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ANNEX III - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED CRIME ON GOVERNANCE: A CASE STUDY OF MOZAMBIQUE 1 About the Author Charles Goredema, is an independent senior Research Consultant conducting research into the impact of trans-national crime networks on governance in some of Africa’s coastal cities. He has previously worked on projects within the Transnational Threats & International Crimes division at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). A lawyer by training, Charles’ career includes a stint in the prosecution of economic crime. He subsequently lectured in Criminal Justice in Zimbabwe and South Africa, while undertaking research and managing research projects in criminal justice. After joining the ISS in August 2000, Charles focused on studying emerging forms of transnational organised crime and money laundering. Most of his recent work focuses on the challenges of preventing and regulating money laundering in Eastern and Southern Africa. He has shared his findings with policy-designing institutions, regulators, law enforcement practitioners and civil society in these sub-regions and beyond at seminars, workshops and conferences. Some of his findings have been published, and can be accessed through the website of the ISS. Acknowledgements The authors are deeply grateful to CIC’s Yanickk Lewis for the excellent research support provided throughout the project. His attention to detail was deeply appreciated and his contributions greatly contributed to the case study. 136 The report was prepared with the assistance of Gabriel Limaverde, who is a Service Learning Coordinator with the American International School of Mozambique, based in Maputo. 1. Ed. Camino Kavanagh (2013), Getting Smart and Shaping Up: Responding to the Impact of Drug Trafficking in Developing Countries, NYU <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation NYU CIC Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
Introduction Organized crime captured public attention in Mozambique early this century in the wake of the highly publicized murders of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso and banker Antonio Siba Siba Macuacua. Both Cardoso and Macuacua had been investigating the extent to which emerging economic and political elites were implicated in banking sector-related fraud. Nyimpine Chissano, the eldest son of former President Chissano, was implicated in the murders. Chissano, who was alleged to have sponsored both murders, died in November 2007 without ever having faced trial. To this day, political and public sector corruption and organized crime remain strongly connected. These connections have their roots in the political settlement concluded after the civil war. Since independence from Portugal in 1975, the FRELIMO party has led the country. Core constitutional reforms introduced after a bitter internal conflict with its rival RENAMO in 1992 led to the introduction of a multi-party political system, which FRELIMO has continued to dominate. This has not enabled a political transition to democratic and accountable governance, but only served to consolidate patronage systems established during the era of institutionalized single-party rule. Barriers to access to the higher echelons of political power remain high, not least because of the degree to which the ruling party controls resources. T<strong>here</strong> are persistent indications that illicit monies are being used to bankroll political contestation. The complex web of informal relations between political actors, civil servants, legitimate business, and organized criminals that was exposed by the scandals concerning the privitization of the Banco Commercial du Mozambique (BCM) in the mid 1990s 2 appears to have endured. These relations are sustained by corruption within the public and private sectors. Corruption within the public and private sectors helps sustain these relations. Corruption has also served to bolster the resilience of organized crime, mainly by lowering the risks attached to engaging in illicit activity. Illicit organizations and networks are known to have exploited geographical areas in Mozambique that are either governed or w<strong>here</strong> the state is not present, 2. An unpublished paper by journalist Paul Fauvet in 2006 sets out the complex webs ion some detail. Some of them were revealed in the subsequent Carlos Cardoso murder trial, and may be accessed through the Pamabazuka website at http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/12024 to provide commodities or broker the provision of basic services. In this manner, criminal organizations have managed to establish themselves while simultaneously mustering political and social capital. These groups have not sought to displace state institutions but have rather benefited from a degree of complicity, as they use the state to facilitate movement of goods and to ensure the protection of the proceeds of their illicit activities. Conversely, as the country moves further away from the threat of war, and peace continues to be consolidated, the nature of both politics and organized criminal activity is shifting. The ruling FRELIMO party is trying to consolidate its monopoly of power by broadening its bases ahead of the 2014 elections. However, the growing gap between the ‘haves’ in the upper echelons of the party, and the broad base of ‘have-nots’ both within the party and beyond represents an important risk to FRELIMO’s political longevity. Indeed, despite consistent economic growth over the past five years, and notwithstanding its reputation as a ‘development success,’ wealth gaps are growing in Mozambique. Large swathes of the population experience pervasive social, economic, and political exclusion and remain extremely vulnerable to economic shocks. Many, especially the young, still find themselves obliged to migrate from rural to (or within) urban and peri-urban areas in search of employment and basic services. At the same time, t<strong>here</strong> are growing signs that more ‘decentralized’ forms of organized criminal activity are taking root and that political approval or acquiescence is no longer an imperative for these ‘decentralized’ forms of organized crime. T<strong>here</strong> are perceptions that a loss of political control over organized crime may also lead to increases in violence, of which citizens will feel the brunt and to which Mozambique’s weak institutions are illsuited to respond. While exposing this development, the case study indicated that this was an area requiring much deeper research. What may also need further inquiry are the drivers of organized crime outside the main urban enclaves of Mozambique. The civil war yielded a dichotomy in terms of influence, with FRELIMO exerting dominance in urban centres, while RENAMO was more influential outside them. This dichotomy expressed itself in a divergence in the way 137 Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries NYU CIC
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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY i CENTER ON INT
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Table of Contents Getting Smart and
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security threats, such as counterin
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section provides concluding remarks
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On Current Dev
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tax evasion, drug smuggling, illega
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fraud. The complex web of informal
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unpopulated regions, weak instituti
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• Supporting crime-sensitive econ
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II. SUGGESTIONS FOR TARGETED PROGRA
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violence by criminal gangs to provi
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criminal activity in order to build
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organized crime-related intelligenc
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countries, security sector reform e
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The growing incidence of cybercrime
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4.2 Apply the principle of shared r
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III. KNOWING WHEN TO ENGAGE AND WHE
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these challenges within government
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Where criminal enc
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Organized criminal corruption can t
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Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar.
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are prevalent, or where</st
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1.1.3 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
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2.5 USE SECTOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL E
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Bibliography Books Arias, Desmond E
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International Drug Policy Consortiu
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US Department of State (undated), M
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ANNEX I - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED C
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New Political Contestation amidst W
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Many in Nepal see the eventual adop
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epresentatives and journalists visi
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(also known as Comrade Kiran), the
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Nepalis continue to be marginalized
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Although informal justice mechanism
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accessibility of law enforcement to
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lines, believing such an institutio
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Chinese Medicine (TCM) and traditio
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declined between 2010 and 2012. (Th
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may well be that it is easy to exer
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in Nepal up to 4,000 cars stolen fr
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were destroyed in 2010 alone. 153 A
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as a transshipment country between
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abroad. At times, they may be trick
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Page 89 and 90: do they yet systematically deliver
Page 91 and 92: youth wing of political parties, pa
Page 93 and 94: Bibliography Books Thapa, Dheepak (
Page 95 and 96: International Crisis Group (2012a).
Page 97 and 98: K.C., Bikash (2011b). “NA Million
Page 99 and 100: Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
Page 101 and 102: Introduction Ghana is experiencing
Page 103 and 104: I. Political, Instituional, Socio-E
Page 105 and 106: overwhelmingly supported by Ewes in
Page 107 and 108: and community over generations. Thi
Page 109 and 110: the potential increases in crime an
Page 111 and 112: charged with conspiracy to distribu
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Page 117 and 118: and Takoradi. The consignments come
Page 119 and 120: In the years preceding 2008, Ghanai
Page 121 and 122: may be attributed to the nature of
Page 123 and 124: etween the two main political parti
Page 125 and 126: police and custom officials arreste
Page 127 and 128: levels, however, treatment for drug
Page 129 and 130: V. The Donor Context Most external
Page 131 and 132: • Addressing socio-economic chall
Page 133 and 134: Ellis, Stephen (2009). ‘West Afri
Page 135 and 136: ‘High Toxic Levels Found at Schoo
Page 137: Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
Page 141 and 142: II. The Political Instiution and So
Page 143 and 144: to anchor contracts. 13 Meanwhile,
Page 145 and 146: promoting alternative approaches to
Page 147 and 148: II. The Nature and Scope of Organiz
Page 149 and 150: of contraband along the potential
Page 151 and 152: investigation into Suleman’s alle
Page 153 and 154: Rovers, Mitsubishi Colts, Land Crui
Page 155 and 156: may have been involved in launderin
Page 157 and 158: linkages between senior FRELIMO off
Page 159 and 160: seeking to more strongly align its
Page 161 and 162: Kyed, Helene Maria (2007), State Re
Page 163 and 164: Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
Page 165 and 166: Introduction Emerging from a decade
Page 167 and 168: political figures in Sierra Leone a
Page 169 and 170: After 150 years under British colon
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Page 173 and 174: and economic development. 75 Amidst
Page 175 and 176: Notwithstanding, in 2011 several in
Page 177 and 178: provoked by an air traffic controll
Page 179 and 180: which raises some concern that the
Page 181 and 182: smuggled diamonds to Belgium in 199
Page 183 and 184: Concerns about the resilience and c
Page 185 and 186: the current Sierra Leonean governme
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V. Conclusions Sierra Leone has mad
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• Beyond traditional support and
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Gbla, Osman (2007). “Security Sec
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United Nations Security Council (20
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Newspaper Online, January 21. Avail
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Guyana is located on t
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Afro-Guyanese and mixed race popula
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Guyanese town Buxton claimed joint
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is primarily based on exports from
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The electronic intelligence devices
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Desi Bouterese, head of the main op
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sector plan based on the government
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development actors might consider a
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Kaieteur News, 2009, Roger Khan Ple
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Annex VI - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED
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I. Regional, Political, Institution
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heterogeneous than they are today.
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that had few economic resources. Po
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II. The Nature of Organized Crime i
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gangs in central and western Kingst
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A US diplomatic cable released by W
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some projects leads to lower levels
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professionalizing the police. Dilap
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Bibliography Books Figueroa, Mark a
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“Jamaica’s Women Drug Mules fil
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Annual Review of Global Peace Opera
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