George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

long prison sentences. Officially declaring the cartels
as terrorists allows for the freezing of business
and organization assets known to be associated with
these activities. This would provide agencies such
as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
more opportunities to target those responsible for
working with the cartels to provide the counterflow
of money, weapons, and supplies into Mexico from
the U.S.. These pipelines remain a primary concern
since 36 percent of the illegal weapons found
in Mexico in 2008 were sent to the ATF for tracing
and 90 percent of these weapons were found to have
originated in the U.S. 18 Security agencies would
have a greater case when seeking more resources
to combat these groups since working against a declared
terrorist organization makes for greater justification
when requesting the allocation of additional
resources.
The intelligence community must significantly improve
its interagency sharing of information that
already exists, as the individuals and networks being
hunted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
DEA, and the ATF, for their smuggling activities
would also be the ones responsible for any IED use.
The information on these individuals and networks
must be shared between these organizations and
with the Border Patrol in order to hasten any potential
incident interdiction and response once an IED
event occurs. Cooperation and liaison with Mexican
authorities to jointly target individuals associated
with the current IED use in Mexico must increase,
as this will degrade the current and future capabilities
of the cartels. Information sharing with Mexico
will provide the groundwork required to understand
and defeat the cartel networks responsible for operations
north of the border. Using the time available to
obtain fingerprints of builders, to establish building
styles, and to identify the more experienced builders
will ensure a quick, precise, and decisive action
following any IED event. These, and other forensic
measures, will prove critical in defeating IED networks
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and bringing them
into play now will greatly enhance the targeting capabilities
of the U.S. and Mexico.
New tools and training regarding this threat must
also be given to the Border Patrol and regional law
enforcement organizations, as they are the most
likely targets of any attack. Various sprays capable
of detecting explosive residue are widely available
and can be used in a variety of practical ways.
Any attempt to have counter remote-controlled IED
(RCIED) electronic warfare (CREW) systems placed
on Border Patrol vehicles on a large scale is unlikely
due to both cost and high frequency of clearance
issues involving the Federal Aviation Agency and
Federal Communications Commission. However, a
plan to have few vehicles per sector equipped with
CREW devices for limited use only during suspected
IED threats would likely be authorized and would
meet budget constraints. As there is a large pool
of professionals who have vast experience in dealing
with IED attacks, an effective training program
would be easy to implement and would be low cost
if combined with existing programs.
Intelligent procedures must be implemented so
that the cartels lose far more than they gain from
conducting these attacks. This will also ensure
that these threats have limited duration. The primary
intent of an attack will be to draw Border
Patrol agents away from their duties to respond to a
situation thus opening the way for traffickers. It will
be much easier for Border Patrol agents to maintain
their assignments if they know that the situation
is being handled effectively, rather than being
caught off-guard with no set of tested procedures in
place for emergency response. Training for an IED
event in advance will result in reaction based on established
procedures rather than on hesitation and
will result in a manageable situation rather than a
crisis situation. The secondary motivation for these
attacks is to instill fear and caution into Border
Patrol agents and to slow their response due to the
real or perceived threat of an IED. Proper training
that involves IED recognition and reaction procedures,
along with the availability and presence of
countermeasures, will undermine this more subtle
effect, which is the intent of current IED use in
Mexico.
Conclusion
As the saying goes, the intelligence community
must stay left of boom, and the opportunity to do
this is slowly slipping away as this threat draws ever
nearer. Rather than wait until the situation gets out
of control, security services must prepare now to
ensure that any attempt to exploit the border using
IEDs is short. The U.S. has learned numerous lessons
in regard to IED use due to its experiences in
April - June 2011 49