Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
Child Support Enforcement - Sarpy County Nebraska
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The party requesting a deviation from the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines<br />
based upon an obligation to support offspring of a subsequent relationship bears<br />
the burden of providing evidence regarding the obligation, including the income of<br />
the other parent of the child or children of the subsequent relationship<br />
In considering whether to deviate from the <strong>Nebraska</strong> <strong>Child</strong> <strong>Support</strong> Guidelines<br />
based on an order of support for a subsequent child, the trial court must have<br />
before it the calculations and any worksheets used to determine the child support<br />
order for the subsequent child.<br />
Double Dipping – If (the obligor in a modification action) was able to use his original<br />
support obligation to decrease the amount of his subsequent support obligation to<br />
(his later born child), it would be inequitable to allow him to turn around and use that<br />
subsequent award as the basis for decreasing the original obligation. It would not be<br />
in the best interests of the children to permit (the obligor) to effectively ―play one<br />
family against the other‖ in order to decrease his child support obligation to both.<br />
Erica J. v. Dewitt, 265 Neb. 728, 659 N.W.2d 315 (2003)<br />
Facts: District court modified child support, but did not do so retro to the date of the filing of the<br />
complaint to modify. State appealed, arguing that the court should have back dated the upward<br />
modification. Held: District court acted within its discretion in not back dating modification.<br />
[T]he delays (in bringing the modification action to trial) do not appear to be the fault<br />
of any one individual. We conclude that the district court‘s determination to make the<br />
increase retroactive to the first day of the month of the hearing before the<br />
referee…was not an abuse of discretion, and we therefore affirm that portion of<br />
the court‘s judgment.<br />
Ferry v. Ferry, 201 Neb. 595, 271 N.W.2d 450 (1978)<br />
Where an award for child support is made in one amount for each succeeding<br />
month for more than one child, it will be presumed to continue in force for the full<br />
amount until the youngest child reaches his majority. The proper remedy, if this be<br />
deemed unjust, is to seek a modification of the decree in the court which entered it<br />
on the basis of the changed circumstances.<br />
Gammel v. Gammel, 259 Neb. 738, 612 N.W.2d 207 (2000)<br />
Citing Rule Q [now § 4-217] of the child support guidelines, stating that a 10% or<br />
greater deviation from the guidelines will justify a modification. A 10% or greater<br />
deviation creates a rebuttable presumption of a material change in circumstances<br />
justifying a modification.<br />
Gangwish v. Gangwish, 267 Neb. 901, 678 N.W.2d 503 (2004)<br />
The paramount concern and question in determining child support, whether in the<br />
initial marital dissolution action or in the proceedings for modification of decree, is<br />
the best interests of the child.<br />
Grahovac v. Grahovac, 12 Neb. App. 585, 680 N.W.2d 616 (2004)<br />
(Voluntary Wastage)<br />
It is well established that a ―material change in circumstances‖ in modification of<br />
child support cases is analogous to the ―good cause‖ standard articulated for<br />
modification of alimony. See also Pope v. Pope, 251 Neb. 773, 559 N.W.2d 192<br />
(1997)<br />
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