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also serve as a useful framework for determining priority actions within the five pillars outlined above. Through further research, conceptual development, and testing, similar frameworks may eventually provide a basis for more sophisticated analytical and programming tools. Finally, an ‘organized crime-sensitive’ approach to development will require important shifts in development policy and the delivery of assistance. The 2011 WDR stresses the importance of cross-regional approaches for responding to organized crime, particularly in relation to the spill over effects of domestic policies. Yet, development agencies and the broader international system continue to be “hampered by structures and processes that are not sufficiently adapted to current challenges,” with efforts targeted more at the national than the regional level.” 19 In this regard, the WDR recommended a focus on “smarter assistance tools” particularly in light of the “current environment of constraints on aid budgets.” 20 16 The latter will require scaling-up and leveraging development assistance around accepted principles such as shared responsibility and accountability, common goals and agreed actions. Today, however, only three development agencies - DFID, USAID, and GTZ - seem directly interested in addressing organized crime through development practice. 21 Notwithstanding, it is an opportune moment to further the debate and ensure stronger engagement and smarter responses to organized crime in developing countries. 19. 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Development & Security 20. Ibid 21. In addition to these three, the government of Norway, through its foreign affairs office, is funding an initiative aimed at deepening understanding of the challenges posed by transnational organized crime to governance and development. NYU CIC Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR TARGETED PROGRAMMING Until recently, limited focus has been placed on understanding the degree to which structural governance challenges, including the nature of the political economy or political settlements, nurture organized crime. In countries emerging from conflict, the prioritization of stability and economic growth has at times overshadowed concerns about the entrenchment of relations between political elites and organized crime in the post-conflict phase. In both post-conflict and traditional development settings (w<strong>here</strong> a country has not gone through an armed conflict), democratic deficits or perhaps a stagnation of democratic consolidation appear to be principal enabling factors of organized crime. Corruption, weak accountability mechanisms (particularly with regard to political actors and public officials), weak service delivery, flaws in the electoral system, weak or inexistent political party, campaign financing and asset declaration regulatory frameworks, and the absence of state services in rural areas, are common in our cases. This section identifies some of these challenges and suggests a range of targeted actions that can help build resistance against them into governance systems. We do not suggest that each and every one of these actions be implemented across countries. Rather, as we note in Section III, we suggest that development actors need to use smart assessment and analysis tools to guide prioritization of action in a given setting and that a core guiding principle in responding to organized crime should be the protection of fundamental rights. 1. PROTECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS FROM ORGANIZED CRIME Organized crime poses enormous governance challenges for developing countries. All of the countries studied for this project (except Nepal) are formal multi-party democracies. However, in most of the cases (including Nepal), formal institutions are underpinned by extensive informal systems sustaining patronage and corruption, and a political economy providing limited services and protection for citizens. In each of the case studies, organized crime takes advantage of systemic weaknesses, for example, through corruption of the electoral, legislative, and public procurement processes, and corruption of local administrations. Coercion of politicians and public service officials by organized criminals also plays into this situation, as does the reverse side with political actors taking advantage of organized crime for political gain. In most cases, a weak or politicized civil society and media, or an academia with limited voice, provide limited checks on government complicity with organized crime. As evident in the cases of Mozambique, Nepal, and Sierra Leone, countries in and emerging from conflict provide excellent entry points for organized criminal activity, first to oil the wheels of war and, later, to obtain or sustain political advantage. What commences as a domestic enterprise (or as a transnational enterprise taking advantage of a domestic problem) often evolves into a complicated network of local, regional, and international organized crime actors that penetrate the political system. Unfettered access to the spoils of organized crime undermines fledgling democratic institutions, state legitimacy, and the delivery of services to citizens. In post-conflict settings, for example Sierra Leone, certain policy responses, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), have often been effective in meeting specific goals such as contributing to stability. Such efforts have not, however, effectively integrated a focus on how to build resilience within the political system against organized crime and the threats it poses to democratic consolidation and development. In Mozambique, for example, the Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DRP) has been considered a ‘success.’ Notwithstanding, in the absence of employment opportunities, many of the mid-to-higher level former combatants have reintegrated themselves into existing or emerging illicit networks or have served as intermediaries or ‘fixers’ between organized crime and the state. The failure to ensure broad disarmament and destruction of weapons also provided lucrative entry points to illicit markets in Mozambique’s near-abroad w<strong>here</strong> organized crime was also on the rise, creating a destabilizing effect in the region. It also provided easy access to instruments 17 Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries NYU CIC
Page 1 and 2: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY i CENTER ON INT
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents Getting Smart and
Page 5 and 6: security threats, such as counterin
Page 7 and 8: section provides concluding remarks
Page 9 and 10: I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On Current Dev
Page 11 and 12: tax evasion, drug smuggling, illega
Page 13 and 14: fraud. The complex web of informal
Page 15 and 16: unpopulated regions, weak instituti
Page 17: • Supporting crime-sensitive econ
Page 21 and 22: violence by criminal gangs to provi
Page 23 and 24: criminal activity in order to build
Page 25 and 26: organized crime-related intelligenc
Page 27 and 28: countries, security sector reform e
Page 29 and 30: The growing incidence of cybercrime
Page 31 and 32: 4.2 Apply the principle of shared r
Page 33 and 34: III. KNOWING WHEN TO ENGAGE AND WHE
Page 35 and 36: these challenges within government
Page 37 and 38: Where criminal enc
Page 39 and 40: Organized criminal corruption can t
Page 41 and 42: Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar.
Page 43 and 44: are prevalent, or where</st
Page 45 and 46: 1.1.3 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
Page 47 and 48: 2.5 USE SECTOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL E
Page 49 and 50: Bibliography Books Arias, Desmond E
Page 51 and 52: International Drug Policy Consortiu
Page 53 and 54: US Department of State (undated), M
Page 55 and 56: ANNEX I - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED C
Page 57 and 58: New Political Contestation amidst W
Page 59 and 60: Many in Nepal see the eventual adop
Page 61 and 62: epresentatives and journalists visi
Page 63 and 64: (also known as Comrade Kiran), the
Page 65 and 66: Nepalis continue to be marginalized
Page 67 and 68: Although informal justice mechanism
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accessibility of law enforcement to
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lines, believing such an institutio
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Chinese Medicine (TCM) and traditio
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declined between 2010 and 2012. (Th
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may well be that it is easy to exer
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in Nepal up to 4,000 cars stolen fr
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were destroyed in 2010 alone. 153 A
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as a transshipment country between
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abroad. At times, they may be trick
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for self-determination and rights e
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do they yet systematically deliver
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youth wing of political parties, pa
Page 93 and 94:
Bibliography Books Thapa, Dheepak (
Page 95 and 96:
International Crisis Group (2012a).
Page 97 and 98:
K.C., Bikash (2011b). “NA Million
Page 99 and 100:
Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
Page 101 and 102:
Introduction Ghana is experiencing
Page 103 and 104:
I. Political, Instituional, Socio-E
Page 105 and 106:
overwhelmingly supported by Ewes in
Page 107 and 108:
and community over generations. Thi
Page 109 and 110:
the potential increases in crime an
Page 111 and 112:
charged with conspiracy to distribu
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and ratified a series of regional a
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funds related to money laundering.
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and Takoradi. The consignments come
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In the years preceding 2008, Ghanai
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may be attributed to the nature of
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etween the two main political parti
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police and custom officials arreste
Page 127 and 128:
levels, however, treatment for drug
Page 129 and 130:
V. The Donor Context Most external
Page 131 and 132:
• Addressing socio-economic chall
Page 133 and 134:
Ellis, Stephen (2009). ‘West Afri
Page 135 and 136:
‘High Toxic Levels Found at Schoo
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Introduction Organized crime captur
Page 141 and 142:
II. The Political Instiution and So
Page 143 and 144:
to anchor contracts. 13 Meanwhile,
Page 145 and 146:
promoting alternative approaches to
Page 147 and 148:
II. The Nature and Scope of Organiz
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of contraband along the potential
Page 151 and 152:
investigation into Suleman’s alle
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Rovers, Mitsubishi Colts, Land Crui
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may have been involved in launderin
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linkages between senior FRELIMO off
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seeking to more strongly align its
Page 161 and 162:
Kyed, Helene Maria (2007), State Re
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Introduction Emerging from a decade
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political figures in Sierra Leone a
Page 169 and 170:
After 150 years under British colon
Page 171 and 172:
signed on behalf of the government
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and economic development. 75 Amidst
Page 175 and 176:
Notwithstanding, in 2011 several in
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provoked by an air traffic controll
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which raises some concern that the
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smuggled diamonds to Belgium in 199
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Concerns about the resilience and c
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the current Sierra Leonean governme
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egional countries through the WACI.
Page 189 and 190:
V. Conclusions Sierra Leone has mad
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• Beyond traditional support and
Page 193 and 194:
Gbla, Osman (2007). “Security Sec
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United Nations Security Council (20
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Newspaper Online, January 21. Avail
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Page 201 and 202:
Introduction Guyana is located on t
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Afro-Guyanese and mixed race popula
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Guyanese town Buxton claimed joint
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is primarily based on exports from
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The electronic intelligence devices
Page 211 and 212:
Desi Bouterese, head of the main op
Page 213 and 214:
sector plan based on the government
Page 215 and 216:
development actors might consider a
Page 217 and 218:
Kaieteur News, 2009, Roger Khan Ple
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Annex VI - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED
Page 221 and 222:
I. Regional, Political, Institution
Page 223 and 224:
heterogeneous than they are today.
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that had few economic resources. Po
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II. The Nature of Organized Crime i
Page 229 and 230:
gangs in central and western Kingst
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A US diplomatic cable released by W
Page 233 and 234:
some projects leads to lower levels
Page 235 and 236:
professionalizing the police. Dilap
Page 237 and 238:
Bibliography Books Figueroa, Mark a
Page 239 and 240:
“Jamaica’s Women Drug Mules fil
Page 241 and 242:
Annual Review of Global Peace Opera
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