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organized crime-related intelligence tools for political and
financial gain.
Traditionally, most efforts to prevent or respond to
organized crime have been centered on developing the
capacity of law enforcement agencies, ensuring sharing
of intelligence across agencies and across borders,
strengthening criminal justice systems, and establishing
and developing the capacity of specialized agencies.
These efforts are implemented by a range of actors and
are generally quite narrow in scope in the sense that they
are geared towards direct provision of technical assistance
and advice. This type of assistance is warranted as strong
law enforcement bodies and criminal justice systems
are needed in any setting. At the same time, however,
given the degree of penetration of many of these same
institutions by organized crime, they need to be made
more accountable to citizens.
Efforts such as the Anti-Money Laundering and Financing
of Terrorism Regime, the U.S. Drug Kingpin Act and bilateral
extradition treaties are helping to respond to some aspects
of organized crime across the countries studied, yet remain
insufficient. In addition, these efforts are often seen in a
negative light by citizens and, as in Ghana, can have the
reverse effect of bolstering the legitimacy of convicted
criminals, as those who are whisked away to spend time
in US or European prisons have often delivered services,
security, or employment to citizens in the absence of the
state. Responding to crime without responding to the
needs of those who have silently acquiesced is hardly a
smart approach. Better collaboration between specialized
agencies and development bodies, might help identify
surge activity in these types of circumstances to cover the
socio-economic void left by effective law enforcement
efforts. In other situations, unless the proper checks and
balances are put in place, strengthened security services
can lead to an increase in violence, while a strengthened
judiciary or empowered economic or financial crimes unit
can actually lead to enhanced corruptibility and the use
of organized crime-related intelligence for political gain.
Of equal concern to law enforcement efforts is the
manner in which organized crime groups and networks
use technology to facilitate efficient operations, conduct
surveillance of, and gather intelligence on those who
may be intent on exposing their activities, and terrorize
those who threaten their survival. For example, as early
as 1994, a Colombian counter-narcotics cell accidentally
discovered a computer centre manned in shifts around
the clock by 4-6 technicians. A front man for Cali cocaine
cartel leader Santacruz Londoño owned the building.
The facility boasted a $1.5 million IBM AS400 mainframe,
the kind once used by banks. It was networked with half
a dozen terminals and monitors. The computer allegedly
held a database of residential and office phone numbers
of US diplomats and agents (both known and suspected
US law enforcement, intelligence, and military operatives)
based in Colombia. In addition, the phone company was
supplying the cartel with complete records of all telephone
calls in the form of the originating and destination
phone numbers. The cartel’s intelligence arm then used
custom-designed software to cross-reference the phone
company records against their own list of suspected law
enforcement, military, and intelligence officials or agents
to produce a list of potential informants. Law enforcement
officials never revealed the fate of the informants in
the Santacruz computer. It is believed they were either
tortured to reveal information or killed outright. 35
More recently in Mexico, the Zeta organized crime
cartel was discovered to have established an extensive
shadow communications network to “conduct encrypted
conversations” outside the official cell phone network,
which is relatively easy for authorities to monitor, and in
many cases does not reach far outside urban centres. 36
According to news coverage, the radio network, established
with legally available material, stretched from the Texas
border through the Gulf region and down into Guatemala.
The person behind the network was Jose Luis del Toro
Estrada – a.k.a. El Tecnico – who was arrested by the DEA in
2008 in Houston, Texas, and later sentenced for conspiracy
to distribute cocaine. According to his plea agreement,
del Toro acknowledged that he had been responsible for
establishing the system in most of Mexico’s 31 states and
parts of northern Guatemala “under the orders of the top
leaders in the Gulf cartel and the Zetas.” 37 Cartel bosses in
35. Paul Kaihla, The Technology Secrets of Cocaine Inc., Business 2.0, July 2002
36. AGORA, La Marina arresta a fundador de Los Zetas ‘Lucky’ y desconecta las comunicaciones del
cartel
37. FoxNews (Latino), Dec. 2011, Drug Cartels in Mexico Have a Clandestine National radio Network
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Responding to the Impact of Organized Crime on Developing Countries
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