George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

Mussolini and His Generals
by John Gooch
(United Kingdom, Cambridge University
Press, 2007) 651 pages, $35.00,
ISBN: 978-0-521-85602-7
There have been many books written about the life
of Mussolini which is certainly understandable because
of his role in enacting a major fascist government
during the twentieth century and Italy’s
participation under his leadership during the
Second World War. However, this book focuses on a
much more limited aspect of fascism and Mussolini
by concentrating on the time between the World
Wars I and II and the role of the Italian military during
that period. It is a time frame primarily limited
to the years from 1922 when Mussolini came into
power to the year 1940. The attention given by the
author to the role of the Italian military during that
time and Mussolini’s relation to it are what sets this
book apart from many other works concerned with
the period of Italian fascist history.
The author provides some interesting information
about Mussolini and his military. For example,
Mussolini increased the capability of each of the
three major parts of the military because of a desire
for Italian expansionism and security. Interestingly,
it was the Navy that seemed to be his favorite branch,
perhaps because of his view that the Mediterranean
Sea had important potential military and domestic
benefits to Italy. However, Mussolini was never
in full control of his military machine as the leader
of Italy. Perhaps this was due to the pressures of
other responsibilities, and the fact, according to the
author that as “military master of Italy, Mussolini
brought to this work the limited perspective of his
frontline experience and a confident assertiveness
founded on ignorance.”(519)
Nevertheless, Mussolini found the military useful
in a number of ways, including its role in helping
him project a powerful image of his country’s ability
to wage war. He did this by increasing the power
of his military forces and his use of military demonstrations
and maneuvers which projected an image
of a nation capable of offensive
and defensive activities.
For example, in one situation
involving Mussolini’s naval
and air maneuvers, a commentator
suggested that the
naval review was “stupefying”
and that the Italian Air Force
had reached a level of perfection
beyond that attained in
Germany.(392) However, the
reality of the maneuvers may well have been another
matter and viewed differently by some other
individuals. A general conclusion of the author is
that Mussolini’s foreign policy was influenced by
his military forces, but the same may be said about
many other world political leaders then and today.
Mussolini’s military machine in this book is not
pictured in a favorable light. A number of reasons
are given by the author to explain this view. For example,
although Mussolini was the country’s leader,
his lack of full control of the military was obvious.
This might be explained by the fact that other matters
were taking much of his time, and that perhaps
the military was insulated in some cases from his
direct influence. Another possible problem for the
military and Mussolini seems to be a failure on their
part to realize that the next war would be a long war
necessitating huge resources. Mussolini’s own leadership
style also contributed to a lessening of the
military’s capabilities because it lacked a clear form
of direction for them.
The author concludes his analysis of Mussolini
and his military machine by noting that although
Mussolini was responsible for Italy’s entrance into
the Second World War, his high ranking officers
also share some of the blame for the failure of the
military due to their ineffectiveness.
The book was written by an excellent scholar
who used a wide variety of primary and secondary
sources of information to bring it about. It should
appeal to a wide variety of readers who desire more
information about a specific time frame of Italian
politics and the role of its military during that time.
For example, students of military history who focus
their interest on the preparation for World War II by
Italy as well as a number of other countries such
as France, England, and Germany will find some
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