George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

Naqib. In fact, one recently released first-hand account
from a former Taliban fighter refers to Naqib
not as “general,” but as “mullah.” That is, the
Taliban radically redefined battlefield force distribution
by turning potential adversaries into allies. 7
Moreover, while Naqib may have been the most
powerful warlord that the Taliban co-opted, he
certainly was not the only one. The Taliban developed
numerous relationships with other Kandahar
strongmen, including Keshkinakhud administrator
Hajji Bashar and Argestan religious leader Mullah
Rabbani Akhund. 8 Indeed, the decisive victory in
Kandahar seems to have come–not on the battlefield–but
during a meeting in Panjwayi, in which
six Taliban leaders forged an informal agreement to
coordinate efforts against the last remaining warlord,
Ustaz Abdul Haleem.
After the removal of Ustaz,
the Taliban quickly gained
control of the capital, with
only a minimal number of
governor Gul Agha Sherzai’s
troops resisting. 9
The Taliban’s ability to mobilize
previously existing political-military
networks in
order to alter battlefield dynamics
highlights a broader
trend in their campaign to
control Afghanistan. Indeed,
the Taliban established a
unique set of tactics, techniques and procedures
that differed significantly from the mujahedeen era
hit-and-run tactics. Instead of relying on insurgent
advantages in guerilla warfare, the Taliban adopted
a dynamic, mobile, and aggressive operational
tempo.
While Taliban propaganda suggests that success
in employing such tactics stemmed from the movement’s
popular support and Taliban combatants’
ideological zeal, Anthony Davis argues that Taliban
proficiency in mobile warfare instead resulted from
successfully integrating networks of former soldiers,
who had been trained during the Soviet occupation
in the employment of air, artillery, mortar and armor
assets. The most notable of these networks was
that of Defense Minister General Shahnawaz Tanai,
who mobilized and persuaded former colleagues
to assist in Taliban military operations. In fact,
one source estimated that 1,600 officers from the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime
were serving with the Taliban by 1995. 10
It is worth asking why the Taliban succeeded in
network mobilization, as opposed to their competitors.
11 As Abdulkader Sinno describes, one important
reason was the Taliban’s understanding of
human geography, which informed their decisions
on which approach (co-option, repudiation, or assassination)
to utilize with adversary commanders
(See Figure 2). 12 In particular, Taliban leaders often
engaged subordinates of a targeted leader first in
order to undermine his power base, before subsequently
offering the leader the choice of disbanding
his militia, joining the Taliban organization, or facing
lethal persecution. 13
Figure 2. Taliban Networking Operations 14
In addition, Taliban identity itself increased persuasive
efficacy. In Afghanistan, tribe, ethnicity,
and clan (qawm) influence identity far more than in
Western nations. 15 As such, many of the failures of
Afghan state modernization can be traced back to
organic preferences for local autonomy and traditional
power structures that oppose a central state. 16
Yet, the Taliban were not commonly associated with
such state centralization efforts, as Taliban did not
share the anti-tribal, urbanite background commonly
associated with political leaders seeking to
revolutionize Afghan society, such as rival Pashtun
warlord Hekmatyar. 17 On the contrary, the Taliban
marketed themselves as a neutral party capable of
restoring justice and order in a country plagued by
warlord exploitation and brutality.
Finally, Taliban networks enjoyed support outside
Afghan borders, most notably in the Pakistani Inter
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