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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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plant, gave concrete evidence to these lawmakers <strong>of</strong><br />

North Korean nuclear proliferation. 11 Sharing this<br />

technology with Syria likely brought a significant<br />

amount <strong>of</strong> financial support to the reclusive regime<br />

in North Korea.<br />

The current show <strong>of</strong> nuclear capabilities by North<br />

Korea could include a capability demonstration<br />

to potential customers. A North Korean sale <strong>of</strong> a<br />

nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization like Al<br />

Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Hamas would serve many purposes.<br />

A condition <strong>of</strong> a sale might include conducting<br />

a detonation on U.S. soil, or at least against a<br />

large U.S. military population such as in Iraq or<br />

Afghanistan. The sale would generate both revenue<br />

for North Korea, and achieve a military victory<br />

against the U.S. The revenue gained would enable<br />

North Korea to purchase both commodities and military<br />

related equipment. The commodities would give<br />

stability to the nation and satisfy Juche ideology. A<br />

military victory in a war <strong>of</strong> proxy against the U.S.<br />

would cleanse North Korean hands <strong>of</strong> allegations <strong>of</strong><br />

wrongdoing, and keep the U.S. military on its heels.<br />

With the U.S. military reeling from a possible significant<br />

loss, the North Koreans could capitalize on<br />

this event and launch a preemptive strike against<br />

South Korea. A unified Korean Peninsula under the<br />

rule <strong>of</strong> North Korea has been a long-standing goal<br />

<strong>of</strong> the isolated nation. Key indicators should allow<br />

analysts to determine intentions by North Korea.<br />

Analysts must take a holistic look at the entirety<br />

<strong>of</strong> the North Korean military in order to determine<br />

possible aggressive intentions from this rogue nation.<br />

A North Korean military conflict would be precipitated<br />

by movements <strong>of</strong> large units and pieces <strong>of</strong><br />

equipment from storage areas to areas <strong>of</strong> anticipated<br />

engagement. Indications and Warning would allow<br />

only limited time for reaction. However, the movement<br />

<strong>of</strong> such large forces would take time in order<br />

to be prepared for engagement. Understanding<br />

non-typical military movements is paramount to<br />

the warning <strong>of</strong> potential direct military conflict with<br />

North Korea. Proliferation <strong>of</strong> technology and weapons<br />

from North Korea to Iran are predictable and<br />

understandable from this perspective.<br />

Many weapons, especially missile technology<br />

in the Iranian inventory seems to replicate North<br />

Korean missile systems. As the other remaining<br />

“Axis <strong>of</strong> Evil,” it would only make sense that the foes<br />

<strong>of</strong> the U.S. unite and share information, technology,<br />

and equipment in order to defeat the common<br />

enemy. The commonality between the two nations<br />

stems from purchasing technology and information<br />

from Abdul Qadeer Khan. 12 A. Q. Khan, a renowned<br />

Pakistani with expertise in nuclear energy and<br />

weapons, purportedly sold centrifuge technology to<br />

North Korea and Iran before his capture. 13 Iran is<br />

likely paying great attention to western reactions to<br />

North Korea’s nuclear declaration and testing.<br />

Iran’s policy to the U.S., Israel, and the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />

world will take shape as world reactions to North<br />

Korea’s nuclear ambitions evolve. Confronting Iran<br />

is difficult given the significant U.S. military presence<br />

in the Middle East. Analysts must determine<br />

whether the intention <strong>of</strong> Iran is to build peaceful<br />

nuclear energy or a nuclear weapons capability.<br />

Given the limited resources, information from<br />

within the withdrawn nation makes analysis difficult.<br />

The miscalculated analysis <strong>of</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong><br />

weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction in Iraq prior to military<br />

conflict in 2003, may lead analysts to refuse<br />

to make a concrete determination on the capabilities<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Iranian nuclear program. This bias could<br />

place the security <strong>of</strong> the Middle East in jeopardy.<br />

If the U.S. does not engage Iran prior to a declared<br />

nuclear weapons capability, then it is forced to deal<br />

with the aftermath <strong>of</strong> a nuclear weapons capable<br />

Iran. U.S. policy towards Iran would likely change in<br />

the advent <strong>of</strong> austere changes in Iran’s nuclear capabilities.<br />

In the event that Iran is simply interested<br />

in peaceful nuclear energy, and the U.S. attacked<br />

Iran, the world would hold the U.S. directly responsible<br />

for the aggression. A miscalculated judgment<br />

could cost the U.S. insurmountable losses in the financial<br />

sector, a loss <strong>of</strong> authority within the world,<br />

and create retaliations by Iran against the U.S.<br />

with the gravest conditions. This burden on analysts<br />

creates a bias that unless gotten rid <strong>of</strong> makes<br />

the right decision by policymakers nothing short <strong>of</strong><br />

questionable.<br />

The analyst’s job is not to influence policy. The<br />

analyst’s job is to inform policymakers on events<br />

and potential courses <strong>of</strong> action by the enemy. Indepth<br />

analysis utilizing the political, economic, military,<br />

social, infrastructure and information factors<br />

enable analysts to take into consideration multiple<br />

aspects when drawing conclusions. Competing hy-<br />

64 Military Intelligence

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