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180 failing to “(…) make efforts to identify trafficking victims, allocate adequate financial or human resources to provide protective services to victims, or educate the population about the dangers of trafficking.” 160 Furthermore, in 2011 the courts convicted no trafficking offenders, and fewer suspects were charged with trafficking crimes compared with the previous year. 161 Trafficking of SALW does not appear to remain a large issue within Sierra Leone. The country figures into the regional arms trafficking context as a former combat zone whose ‘legacy weapons,’ especially ammunition, continue to surface a decade onwards. 162 In August 2012, the Sierra Leone legislature passed the Arms and Ammunition Bill legalizing gun ownership for the first time since the end of the civil war, while aiming to comply with commitments under Economic Community of West African States conventions to regulate the use of small arms. 163 Of concern however is a 012 incident regarding the purchase by the government of heavy weaponry, apparently from a former diamond dealer, to equip a recently enlarged paramilitary wing of the police loyal to the President’s party. 164 The government finally backtracked and committed to handing over the weaponry to the armed forces. 165 160. Ibid. 161. Ibid. 162. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), 35. 163. United Nations Security Council (2012), Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, S/2012/679, August 13. 164. UN Raises Question about President Koroma’s Arms Purchase, 22 March 2012 http://www. thesierraleonetelegraph.com/?p=1417. 165. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2012/11) http://www. securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SL%20 S%20PRST%202012%2011.pdf. III. Responding to Organized Crime in Sierra Leone The Government Response Over the years, Sierra Leone has taken various steps to tackle the multi-faceted problems posed by organized crime. The country is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol Against Trafficking in Human Beings, and the Protocol Against Trafficking in Firearms. Three acts of Parliament dealing with specific aspects have been enacted: the Anti- Human Trafficking Act (2004), the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2005) with the corresponding establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) located in the Bank of Sierra Leone, and the Anti-Drugs Act (2008). An Inter- Ministerial Committee on Human Trafficking and its implementing arm – the Task Force for Human Trafficking – have also been established. 166 In order to fight smuggling, the National Revenue Authority (NRA) has a Preventive Services and Special Duties Department at its disposition, although it is viewed as having been largely ineffective to date. 167 It is however, about to be organized with the aim of improving its performance. In addition, the National Security and Central Intelligence Act (2002) established the Office of National Security and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU). The ONS Department of Serious Organized Crime Coordinating Group is mandated to assist in the coordination of all aspects of organized crime. In addition, in its Second Poverty Reduction Strategy, the government called for stronger “partnerships between already established security sector institutions and MDAs [Ministries, Departments, and Agencies] to prevent and combat transnational organized crimes such as international terrorism, smuggling, money laundering, mercenaries and dissidents, drugs and human/child trafficking, and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).” 168 166. However, the 2012 US Trafficking in Persons Report states that Sierra Leone’s “national trafficking in persons task force re-submitted a budget request in late 2011, but as with past years, the funding had not been approved by the end of the reporting period.”US Department of State (2012b). 167. Research project validation workshop, London, May 2013. 168. Government of Sierra Leone, An Agenda for Change, Second Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP II) 2008-2012, p. 102. NYU CIC Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
Concerns about the resilience and capacity of law enforcement and Sierra Leone’s judiciary have always existed. In 2010, Sierra Leone was ranked in the 10th-25th percentile for the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicators. 169 According to the latest Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index Report (BTI), “t<strong>here</strong> is a de facto lack of separation of powers due to the executive’s attempts to influence and put pressure on the legislative and judicial powers.” 170 Moreover, the report notes that the combination of Attorney General and Minister of Justice functions in a single individual is viewed “as a structural factor impeding the effective separation of powers.” 171 While “judicial independence in Sierra Leone is constitutionally guaranteed, it may be problematic since not all judges perceive it as a core value of the judicial culture.” 172 Security sector reforms introduced since the end of the conflict, and largely led by the UK, have created a multitiered security architecture combining local level councils and policing groups with the national level. The reforms have restored an important degree of functionality to the country’s security services. By late 2011 the Sierra Leone police had reached an authorized strength of 10,000 police men and women, with plans to reach 12,000 in the following period. The police force is still however, recovering from the civil war, and as was the case before the war, remains greatly constrained by inadequate resources, equipment and capacity. Poor infrastructure beyond urban centers means that many areas remain outside the reach of law enforcement. As noted in a 2012 Institute of Development Studies (IDS) report, “not only have insufficient numbers of incompetent and corrupt police been replaced in the SLP to create the kind of thorough reform that was accomplished with the SLA, but the NA police rural base for policing was ignored, is starved for support and now rarely functions properly. SSR cannot be accomplished from the capital alone; community institutions have to be supported or changed as well.” 173 169. The World Bank (2011). The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2011 Update, available at: http://www.govindicators.org 170. BTI (2012). 171. BTI (2012), p. 9. 172. Interview with Justice Bankole Thompson, Accra, Ghana, 29 April 2013. 173. James B. M. Vincent, (2012) A Village-Up View of Sierra Leone’s Civil War and Reconstruction: Multilayered and Networked Governance, Institute of Development Studies, Research Report vol 2012, no 75, May, 27. In November 2011, the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa issued a statement voicing its concern about the significant weaknesses in the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) regime of Sierra Leone. The country has not yet operationalized its approved National AML/CFT Strategy designed to facilitate the implementation of the AML/CFT regime in a coordinated and concerted manner. And while organized forms of criminality, particularly in the diamond sector, have been reduced through stricter regulations and monitoring, and t<strong>here</strong> have been limited reports of organized arms trafficking in Sierra Leone, other forms of organized crime such as illegal logging and drug trafficking have moved to the foreground. 174 The case of Ibrahim Komeh Sesay (the Lungi Affair) is indicative of the challenges that law enforcement and the judiciary are facing. Justice Browne-Marke, the judge who presided over the trial, lists several lessons that can be drawn from the case including the importance of “regularly assess[ing] old and new threats, and pass[ing] appropriate legislation as soon as possible.” He also raised the concern of how easily penetrable Sierra Leone’s security sector still is since “[s]pecial branch officials, intelligence officers, police officers, could all be got at with ease w<strong>here</strong> large amounts of money were concerned.” 175 Notwithstanding, according to a former senior member of the judiciary, “Sierra Leone’s hitherto lethargic attitude to the incorporation of international conventions and treaties into its domestic law forced it to have recourse to political expediency in the cocaine case presided over by Justice Browne-Marke rather than uphold the principal of legality precluding, as a rule, the enactment of retroactive penal laws, one of the issues that came up for litigation before the judicial committee of the Privy Council in the case of Akar v Attorney-General.” 176 174. Introducing the United Nations Secretary-General’s latest report, Michael von der Schulenberg voiced his concern over “reports that the Government had imported millions of dollars worth of assault weapons in January [2012] to equip a recently enlarged paramilitary wing of its police force, known as the Operational Services Division. See: United Nations Department of Public Information (2012). „Sierra Leone Must Pass ‚Crucial Test’ of November Elections to Consolidate Exceptional Success Achieved Since Civil War, Security Council Told;“ and United Nations Security Council (2012), p. 5. 175. Justice Nicholas Browne-Marke (2012). 176. Interview with Justice Bankole-Thompson, Accra, Ghana, 29 April 2013. See also African Law Reports: Sierra Leone Series (1964-66), and Bankole Thompson (1997), The Constitutional History and Law of Sierra Leone (1961-1995), Maryland: University Press of America Inc. for a legal analysis of the decision in that case (pp. 21-25). 181 Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries NYU CIC
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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY i CENTER ON INT
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Table of Contents Getting Smart and
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security threats, such as counterin
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section provides concluding remarks
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On Current Dev
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tax evasion, drug smuggling, illega
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fraud. The complex web of informal
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unpopulated regions, weak instituti
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• Supporting crime-sensitive econ
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II. SUGGESTIONS FOR TARGETED PROGRA
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violence by criminal gangs to provi
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criminal activity in order to build
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organized crime-related intelligenc
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countries, security sector reform e
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The growing incidence of cybercrime
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4.2 Apply the principle of shared r
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III. KNOWING WHEN TO ENGAGE AND WHE
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these challenges within government
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Where criminal enc
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Organized criminal corruption can t
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Afghanistan, Somalia, and Myanmar.
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are prevalent, or where</st
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1.1.3 SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
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2.5 USE SECTOR SPECIFIC POLITICAL E
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Bibliography Books Arias, Desmond E
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International Drug Policy Consortiu
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US Department of State (undated), M
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ANNEX I - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED C
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New Political Contestation amidst W
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Many in Nepal see the eventual adop
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epresentatives and journalists visi
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(also known as Comrade Kiran), the
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Nepalis continue to be marginalized
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Although informal justice mechanism
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accessibility of law enforcement to
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lines, believing such an institutio
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Chinese Medicine (TCM) and traditio
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declined between 2010 and 2012. (Th
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may well be that it is easy to exer
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in Nepal up to 4,000 cars stolen fr
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were destroyed in 2010 alone. 153 A
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as a transshipment country between
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abroad. At times, they may be trick
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for self-determination and rights e
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do they yet systematically deliver
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youth wing of political parties, pa
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Bibliography Books Thapa, Dheepak (
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International Crisis Group (2012a).
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K.C., Bikash (2011b). “NA Million
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Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
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Introduction Ghana is experiencing
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I. Political, Instituional, Socio-E
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overwhelmingly supported by Ewes in
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and community over generations. Thi
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the potential increases in crime an
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charged with conspiracy to distribu
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and ratified a series of regional a
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funds related to money laundering.
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and Takoradi. The consignments come
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In the years preceding 2008, Ghanai
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may be attributed to the nature of
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etween the two main political parti
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police and custom officials arreste
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levels, however, treatment for drug
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V. The Donor Context Most external
Page 131 and 132: • Addressing socio-economic chall
Page 133 and 134: Ellis, Stephen (2009). ‘West Afri
Page 135 and 136: ‘High Toxic Levels Found at Schoo
Page 137 and 138: Getting Smart and Scaling Up : The
Page 139 and 140: Introduction Organized crime captur
Page 141 and 142: II. The Political Instiution and So
Page 143 and 144: to anchor contracts. 13 Meanwhile,
Page 145 and 146: promoting alternative approaches to
Page 147 and 148: II. The Nature and Scope of Organiz
Page 149 and 150: of contraband along the potential
Page 151 and 152: investigation into Suleman’s alle
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Page 157 and 158: linkages between senior FRELIMO off
Page 159 and 160: seeking to more strongly align its
Page 161 and 162: Kyed, Helene Maria (2007), State Re
Page 165 and 166: Introduction Emerging from a decade
Page 167 and 168: political figures in Sierra Leone a
Page 169 and 170: After 150 years under British colon
Page 171 and 172: signed on behalf of the government
Page 173 and 174: and economic development. 75 Amidst
Page 175 and 176: Notwithstanding, in 2011 several in
Page 177 and 178: provoked by an air traffic controll
Page 179 and 180: which raises some concern that the
Page 181: smuggled diamonds to Belgium in 199
Page 185 and 186: the current Sierra Leonean governme
Page 187 and 188: egional countries through the WACI.
Page 189 and 190: V. Conclusions Sierra Leone has mad
Page 191 and 192: • Beyond traditional support and
Page 193 and 194: Gbla, Osman (2007). “Security Sec
Page 195 and 196: United Nations Security Council (20
Page 197 and 198: Newspaper Online, January 21. Avail
Page 201 and 202: Introduction Guyana is located on t
Page 203 and 204: Afro-Guyanese and mixed race popula
Page 205 and 206: Guyanese town Buxton claimed joint
Page 207 and 208: is primarily based on exports from
Page 209 and 210: The electronic intelligence devices
Page 211 and 212: Desi Bouterese, head of the main op
Page 213 and 214: sector plan based on the government
Page 215 and 216: development actors might consider a
Page 217 and 218: Kaieteur News, 2009, Roger Khan Ple
Page 219 and 220: Annex VI - THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED
Page 221 and 222: I. Regional, Political, Institution
Page 223 and 224: heterogeneous than they are today.
Page 225 and 226: that had few economic resources. Po
Page 227 and 228: II. The Nature of Organized Crime i
Page 229 and 230: gangs in central and western Kingst
Page 231 and 232: A US diplomatic cable released by W
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some projects leads to lower levels
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professionalizing the police. Dilap
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Bibliography Books Figueroa, Mark a
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“Jamaica’s Women Drug Mules fil
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Annual Review of Global Peace Opera
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