George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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Services Intelligence (ISI), the organization that had previously coordinated mujahedeen resistance to the Soviet occupation. 18 These connections substantially shaped operations in Kandahar. One report indicates that Pakistan provided indirect fire support during the Spin Boldak raid. Pakistan also provided logistical assistance. In the final assault on Kandahar City, Taliban combatants were reportedly armed with new weapons, supplied through Pakistani channels. 19 In addition to military assets, Pakistan provided political and financial support. For example, Colonel Imam, the Pakistani ISI representative in Afghanistan at the time, reportedly assisted in securing Naqib’s cooperation through a 1.5 million USD bribe. 20 The Taliban’s ability to shape the battlefield through managing political-military networks before kinetic operations commenced proved an overwhelming advantage against a clearly divided group of self-interested warlords. Such insights might help inform modern International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan. While historical comparisons must be drawn cautiously, co-opting political-military networks represents a viable strategy that would likely assist counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. As Michael Semple argues, the Taliban is a patchwork of political loyalties: […] the current insurgency is not monolithic, but rather a loose association of different commander networks that have some overlapping interests but that also have varying degrees of adherence to the leadership of the Taliban movement. Although […] the prospects of a general political agreement between the Afghan government and the insurgency are poor, […] there is potential for the reconciliation of particular commander networks [emphasis added]. 21 However, ISAF cannot exploit these divisions if it does not invest sufficient intelligence resources into mapping human terrain. “Friendly” link diagrams and orders of battle are just as important as their “enemy” counterparts, as distinctions between friend and foe in a COIN environment should be proactively manipulated rather than passively accepted. Thus, ISAF intelligence operations can and should incorporate lessons learned from Taliban successes into its own process. Yet, the Taliban continues to possess a substantial advantage over ISAF forces in network mobilization, as foreign advisors will never be able to match the Taliban’s understanding of human geography. The Afghan National Army (ANA) may prove more adept, but even they will face challenges, as most ANA soldiers deploy to locations outside their native province. 22 At the same time, the Taliban has gradually lost its reputation as a neutral and just governor in many parts of the country. 23 This presents an opportunity for ISAF to leverage popular discontent in order to solicit intelligence that facilitates network mapping in exchange for security and socio-economic assistance. As stated in Major General Michael Flynn’s recent report on intelligence in Afghanistan, the key is to focus on the non-lethal elements–including network manipulation–rather than massing resources to plan the next “kill-orcapture” mission. 24 Endnotes 1. Reports on the exact number of individuals involved in the attack range from forty to two hundred. 2. Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, Editors: Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 72 and David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 181-2. Zaeef’s account indicates that fighting may have ended in as little as fifteen minutes. 3. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 27-8. 4. Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994- 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 60-2. 5. Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, Editor: William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 47-8. 6. Ibid, 67. 7. Zaeef, 72-3. Some scholars argue that then incumbent President Rabbani supported Naqib’s decision to cooperate with the Taliban. See also Davis, 49-50. Such explanations seem plausible given that Rabbani likely viewed the early Taliban movement as a means to undermine Hekmatyar, who was heavily engaged in armed conflict against the Rabbini coalition in Kabul. Whatever the case, not only did Naqib not resist, but he offered heavy weapon support for Taliban fighters as well. 8. Zaeef, 69-70. 9. Ibid, 73-5. Some reports indicate that additional militants under Mansur Achakzai, Amir Lalai and Sarkateb continued resistance into the final two days of fighting. 60 Military Intelligence
10. Davis, 54. The PDPA was the communist regime that ruled in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992. Given that the allegation was made by one of the Taliban’s adversaries, Hekmatyar, the number is likely exaggerated. However, even if inflated, the report still highlights the extent of Taliban influence in former military networks. 11. For background information about warlordism and the political landscape in Kandahar, see Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, ““Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005,” LSE Crisis States Research Center, September 2006. 12. Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 240-1. 13. Abdulkader H. Sinno, “The Taliban’s Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns,” The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 79-82. 14. Drawn loosely from various sources, including: Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias, “The Resurgence of the Taliban in Kabul: Logar and Wardak;” Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, edited by Antonio Giuztozzi,51; Pravin Rajan, “Networks of Faith and Community: The Taliban and Political Mobilization in Contemporary ‘AfPak,” unpublished paper, and Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond. 15. Anthony Hyman, “Nationalism in Afghanistan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002): 299-300. 16. David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 17. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, 242-3. 18. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan and the Taliban,” Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban. 19. Davis, 49-50. Reports from the battle describe a plethora of grease paper left “everywhere as the madrassa students removed the new weapons from their wrappings.” 20. Ibid, 49. 21. Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 3. 22. See Samuel Chan, “Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army,” Military Review, January-February 2009 and Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan’s National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. 6, Issue 9, May 2008. 23. Semple, 46-7. 24. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington: Center for New American Security, January 2010). First Lieutenant Tyler Jost is a Military Intelligence officer with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an MA from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He can be contacted at tyler.jost@us.army.mil. The order creating the Army Intelligence and Security branch is signed by Army Chief of Staff Gen. George H. Decker on 1 July 1962. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Alva Fitch, is at the far left April - June 2011 61
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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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