George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus,
COIN operations always demand considerable
expenditures of time and resources. The populace
may prefer the HN government to the insurgents;
however, people do not actively support a
government unless they are convinced that
the counterinsurgents have the means, ability,
stamina, and will to win. The insurgents’ primary
battle is against the HN government, not the United
States; however, U.S. support can be crucial to
building public faith in that government’s viability.
The populace must have confidence in the staying
power of both the counterinsurgents and the HN
government. Insurgents and local populations often
believe that a few casualties or a few years will
cause the U.S. to abandon a COIN effort. Constant
reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds,
can overcome that perception and bolster faith
in the steadfastness of U.S. support. But even the
strongest U.S. commitment will not succeed if the
populace does not perceive the HN government
as having similar will and stamina. U.S. forces
must help create that capacity and sustain that
impression. 2
The Iraqi Partnership Program
As the security conditions in Iraq changed, the local
populace needed to see the Iraqi face on military
operations as the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) defending
their country. This capacity building provided an
assurance that the country would be in the capable
hands of the ISF as they carried out the operations.
To ensure this transfer of authority was complete,
the ISF needed to adopt some U.S. methods to ensure
they could capably assume the mission given
the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The HCT proof of concept
was the critical link to ensure the intelligence
process would develop and provide the framework
for Iraqi forces in future military operations.
In early January, HCT 356 began the process to
partner with the 10th IA Division MiTT. HCT 356
conducted training with their IA and IP counterparts
over the course of the year. Team members trained
the Iraqis on tasks such as tactical questioning, evidence
collection, gathering sworn statements, and
the warrant process to detain suspected persons.
As part of the security agreement, the Iraqi warrant
process had to be explained to the IA and IP so they
could understand the process U.S. forces used to
detain suspected persons. The HCT led the Iraqis
through a crawl, walk, and run training plan to ensure
the lessons were accurately retained. Other
HCTs who partnered with Iraqis taught classes on
the use of GPS, map reading, and basic questioning
techniques. This training foundation gave the
Iraqis the confidence to use these enablers in their
daily operations and prove their ability to the Iraqi
populace.
Establishing an Iraqi partnership is not as easy as
it sounds. The Iraqi unit must be willing to engage
in the partnership program. This may require several
informal agreements between the U.S. and Iraqi
military prior to formally establishing the partnership
program. There are also several external factors
necessary for the partnership to be successful.
First, the HCTs supported unit has to be willing to
support the HCT and align it with an Iraqi unit for
the partnership to begin. The HCT may have the
experience to begin the partnership immediately,
but without the unit’s support, the HCT and Iraqi
partnership will be ineffective. Also, the supported
unit has to provide the logistical resources for the
HCT to establish operations since the team is not
an organic asset to the BCT. The HCT brings basic
requirements such as computers, printers, and
intelligence equipment but basic necessities such
as office space, lodging, and meeting rooms are still
needed to conduct operations. The supported unit
needs to provide the logistical support for the HCT
to be effective so they can concentrate on establishing
the intelligence partnership program.
Once the ISF was prepared to conduct operations,
they demonstrated that they can locate indicators of
impending attacks as well as weapon caches. With
the assistance of HCT 098 and the supported unit,
172 nd BCT, the IA identified over twelve weapon
caches. The items found were improvised explosive
device components and rockets that were planned
56 Military Intelligence