George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

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Iraq and Afghanistan. None of these lessons, however, are being used on the border. The longer this threat is ignored, the more devastating its effects will be once attacks occur. The U.S. has willingly ceded the initiative, and its inaction has provided the cartels an opportunity to implement explosive devices whenever they so desire. As conditions inside Mexico and along the border change; and as it becomes more worthwhile to risk reaction to IEDs, the attacks will begin. If the U.S. undertakes a quick and comprehensive strategy now, it still has an opportunity to both prepare for and eventually negate its effectiveness. 9. John Murray, “Ciudad Juarez: War against Los Zetas, Along the Gulf and Into America,” The AWL, 22 April 2010, retrieved at http:// www.theawl.com/2010/04/ciudad-juarez-war-against-los-zetasalong-the-gulf-and-into-america. 10. Martin Barillas, “Is Mexico on the Verge of Collapse?” Spero News, 9 February 2009, retrieved at http://www.speroforum. com/a/18087/Is-Mexico-on-the-verge-of-collapse. 11. E. Eduardo Castillo, “Car bomb Damages Mexico TV Building,” The Washington Post, 28 August 2010, retrieved at http://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/27/car-bomb-damagesmexico-tv-building/. 12. Border Patrol Announcement. SBInet, 2009, retrieved at http:// www.cbp.gov/xp/ cgov/border_security/sbi/sbi_net/. 13. Jen Phillips, “Mexico’s New Super-Cartel Ups Violence in Power Play,” Mother Jones, 13 April 2010, retrieved at http://motherjones. com/mojo/2010/04/evolution-mexicos-cartel-war. 14. Earl Cebedo, “Alleged drug cartel leader in Mexico, arrested,” All Voices, 12 September 2010, retrieved at http://www.allvoices.com/ contributed-news/6741041-alleged-drug-cartel-leader-in-mexicoarrested 15. Alicia A. Caldwell, “US Official: Industrial Explosive Tovex Likely Used in Car Bomb Attack Against Mexican Police,” The Associated Press, 19 July, 2010, retrieved at http://www.news1130.com/ news/world/article/79260--us-official-industrial-explosive-tovexlikely-used-in-car-bomb-attack-against-mexican-police. 16. Oscar Villalba, “Massacre in Mexico: 17 killed at party,” The Associated Press, 8 July 2010, retrieved at http://www.wfaa.com/ news/world/Massacre-in-Mexico-17-killed-at-party-98705879. html. Endnotes 1. Kimberly Dvorak, “Los Zetas Drug Cartel Seizes 2 U.S. Ranches in Texas,” The Examiner, 24 July 2010, retrieved at http://www. examiner.com/county-political-buzz-in-san-diego/los-Zetas-drugcartel-seizes-2-u-s-ranches-texas. 2. George W. Grayson, “Mexico and the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2007, retrieved at http://www.fpri.org/ enotes/200708.grayson.mexicodrugcartels.html. 3. Samuel Logan, “Los Zetas: Evolution of a Criminal Organization,” ISN Security Watch, 11 March 2009, retrieved at http://www.isn.ethz. ch/isn/CurrentAffairs/SecurityWatch/Detail/?id=97554&lng=en. 4. Ibid. 5. Robert Campbell, “Drug War Puts Mexican Oil Industry on Defensive,” Reuters, 4 August 2010, retrieved at http://www. reuters.com/article/idUSN0417574420100804. 6. Tracy Wilkinson, “Mexican Drug Cartels Cripple Pemex Operations in Basin,” Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2010, retrieved at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/06/world/la-fg-mexicopemex-20100906. 7. Ibid. 8. Matt Badiali, “One of the World’s Biggest Oil Producers Is Going Bust,” Daily Wealth, 10 April 2010, retrieved at http://www. dailywealth.com/1323/One-of-the-World-s-Biggest-Oil-Producers- Is-Going-Bust. 17. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organization, 6 August 2010, retrieved at http://www.state.gov/s/ ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 18. William La Jeunesse and Maxim Lott, “The Myth of 90 Percent: Only a Small Fraction of Guns in Mexico Come from U.S.,” Fox News, 2 April 2009, retrieved at http://www.foxnews.com/ politics/2009/04/02/myth-percent-small-fraction-guns-mexicocome/. Works Cited Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. (NJ: Transaction Publishing, New Brunswick, 2008). Walsh, Mark. “Explosion at Pemex refinery kills 1 in Mexico,” The Associated Press, 8 retrieved at September 2010, retrieved at http:// www.760kfmb.com/Global/story.asp?S=13111843. Sergeant Ludwig has deployed twice in support of OIF, in 2006-2008 with the 1st Cavalry Division G2 assigned as the Al Qaeda in Iraq High-Value Individual Targeting Analyst and in 2009, again with 1CD as the Lead AQI and Sunni Insurgent Analyst until the Division redeployed in 2010. He is currently assigned to the CIED Branch of the Intelligence Electronic Warfare Test Directorate at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 50 Military Intelligence
y First Lieutenant Nathaniel L. Moir Introduction It is an oft-quoted truism that “Intelligence drives Operations,” as the Intelligence Section is responsible for the preparation and assessment of the battlefield. However, many Intelligence sections do not always fully utilize enablers in shaping and assessing the battlefield environment as it relates to preventing and mitigating civilian casualties (CIVCAS). This may lead to an incomplete assessment of the battlefield which potentially weakens the prevention of CIVCAS. What, then, is the role of Military Intelligence (MI) as it relates to CIVCAS incident prevention and mitigation and why is it important? The issue of CIVCAS is addressed in this article along two main themes. The first regards support that may be provided in preventing CIVCAS. This is examined by looking at how force ‘enablers’ may contribute to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) as a tool in mapping human terrain more extensively. Increased use of enablers is also discussed as a way to increase population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Population-centric approaches, versus enemy-centric approaches, are keys to more effective prevention of CIVCAS and this may be achieved through greater inclusion of enablers into the IPB process. The second theme of the paper addresses the mitigation and control of CIVCAS when it does occur. This focuses on how intelligence sections, through use of enablers and Information Operations (IO), may more effectively assist in lessening the operational impact of CIVCAS in the public’s perception at both local, and potentially, international levels. CIVCAS–Why it is Important, Why it is a Problem The issue of civilian casualties continues to be a major issue during OEF and directly impacts the effectiveness and legitimacy of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Therefore, the importance of preventing, and quickly responding to CIVCAS in the battlespace, whether caused by insurgents or Coalition Forces (CF), is critical. In this regard, CIVCAS has important operational implications for the local base of support for the CF. Insurgents seek to manipulate incidents of CF-caused CIVCAS. They further blame the CF of CIVCAS that insurgents themselves have unintentionally caused and, in many cases, intentionally caused for the explicit purpose of weakening support for the ISAF’s mission. Due to the speed and ease of communications technology, reports of CIVCAS may be broadcast internationally. This factor is manipulated by insurgents to decrease support for Coalition and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s efforts in courts of public opinion. CIVCAS, thus, is an ostensible strategic concern; its prevention and mitigation should be a priority for battlespace owners from squad leaders and up the chain of command. Unfortunately, Intelligence Sections are not fully utilized in efforts to prevent and mitigate CIVCAS. All too often, S2 Sections demonstrate an overall enemy-centric focus. April - June 2011 51
Page 2 and 3: Commanding General Brigadier Genera
Page 4 and 5: always out front by by Brigadier Br
Page 6 and 7: 4 Military Intelligence
Page 8 and 9: All the STX lanes included time for
Page 10 and 11: access to a higher echelon tactical
Page 12 and 13: We should also note that the 2006 F
Page 14 and 15: BCTs will face a more sophisticated
Page 16 and 17: Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Haynicz
Page 18 and 19: 1. A qualified field support engine
Page 20 and 21: The Role of the Company Intelligenc
Page 22 and 23: with operational requirements. Patr
Page 24 and 25: Targeting is another critical area
Page 26 and 27: Chief Warrant Officer Three Conan P
Page 28 and 29: provides and how HUMINT collects it
Page 30 and 31: We have the SIGINT equipment to cov
Page 32 and 33: Sergeant First Class Bryan J. Ward
Page 34 and 35: Engineer support provided to the TU
Page 36 and 37: model is the lack of appropriately
Page 38 and 39: COIST members is that their focus m
Page 40 and 41: fore information is pulled away by
Page 42 and 43: y Major Ismael R. Rodriguez Militar
Page 44 and 45: e no solution at all. Thus, determi
Page 46 and 47: 20. FM 2-01.3, MCRP 2-3A: Intellige
Page 48 and 49: a bodyguard and assassination unit
Page 50 and 51: device from a distance without expo
Page 54 and 55: This, of course, is Intelligence’
Page 56 and 57: fined steps to prevent CIVCAS shoul
Page 58 and 59: Insurgencies are protracted by natu
Page 60 and 61: y First Lieutenant Tyler Jost In 19
Page 62 and 63: Services Intelligence (ISI), the or
Page 64 and 65: y Robert J. Leach In the U.S., inte
Page 66 and 67: plant, gave concrete evidence to th
Page 68 and 69: it was a case of mistaken identity,
Page 70 and 71: culturation, and one of its consequ
Page 72 and 73: of the actual negotiation process,
Page 74 and 75: leader who appears to have complete
Page 76 and 77: and data constantly bombards intell
Page 78 and 79: elies heavily upon on a person-to-p
Page 80 and 81: Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CI
Page 82 and 83: The event itself has been written a
Page 84 and 85: Soldiers at Camp Tracy deliberately
Page 86 and 87: contact and article Submission Info

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