Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
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<strong>Gisborne</strong> <strong>Hospital</strong> 1999 – 2000<br />
PSA Testing Procedures<br />
work with Dr Gowl<strong>and</strong>, Mr Ted Wesley, an executive member of the Prostate<br />
Awareness <strong>and</strong> Support Society:<br />
“As a lay person I was pleased with the professional attitude <strong>and</strong> the<br />
trouble being taken to track down <strong>and</strong> organise clinic visits for ‘at risk’<br />
men following errors in PSA reporting by the laboratory at <strong>Gisborne</strong><br />
<strong>Hospital</strong>. I am satisfied that everything possible is being done in the<br />
follow-up of these men. It is pleasing that of the men seen so far, no<br />
patient has been placed at further risk or clinically disadvantaged due to<br />
mistake in the PSA results. This, in no small part, reflects the rigorous<br />
follow-up <strong>and</strong> ongoing care they have received over the years despite the<br />
errors in the PSA tests.”<br />
4.13 Dr Gowl<strong>and</strong> began the summary of this report by commenting that “the THL<br />
laboratory appears to have been a disaster waiting to happen”. This is not just<br />
a retrospective view, made with the benefit of hindsight. Much the same<br />
language was used, <strong>and</strong> assessment made, by the Clinical Director (Surgery) in<br />
a letter to the Group Manager (Community & Support Services) dated 28<br />
September 1999. The Clinical Director (Surgery) complained of the regularity<br />
with which “fundamental” mistakes were occurring in the laboratory <strong>and</strong><br />
insisted that they required correction urgently. “These [mistakes] simply<br />
should not happen <strong>and</strong> need addressing with the utmost urgency before the<br />
disaster that is waiting to happen does happen.” The Clinical Director was not<br />
referring to mistakes in PSA testing, of course, but his assessment that the<br />
biochemistry section of the laboratory was a disaster waiting to happen was<br />
shared by others at the time, <strong>and</strong> confirmed by the events in 2000.<br />
5. ORGANISATIONAL, MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL<br />
FACTORS<br />
5.1 As will be clear already, the problem with PSA testing must be understood in<br />
context. Several organisational, management <strong>and</strong> institutional factors clearly<br />
contributed to the environment in which the mistakes occurred.<br />
Lack of resident pathologist<br />
5.2 Over the last ten years THL has had eight pathologists. There has been<br />
difficulty in attracting <strong>and</strong> then providing sufficient work, <strong>and</strong> work of a<br />
sufficiently varied <strong>and</strong> interesting nature, to keep an active pathologist fully<br />
occupied. The last resident pathologist resigned in late 1999 <strong>and</strong>, despite<br />
conscientious efforts, THL has been unable to appoint a successor.<br />
5.3 Throughout all the changes of the last few years THL has been determined to<br />
maintain an on-site pathologist, particularly in light of the needs of Maori.<br />
THL’s proposal to contract laboratory services to an alternative on-site<br />
provider (discussed later in this chapter) had at its core the requirement for an<br />
on-site pathologist. At a hui attended by my investigation team, staff were<br />
told of a perceived lack of cultural sensitivity by THL due to the lack of a<br />
residential pathologist at <strong>Gisborne</strong>. Since there was no pathologist at<br />
<strong>Gisborne</strong>, bodies were “stockpiled” before transportation to Tauranga for<br />
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