George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

Signals Intelligence in Full Spectrum Operations:
“Outside the Wire? What Wire?”
Warrant Officer One Larry Jones and Sergeant First Class Timothy Rodriguez
Introduction
The tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) missions
and resultant observations from the 3/82 ABN full
spectrum operations (FSO) rotation in October 2010
at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) were
considerably different from our “normal” counterinsurgency
(COIN) centric mission rehearsal exercises
(MRE) missions and observations. The three major
lessons learned were:
There is a lack of a comprehensive SIGINT
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
There is too much focus on “sophisticated” communication
methods.
There is a lack of tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) to use SIGINT collection systems
tactically.
COIN is but a small part of FSO, it is nonetheless
driving how the Army is currently training SIGINT
Soldiers.
There are three underlying reasons why FSO has
become a lower SIGINT training priority over the last
10 years. The first major challenge involves live environment
training and the Relief in Place/Transfer
of Authority (RIP/TOA) process. Units focus their
SIGINT platoon entirely on their future battle space
where the SIGINT operational environment (OE) is
fully matured. Also, traditional SIGINT IPB is not
taught as part of the larger Military Decision Making
Process (MDMP). The second challenge is that units
experience a large personnel turnover in the tactical
SIGINT platoon and do not set priorities for
home station training focusing on traditional FSO
requirements. As a result, units default to their experiences
in Iraq and Afghanistan and train accordingly.
This focus on the CENTCOM mature theater
eliminates the training on much of the SIGINT spectrum
necessary for FSO.
The final challenge is time (operational tempo).
Leaders do not have time to prioritize the necessary
SIGINT training for FSO. Time between deployments
is limited and focused on their future battlespace.
SIGINT platoons do not train on maneuvering and
employing tactical SIGINT assets and focus instead
on their next deployment. 3/82 ABN experienced all
of these challenges before their rotation and experienced
the effects of these challenges during their
FSO rotation.
OE Tunnel Vision
In the current COIN operational environment, traditional
IPB is deemed unnecessary as units RIP
and “fall in on” a mature SIGINT enterprise. Tactical
SIGINT platoons deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq
commonly do not complete an IPB of the SIGINT
environment; relying instead on products already
developed by the outgoing unit. SIGINT Soldiers rotating
into a COIN fight often fall into an already
established SIGINT environment where enemy networks
are already identified and targeting lines have
already been developed and often have been worked
for months, if not years.
FSO is completely different in that there is likely
an immature SIGINT environment compared to that
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously, in a forced entry
situation, there is no RIP/TOA process. 3/82 ABN
was challenged by the fact that their tactical SIGINT
Soldiers had limited training and experience to conduct
SIGINT IPB during the MDMP preceding their
forced entry operation. 3/82 ABN quickly discovered
that their difficulty in defining the SIGINT OE
prior to initial entry by identifying the best places
for signals collection and exploitation was an absolute
necessity and prevented them from effective
collection until D+2.
Another challenge experienced by 3/82 ABN was
not having a developed SIGINT collection plan prior
to initial entry that tied back to a comprehensive
collection plan focused on intelligence gaps and
the commander’s priority intelligence requirements
(PIRs). Additionally, inconsistent communication
with the fusion cell hampered the SIGINT cells collection
focus.
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