George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

of both units. This tends to make the process difficult
for the command to gauge the level of achieved
success.
In my experience in monitoring and gauging this
transfer, knowledge was stored and presented from
a PowerPoint presentation. This product reflected all
critical knowledge by staff function or by individual
Soldiers, in order to calculate what was transferred,
and resulted in accountability by demonstrating
what had to be accepted and confirmed by both inbound
and out-going units.
This gauge provided the basis upon which the TOA
was authorized and executed. If the incoming unit
disagreed with the fidelity and confidence transferred
via the RIP, it could push back the TOA and
delay departure. This analysis provided an authoritative
account and basis for agreement between
units with the understanding they had received all
that was presented to a level of proficiency that they
could continue the mission without interruption of
military capabilities.
In my personal case, I was the primary battalion
staff intelligence officer. For the last month before the
RIP, an average of 20 to 30 percent of my section’s
time and effort was spent working upon assembling
imperative and empirically explicit knowledge to impart
during the RIP. In our case, the checklist and
status of all critical tasks was developed with guidance
from the battalion executive officer, which by
my observation, represented a huge focus for him in
preparation and monitoring during that last month.
Knowing that the volatility of conducting a war is
difficult in and of itself, it is difficult to relate the
importance of such work without actually being in
such a threatening environment.
So far, the challenges that have been highlighted
are those presented during the operation, but looking
at the problem foundationally for the Army,
there is no training or simulation that might help
establish or hone these skills and expectations necessary
to the successful conduct of this endeavor.
Aside from the challenges mentioned above, entering
into the second week presents an opportunity
for the incoming unit to occupy
by position and start assuming responsibility
of the out-going unit’s roles. This
provides a mentored and closely observed
practice of operating in assigned capacities.
This hands-on approach serves to protect
the new unit during its novice operational
stage, in order to increase that unit’s operational
confidence and experience. It is a
responsibility concluded at the end of the
second week at TOA.
This jointly operated two-week period
becomes an intensified internship totally
designed to transfer as much critical
knowledge as possible related to the current
threat and operational picture, in order
to quickly get the incoming unit up to speed;
taking it from an “how to” mode to “now do.” It prepares
Soldiers for assuming their roles quickly and
efficiently in order to provide a continuum of operational
effectiveness and impact and to minimize
operational interruptions. More importantly, in the
eyes of the enemy and the regional inhabitants, this
represents a cycle during which the passing of the
baton needs to remain unnoticed. The second week
allows for some latitude in conducting operations
that gives the incoming unit a little wiggle room for
making mistakes, because after TOA they will have
no side-by-side ability for oversight and assistance.
Measures of Effectiveness
The two-week RIP window is both exhausting and
rewarding, and represents a dual situation in which
one is expected to systematically approach and rapidly
learn to operate in a chaotic and violent venue,
and to individually participate as an intricate part in
an Army conducting the art of warfare. This process
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