George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

e no solution at all. Thus, determining the feasibility
of potential plans is dependent “on realistic
judgment, the capability to appraise ‘exotic’ ideas
and on the amount of trust and credibility between
planner and clientele.” 17
As evident in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders
Production, some military doctrine takes a realistic
view of the world. It fully accepts the notion that
uncertainty exists and that it yields unpredictability.
18 Yet, is this commonplace in other military doctrine?
Unfortunately, the doctrine is inconsistent,
and there seems to be a disconnection between
operational and intelligence doctrine on this subject.
Predictive intelligence analysis has long been
the gospel for intelligence professionals. At a minimum,
FM 2-0, Intelligence pays lip service to the
uncertain environment of the modern battlefield,
accepting that “The environment we operate in is
characterized by violence, uncertainty, complexity,
and asymmetric methods by the threat.” 19 This is
not quite the case with other intelligence doctrine.
In fact, quite recently, the dogma of predictive intelligence
is still evident throughout FM 2-01.3,
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 20
On the other hand, operational doctrine is largely
clear in its perception of uncertainty. TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-5-500, The U.S. Commander’s
Appreciation and Campaign Design even builds upon
the wicked problem theory. 21 Instead of harping on
prediction, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, chooses to
emphasize understanding. The field manual’s chapter
“Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” contends
that “the purpose of this IPB step [determine threat
courses of action] is to understand insurgent approaches
and tactics so they can be effectively countered…The
insurgents’ approach is based on their
objectives, desired end state, and requirements of
the operational environment.” 22 Understanding essentially
replaces prediction. If the very nature of
uncertainty makes it is impossible to predict, then
the emphasis on prediction seems ill informed.
Is there a way to reconcile prediction and uncertainty?
The linear methods of solving certain intelligence
problems may still hold some relevance. For
one, not all adversaries are insurgents. Moreover,
the scientific methods used to determine cause and
effect will continue to have value. Even in a challenging
human environment, the military intelligence
community could tap into a variety of social
science related fields in order to predict certain human
behaviors and activities. These applications
should also have strong spatial components. As
such, the application of geospatial information systems
could be of great value. For instance, military
doctrine has taken notice of these trends. FM 3-24,
devotes much of its Appendix B to Social Network
Analysis. 23 The intelligence community has invested
heavily in geospatial capabilities that could have the
potential to tap into cutting edge techniques used
by the academic and research communities.
The doctrinal foundations of the intelligence and
operations planning community offer several practical
means to decrease uncertainty. The tenets of
the Military Decision Making Process present a systematic
method of understanding the intricacies of
an operation. While intelligence planners may wish
to focus their efforts on defining the operational
environment and assessing the capabilities of the
enemy, there are still other important ways to contend
with uncertainty. By sorting out a complicated
landscape and describing an adaptive enemy, the
intelligence planner essentially presents an uncertain
environment. The intelligence planner can then
turn attention to the means of contending with that
uncertainty.
One possibly overlooked method of contending with
uncertainty is task organization. Simple changes
to the command and control of intelligence organizations
can have profound effects. Major General
Flynn, Captain Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor recently
noted this phenomenon in Afghanistan. In
their example, a Marine infantry battalion chose to
send its intelligence analysts down to the company
level, placing skilled professionals at a level where
they could have first hand access to an assortment
of front line collectors. 24 From a theoretical standpoint,
this approach makes sense. From the perspective
of organizational design, a decentralized
organization can contend with the challenges of a
complex and dynamic situation. 25
Flynn’s proposal to use a journalist-style network
of contacts fits within this context as well. In essence,
these investigative officers provide a critical
linkage to the outside environment, creating what
Daft terms “boundary spanning roles” in order to
“link and coordinate an organization with key elements
in the external environment.” 26 In any case,
the traditional top heavy bureaucratic field organi-
42 Military Intelligence