here - Center on International Cooperation - New York University

24
each drug-smuggling territory were “responsible for buying
towers and repeaters as well as equipping underlings with
radios and computers.” 38 Del Toro was also responsible for
“employing specialists to run the network and research
new technology.” 39 This highly elaborate system also
allowed the highest-ranking Zeta operatives to engage in
highly encrypted communications over the Internet. Joint
US-Mexican investigations have since led to several arrests
and the seizure of some 167 antennas, 155 repeaters,
166 power sources, 71 pieces of computer equipment,
and 1,446 radios. 40 Other cartels operating in Mexico are
reported to have also developed similar, albeit narrower in
territorial scope, communications systems. Beyond Ghana,
w<strong>here</strong> the incidence of ICT-related crime is significant yet
non-violent, t<strong>here</strong> is limited, if any knowledge of how ICTs
are being used by organized criminals in the other cases
that were part of this research project. Again, monitoring
judicial processes involving serious organized crime can
shed light on the technological tools criminals are availing
of at national and regional levels to conduct their business,
and indicate their level of sophistication.
While external actors (generally specialized agencies
such as the US DEA, UK SOCA, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, or
UNODC) have often provided specialized training for
responding to specific forms of organized crime (for
example, counter-narcotics, anti-money-laundering,
environmental or economic, financial and cybercrimes), in
each of the countries, the capacity to absorb this training
is limited, and unless the issue area has been identified as
a priority by the government or an international partner,
limited resources also hinder action. A lack of contiguous
monitoring and post-training reach-back capacity by
external donors/trainers means that often, trained units
go rogue and become highly competent criminals. This
was the case of efforts in West Africa to establish crossborder
crime units in the past. Despite these experiences,
no vetting or monitoring mechanism has apparently
been established to protect the new Transnational Crime
Units operating under the umbrella of the WACI from the
same fate. 41 In addition, unless the mechanisms are in
38. Ibid
39. Ibid
40. Ibid
41. See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones (2011), Shaky Foundations, An Assessment of UN
Rule of Law Support. According to one ECOWAS official, an earlier project aimed at developing
regional capacity to deal with organized crime through the establishment of joint operation units
place, strengthened security can also lead to increases in
violence, while a strengthened judiciary or empowered
economic or financial crimes unit can actually lead to
enhanced corruptibility and the use of organized crimerelated
intelligence tools for political and financial gain.
Indeed, cross the six case studies, organized crime-related
political and public sector corruption enormously affects
law enforcement efforts, while deep-rooted corruption
within law enforcement agencies, specialized security
services and the judiciary often derails investigations and
criminal proceedings.
In relation to drug trafficking in particular, capacity
building of national drug law enforcement agencies rarely
considers developments and trends in the global drug
policy arena, particularly in terms of introducing harm
reduction principles into policing efforts. Recent efforts by
the London-based consortium involving the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Drug
Policy Consortium (IDPC), and Chatham House through
their Modernizing Drug Law Enforcement (MDLE) initiative
is analyzing new strategies for drug law enforcement that
focus on “reducing the consequential harms that arise from
drug markets and drug use, rather than just on seizing
drugs or arresting users.” 42 Several of the case studies in
this project confirmed many of the findings in the MDLE
initiative, including the fact that citizen trust in the police
is undermined “when procedural fairness, lawfulness and
effectiveness of police actions come into question,” or
that “zero-tolerance approaches to drugs and crime have
failed to reduce criminality while increasing human rights
violations and police abusiveness,” and generally target
“low-level offenders.” In Ghana for example, first time users
of drugs face prison sentences of 1-5 years; those caught
in possession of or selling drugs face sentences of 10 years
to life imprisonment, regardless of the amount of drugs
being carried or sold. Generally it is small-time peddlers
and/or dependent drug users who experience the brunt
of these laws. Meanwhile, in post-conflict or transition
only served to produce highly sophisticated criminals in the sense that a large number of those
trained later left the police for a more lucrative life of crime. Similar situations have emerged with
elite trained units in Latin America and elsew<strong>here</strong>. Interviews, July 2011. See also Vanda Felbab-
Brown and James J.F Forest (2012), Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa,
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
42. Modernising Drug Law Enforcement (MDLE) Seminar: http://idpc.net/publications/2013/04/
idpc-chatham-house-iiss-seminar-modernising-drug-law-enforcement?utm_
source=IDPC+Monthly+Alert&utm_campaign=aa8b2aaea8-IDPC+May+2013+Alert&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_e2e88d9477-aa8b2aaea8-19295501
NYU
CIC
Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries