George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

The unit employed an organic, air-droppable tactical
command and control HMMWV (named the
SHARC) uploaded with multiple communication and
analysis systems for rapidly establishing command
and control immediately following the airborne insertion.
For the Intelligence section, communication
systems for initial entry included GRRIP (Global
Rapid Response Information Package) for primary
digital communications loaded with “mIRC chat”
capability and a stand-alone Distributed Common
Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) to process data.
For communication with Battalions, the PACE was
primarily the same, replacing the Iridiums with
Blue Force Tracker/Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (BFT/FBCB2), and as a last resort,
runners.
This plan was effective in communicating with
subordinate battalions during the initial insertion.
As operations continued and the BCT footprint increased,
FM communications were strained due to
distance, necessitating the use of digital systems.
For communication with the JTF HQ, FM communications
never materialized and the BCT S2 exercised
their alternate plan, immediately switching to
mIRC Chat over GRRIP. This was very successful
in communicating and passing data. However, had
the GRRIP system failed, there was no redundant
method for data exchange and therefore would have
severely limited intelligence support and coordination
during the initial phase of operations.
As stated earlier, the past decade of persistent
conflict has afforded units the ability to fight digitally,
using assured communications and access to
data. The rotational unit employed all of their digital
systems in the planning and preparation phase
prior to operations. The unit then shifted to analog
systems for Initial Entry operations, requiring
those units without connectivity, particularly at
company and battalion level, to fight from analog
systems, mainly FM radios and mapboards. BFT
was included in the PACE plan, but use was limited.
The plan for the employment of the DCGS-A
called for all pre-deployment Intelligence products
and extracted data to be copied to all operator laptops
prior to departure in anticipation of the period
of limited to no digital communications inherent in
initial entry operations.
This concept of operations (CONOP) was intended
to allow operators at all echelons to continue to produce
mapping, link diagramming, spatial, and temporal
analytical products digitally using data current
as of departure from the ISB as long as there was
power available. Collaboration across all elements,
as well as current data updates from higher headquarters
(HHQ), was intended to be accomplished
using DCGS-A Offline Case files and ARC Shape
files transferred via the unit’s PACE plan. Once full
Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) capability
and digital connectivity was established, the intent
was to shift collaboration and data update functions
to the BCT and HHQ ABCS Publish and Subscribe
Servers as designed.
The BCT HQ established partial digital connectivity
within four hours after initial entry and full
digital connectivity on D+2. The Battalions followed
with full connectivity by D+3. The unit’s plan for
employment of DCGS was successful and facilitated
limited situational awareness at the BCT level.
GRRIP was also successful as an initial connectivity
platform. The Brigade Support Element (BISE)
Chief was able to communicate with JTF counterparts
(via GRRIP mIRC Chat) within hours of Initial
Entry and was able to access data resident on HHQ
systems, receive data updates via Offline Case files,
and disseminate data to subordinate elements via
Offline Case files shortly thereafter.
The Digital-Analog-Digital Transition
The unit learned that the transition from digitalanalog-digital
must be a deliberate, planned process.
As discussed above, the PACE plan must be
identified by specific system with redundant methods.
The plan for DCGS connectivity must be developed
and understood by all operators. Additionally,
the BCT should not wait on battalions to establish
digital capability, but should direct a set date-timegroup
for subordinates to establish connectivity by
a specific system. This needs to be wargamed, synchronized
and resourced, as with any operation. To
ensure success, future units should employ plans
similar to 3/82 nd for initial operations considering
redundant communication systems whereby all analysts
have access to data until more mature communications
and servers are established. As such,
3/82 ABN chose not to employ their organic DCGS-A
Intelligence Fusion System (IFS) server sets at the
maneuver Battalions after considering the following
issues:
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