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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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y Robert J. Leach<br />

In the U.S., intelligence analysis enables policy<br />

makers to make informed decisions that reverberate<br />

globally. This article explores two major challenges<br />

facing analysts over the next twelve months that<br />

will influence U.S. policy for many years to come.<br />

The first challenge is the question <strong>of</strong> what North<br />

Korea will do given its self-declared nuclear capability.<br />

The second question revolves around Iran’s<br />

nuclear capability.<br />

North Korea has declared its nuclear capability.<br />

The intentions <strong>of</strong> the declaration remain a mystery to<br />

most analysts and government organizations alike.<br />

North Korea, arguably the most reclusive nation in<br />

the world, remains in the headlines <strong>of</strong> news organizations<br />

around the world. Even China, its greatest<br />

ally, seems to be at a loss on the recent escalation<br />

<strong>of</strong> nuclear rhetoric displayed by North Korea.<br />

Historically, when North Korea behaved in a manner<br />

unbecoming <strong>of</strong> a nation, they sought concessions.<br />

Policy makers previously rewarded deliberate<br />

and hostile North Korean behaviors with energy and<br />

other nation stabilizers (i.e., food supplies and commerce.)<br />

Perhaps the concessionary negotiations <strong>of</strong><br />

the previous policies with North Korea allowed it to<br />

formulate a standard behavior in order to achieve a<br />

desired result.<br />

It is possible that the U.S. currently faces nuclear<br />

rhetoric, testing, and possible proliferation by North<br />

Korea as a direct result <strong>of</strong> a standard practice <strong>of</strong><br />

quid pro quo. Analysts focused on current behaviors<br />

must look at previous activities and rewards to understand<br />

possible goals <strong>of</strong> the current escalation <strong>of</strong><br />

hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. In 2002, North<br />

Korea faced severe energy and food shortages. It responded<br />

to the labeling as a member <strong>of</strong> the “Axis <strong>of</strong><br />

Evil” by President Bush with predictable hostility. 1<br />

The expected reaction, based upon previous acts <strong>of</strong><br />

aggression, led North Korea to admit: “to U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />

that it was pursuing a highly enriched uranium<br />

program in violation <strong>of</strong> several international<br />

agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework<br />

signed with the Clinton administration.” 2 Through<br />

the Six-Party Talks, which involve the U.S., North<br />

Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia,<br />

North Korea agreed to disband its nuclear pursuits<br />

in exchange for energy resources and also received<br />

further commitments from South Korea for foodstuffs<br />

and cooperation with building the “Kaesong<br />

Industrial Complex just north <strong>of</strong> the demilitarized<br />

zone.” 3<br />

The South Korean equation limits military action<br />

against North Korea by the U.S. Any U.S. military<br />

response would likely cause North Korea to unleash<br />

a wave <strong>of</strong> military counter-responses, which<br />

would cripple South Korea. Protection <strong>of</strong> South<br />

Korean and Japanese economies is vital in any response<br />

by the U.S. or any U.S. ally. North Korea<br />

understands the vital role played by the economies<br />

<strong>of</strong> South Korea and Japan in measured responses<br />

by the U.S. and its allies. Based on decades <strong>of</strong> titfor-tat<br />

exchanges <strong>of</strong> rhetoric and sanctions, North<br />

Korea plays a chess game one move ahead <strong>of</strong> U.S.<br />

policy. The North Korean advantage stems partly<br />

from regime and policy changes on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

U.S. However, the isolated nature <strong>of</strong> North Korea<br />

plays an additional role in staying one step ahead <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>American</strong> predictive analysis <strong>of</strong> reactions by party<br />

leaders in Pyongyang.<br />

Kim Jong-Il’s recent health concerns brings into<br />

question who has really been in charge <strong>of</strong> North<br />

62 Military Intelligence

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