George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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20. FM 2-01.3, MCRP 2-3A: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield /Battlespace, 2009. 21. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: The U.S. Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, January 2008. 22. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 3-20. 23. Ibid. 24. Michael Flynn, Matt Pottinger, & Paul Batchelor. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 2010) 14. 25. Daft, 152. 26. Ibid., 145. 27. Ibid., 152. 28. FM 34-8 Combat Commander’s Handbook on Intelligence, 1992 Front Cover. 29. FM 100-5 Operations, 1944, 49. 30. FM 2-0, 1-11. 31. Ibid., 1-12. 32. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 2005, 1. 33. FM 5-0, 1. MAJ Ismael Rodriguez is a 2010 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School Special Operation Irregular Warfare Masters degree program. He is currently in ILE at Redstone Arsenal and is on orders to the AF/PAK Hands Program. He has deployed to Iraq with the 172 nd SBCT, and has served as an intelligence planner at the ASCC and brigade level, an SBCT Surveillance Troop Commander, and a battalion intelligence officer for both a Field Artillery and light Infantry battalion. He can be contacted at ismael.r.rodriguez@us.army.mil. 44 Military Intelligence
y Sergeant Matthew Ludwig The opinions expressed in this document are my own and do not represent any official Department of Defense or U.S. Government policy or position. Introduction The U.S. was caught off-guard by the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, IEDs were an unexpected threat used by remnants of the Taliban after their removal from power. While IEDs were expected to be used by pro-Saddamist insurgents following the invasion of Iraq, the level of sophistication achieved by groups affiliated with alternate extremist movements could not have been foreseen. Despite the lessons learned about IED use from these two conflicts, the U.S. has failed to prepare itself and will again be caught off-guard, this time by the cartels currently causing turmoil in Mexico. Despite news reports detailing the cartels’ use of IEDs and their recent transition to vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), the situation remains under-analyzed, and security forces are unprepared for a situation that may involve IED use along the border. If the U.S. does not prepare for this eventual occurrence, it will run the risk of attempting to play catch-up again, only this time with an enemy who is harder to catch. Accurate prediction as to when IED use will move north requires an understanding of the situation in Mexico and the conditions and events that could prompt the use of this tactic. Warring Cartels The current reality in Mexico is that the government is caught in the middle of a war between two groups of cartels. On one side is the New Federation, led by the Sinaloa, La Familia, and Gulf Cartels, while on the other side is the group consisting of the upstart Los Zetas and their allies. The fighting between these two factions is the reason for the current cycle of violence that has left Mexico in turmoil. The effort to gain power and influence has led to an increase in ruthless and brutal tactics. As with any conflict, innovation breeds imitation and Mexico is no exception. Los Zetas are the driving force behind the increase in brazen violence. Their consistent effort to instill fear in their enemies is driving their opponents to retaliate in kind. 1 The New Federation, headed by two former enemies, namely the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels, is currently the larger of the two alliances. The Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels joined forces due to the threat posed by the newer cartels. The violence propagated by groups such as Los Zetas had destroyed the symbiotic relationship the cartels had previously maintained with the Mexican people and their government. The New Federation appears to receive less attention from the Mexican government and security forces than their competitors. The reasons for this vary, but the prevailing theories are government corruption and the fact that the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels are similar to the American Mafia, as they prefer to keep their operations quiet in order to draw less attention to their activities. The likely truth is that the New Federation is the lesser of the two evils in the eyes of the Mexican government, and the initial decision was to focus security efforts on defeating the most violent of the cartels. Despite the New Federation’s stated intentions, whether grounded in truth or not, the current violence spurred by Los Zetas shows no sign of lessening. The New Federation continues to practice the same type of violent tactics as their rivals. 2 Los Zetas have a history full of twists and turns. They were initially a group of former Mexican Special Forces members who deserted to become April - June 2011 45
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George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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