Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
Gisborne Hospital Report - Health and Disability Commissioner
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<strong>Gisborne</strong> <strong>Hospital</strong> 1999 – 2000<br />
Incident <strong>Report</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> Complaints Procedure<br />
4.10 Further examples of Tairawhiti <strong>Health</strong>care’s failure to identify the root cause<br />
of incidents are reflected in the response to incidents relating to Dr Lucas. The<br />
focus of management actions was on proximal events <strong>and</strong> there was no<br />
tracking back to root causes. For example, there was no initiation of a multidisciplinary<br />
forum for discussing proposed changes to practice prior to the<br />
introduction of restraints (straps), or resolution of communication difficulties<br />
between Dr Lucas <strong>and</strong> theatre staff.<br />
4.11 Another issue discussed by some interviewees was the responsibility <strong>and</strong><br />
accountability for following up incident reports. One senior clinician noted<br />
that there is a gap between the general management reporting pathway <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Clinical Director pathway when there are recommendations for action on an<br />
incident. He commented that “the gap appears when it comes to identifying<br />
who ultimately takes responsibility for those recommendations”. He observed<br />
that “there are often debates at Senior Management Group meetings over who<br />
should bear responsibility for dealing with incidents”. The Human Resources<br />
Manager illustrated the dilemma. He asked rhetorically, in relation to the<br />
alleged needle throwing incident, “who is responsible for h<strong>and</strong>ling the<br />
incident, the Clinical Director as a professional issue or the Group Manager as<br />
a disciplinary matter?”<br />
Feedback to staff following incident reporting<br />
4.12 The investigation team consistently received strong comment from staff that<br />
they expected, but had not received, feedback on the incident forms they<br />
submitted. The persistent lack of feedback has severely damaged the<br />
credibility of the incident reporting system in the eyes of many staff. The New<br />
Zeal<strong>and</strong> Nursing Organisation stated in its submission: “NZNO members have<br />
a strong view that completing incident forms was a waste of time because<br />
feedback was rare <strong>and</strong> frequently negative .… Professional responsibility <strong>and</strong><br />
an awareness of the importance of documentation led staff to continue filling<br />
in forms, rather than the belief that the situation would be addressed.”<br />
4.13 One senior doctor stated that “to fill in an incident form <strong>and</strong> get no feedback is<br />
like hitting your head against a brick wall. The perception is that the incident<br />
form goes into a big dark hole so there is no point in filling them in.”<br />
4.14 One of the strongest advocates that feedback should occur was Dr Lucas (see<br />
also para 4.40). His suggestion to that effect was passed on to the Senior<br />
Management Group by a Clinical Director.<br />
4.15 In contrast to the staff experience of receiving no feedback, the Human<br />
Resources Manager, who oversees the system, expected “the person who<br />
completes the incident form will be spoken to. The process is that the incident<br />
form is completed, the manager investigates <strong>and</strong> provides feedback to that<br />
person.”<br />
4.16 THL stated that:<br />
“The system is only as good as the people who use it. The staff need to<br />
fill in incident reports <strong>and</strong> there is no excuse for not completing them.<br />
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