George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists
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plant, gave concrete evidence to these lawmakers <strong>of</strong><br />
North Korean nuclear proliferation. 11 Sharing this<br />
technology with Syria likely brought a significant<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> financial support to the reclusive regime<br />
in North Korea.<br />
The current show <strong>of</strong> nuclear capabilities by North<br />
Korea could include a capability demonstration<br />
to potential customers. A North Korean sale <strong>of</strong> a<br />
nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization like Al<br />
Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Hamas would serve many purposes.<br />
A condition <strong>of</strong> a sale might include conducting<br />
a detonation on U.S. soil, or at least against a<br />
large U.S. military population such as in Iraq or<br />
Afghanistan. The sale would generate both revenue<br />
for North Korea, and achieve a military victory<br />
against the U.S. The revenue gained would enable<br />
North Korea to purchase both commodities and military<br />
related equipment. The commodities would give<br />
stability to the nation and satisfy Juche ideology. A<br />
military victory in a war <strong>of</strong> proxy against the U.S.<br />
would cleanse North Korean hands <strong>of</strong> allegations <strong>of</strong><br />
wrongdoing, and keep the U.S. military on its heels.<br />
With the U.S. military reeling from a possible significant<br />
loss, the North Koreans could capitalize on<br />
this event and launch a preemptive strike against<br />
South Korea. A unified Korean Peninsula under the<br />
rule <strong>of</strong> North Korea has been a long-standing goal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the isolated nation. Key indicators should allow<br />
analysts to determine intentions by North Korea.<br />
Analysts must take a holistic look at the entirety<br />
<strong>of</strong> the North Korean military in order to determine<br />
possible aggressive intentions from this rogue nation.<br />
A North Korean military conflict would be precipitated<br />
by movements <strong>of</strong> large units and pieces <strong>of</strong><br />
equipment from storage areas to areas <strong>of</strong> anticipated<br />
engagement. Indications and Warning would allow<br />
only limited time for reaction. However, the movement<br />
<strong>of</strong> such large forces would take time in order<br />
to be prepared for engagement. Understanding<br />
non-typical military movements is paramount to<br />
the warning <strong>of</strong> potential direct military conflict with<br />
North Korea. Proliferation <strong>of</strong> technology and weapons<br />
from North Korea to Iran are predictable and<br />
understandable from this perspective.<br />
Many weapons, especially missile technology<br />
in the Iranian inventory seems to replicate North<br />
Korean missile systems. As the other remaining<br />
“Axis <strong>of</strong> Evil,” it would only make sense that the foes<br />
<strong>of</strong> the U.S. unite and share information, technology,<br />
and equipment in order to defeat the common<br />
enemy. The commonality between the two nations<br />
stems from purchasing technology and information<br />
from Abdul Qadeer Khan. 12 A. Q. Khan, a renowned<br />
Pakistani with expertise in nuclear energy and<br />
weapons, purportedly sold centrifuge technology to<br />
North Korea and Iran before his capture. 13 Iran is<br />
likely paying great attention to western reactions to<br />
North Korea’s nuclear declaration and testing.<br />
Iran’s policy to the U.S., Israel, and the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world will take shape as world reactions to North<br />
Korea’s nuclear ambitions evolve. Confronting Iran<br />
is difficult given the significant U.S. military presence<br />
in the Middle East. Analysts must determine<br />
whether the intention <strong>of</strong> Iran is to build peaceful<br />
nuclear energy or a nuclear weapons capability.<br />
Given the limited resources, information from<br />
within the withdrawn nation makes analysis difficult.<br />
The miscalculated analysis <strong>of</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong><br />
weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction in Iraq prior to military<br />
conflict in 2003, may lead analysts to refuse<br />
to make a concrete determination on the capabilities<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Iranian nuclear program. This bias could<br />
place the security <strong>of</strong> the Middle East in jeopardy.<br />
If the U.S. does not engage Iran prior to a declared<br />
nuclear weapons capability, then it is forced to deal<br />
with the aftermath <strong>of</strong> a nuclear weapons capable<br />
Iran. U.S. policy towards Iran would likely change in<br />
the advent <strong>of</strong> austere changes in Iran’s nuclear capabilities.<br />
In the event that Iran is simply interested<br />
in peaceful nuclear energy, and the U.S. attacked<br />
Iran, the world would hold the U.S. directly responsible<br />
for the aggression. A miscalculated judgment<br />
could cost the U.S. insurmountable losses in the financial<br />
sector, a loss <strong>of</strong> authority within the world,<br />
and create retaliations by Iran against the U.S.<br />
with the gravest conditions. This burden on analysts<br />
creates a bias that unless gotten rid <strong>of</strong> makes<br />
the right decision by policymakers nothing short <strong>of</strong><br />
questionable.<br />
The analyst’s job is not to influence policy. The<br />
analyst’s job is to inform policymakers on events<br />
and potential courses <strong>of</strong> action by the enemy. Indepth<br />
analysis utilizing the political, economic, military,<br />
social, infrastructure and information factors<br />
enable analysts to take into consideration multiple<br />
aspects when drawing conclusions. Competing hy-<br />
64 Military Intelligence