, the Taliban continues to possess a substantial
advantage over ISAF forces in network mobilization,
as foreign advisors will never be able to match
the Taliban’s understanding of human geography.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) may prove more
adept, but even they will face challenges, as most
ANA soldiers deploy to locations outside their native
province. 22 At the same time, the Taliban has gradually
lost its reputation as a neutral and just governor
in many parts of the country. 23 This presents
an opportunity for ISAF to leverage popular discontent
in order to solicit intelligence that facilitates
network mapping in exchange for security and socio-economic
assistance. As stated in Major General
Michael Flynn’s recent report on intelligence in
Afghanistan, the key is to focus on the non-lethal
elements–including network manipulation–rather
than massing resources to plan the next “kill-orcapture”
mission. 24
Endnotes
1. Reports on the exact number of individuals involved in the attack
range from forty to two hundred.
2. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, Editors: Alex Strick
van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2010), 72 and David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred
Years of British, Russian and American Occupation (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 2009), 181-2. Zaeef’s account indicates that fighting
may have ended in as little as fifteen minutes.
3. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 27-8.
4. Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-
1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 60-2.
5. Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,”
Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, Editor:
William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 47-8.
6. Ibid, 67.
7. Zaeef, 72-3. Some scholars argue that then incumbent President
Rabbani supported Naqib’s decision to cooperate with the Taliban.
See also Davis, 49-50. Such explanations seem plausible given that
Rabbani likely viewed the early Taliban movement as a means to
undermine Hekmatyar, who was heavily engaged in armed conflict
against the Rabbini coalition in Kabul. Whatever the case, not
only did Naqib not resist, but he offered heavy weapon support for
Taliban fighters as well.
8. Zaeef, 69-70.
9. Ibid, 73-5. Some reports indicate that additional militants under
Mansur Achakzai, Amir Lalai and Sarkateb continued resistance
into the final two days of fighting.
60 Military Intelligence