George w. casey jr. - Federation of American Scientists

are a number of areas in which we can help them
develop an enduring capacity, and because time is
so limited we must move to set the conditions for
Iraq post-December 2011 now. Reinforcing the existing
intelligence architecture by getting undertrained
personnel into the Intelligence schools their
own forces offer or offering exchange scholarships
at Fort Huachuca to the brightest and most promising
young officers might be a start. The problem is
that even though the Iraqi Army (IA) has an established
system of schooling, training, and on-the-job
experience, the culture of mistrust when sharing
information hampers further holistic development.
As our Commanding General put it, “We must do
some expectation management of what we can affect
because we are looking at the IA system from an
American standpoint and looking for ways to make
it more efficient, whereas they are looking at the
system with a legacy of corruption and attempting
to fix that internally first.” 2
It seems we spend half of our time trying to catchup
with the Iraqi brigade and division S2s who are
not so willing to share information about their current
targeting, not only with us, but also with each
other and especially with sister security force organizations
like the Iraqi Police (IP). As the country
attempts to transition to police primacy, IA leaders
must also understand how this affects the nature
of their organization. In turn, the U.S. Forces’ mission
to advise, train, and assist can ultimately be
successful if we have the Iraqi Forces’ cooperation.
Evaluating staff integration and coaching staff exercises
to the willing may be an effective way to get
the ISF to see the battlefield with a cross-sectional
lens, but they have more on their plate than simply
attending our recommended staff classes.
Our focus should assist through tangibles like
Actionable Intelligence derived from our technologically
advanced platforms, but also significant time
or more efforts spent on the advising aspect such as
teaching tradecraft in bilateral programs and providing
a focus through which the ISF will be able to
conduct a full security assessment, not limited to
threat actions. In order to be relevant and contribute
to mission success in the Intelligence Warfighting
Function, the mission tasks of “advise and assist”
must be accomplished simultaneously, but should
also take into account on what the Iraqis want to be
advised and assisted.
Finding Intellect in Intelligence
Eighteen months following this unit’s redeployment,
reset, and an NTC-rotation focused on the
transition to an Advise and Assist Brigade, and here
we are back in Iraq, in a new province with new
problems spread over 4,000 square kilometers. As of
1 September 2010, the total strength of U.S. Armed
Forces was capped at 50,000 personnel versus
nearly 170,000 at the war’s height. In operational
terms, this translates to roughly two battalions per
province. In Kirkuk, where we are deployed, there
is a Cavalry Squadron partnered with the IP in the
City. Our Infantry Battalion is partnered with the
ISF (to include the IA and IP) and Sons of Iraq (SoI))
in all areas outside of Kirkuk and the Combined
Security Area. The challenge is being responsible
for, “Kul Kirkuk, maad Medina,” or, “all of Kirkuk,
except for the City,” as our IA counterparts like to
say, highlighting the fact that everything affecting
our area stems from the political developments in
the provincial capital. In order to meet reduction in
force numbers, our Intel section was reduced below
the modified table of organization and equipment,
without the augmentation of analysts that General
Flynn’s article advocates. 3
Analyst shortfalls, however, have helped us focus
on being more efficient and utilizing all available
assets to include building competent COISTs that
work in conjunction with direct-support HUMINT
Collection Teams. What COIST leaders lack in formal
intelligence training, they make up for in aggressive
attitudes of would-be platoon leaders. Prior
to deployment, familiarization with our proposed
targeting process and tactical intelligence equipment
was essential for their ability to cope with an
ever-demanding deployment battle rhythm. Most
of the COIST officers-in-charge are from the Field
Artillery branch and use this additional assignment
as an effective way to help focus their company’s
targeting efforts. Still, getting the right personnel in
the right jobs is always a challenge.
While there has been some continuity in COIST
makeup, many of the junior Soldiers were redistributed
in order to meet line platoon shortages. That
leaves us heavily dependent on OICs and NCOICs
to take the initiative and be more than just an IST
and who are, in reality, the company commander’s
staff for all areas in which he wishes to advise
and assist the ISF. What we’ve tried to instill in our
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